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Market design is the development of mechanisms that improve market 
efficiency and build on an understanding of the interaction between human behavior 
and market rules. The first chapter considers the sale of a charitable membership 
where the charity poses the market design question of how to price these 
memberships to capture the maximum value from donors’ altruism.  Using an online 
natural field experiment with over 700,000 subjects, this chapter tests theory on price 
discounts and shows large differences in donation behavior between donors who have 
previously given money and/or volunteered. For example, framing the charity’s 
membership price as a discount increases response rates and decreases conditional 
contributions from former volunteers, but not from past money donors. This chapter 
  
thereby demonstrates the importance of conditioning fundraising strategies on the 
specifics of past donation dimensions. 
The second chapter examines an auction used to solve the assignment and 
price determination problems where price depends on the propensity to own or farm 
the land, a non-market good.  This chapter studies bidder behavior in a reverse 
auction where landowners compete to sell and retire the right to develop their 
farmland.  A reduced form bidding model is used to estimate the role of bidder 
competition, winner’s curse correction, and the underlying distribution of private 
values.  The chapter concludes that the auction enrolled as much as 3,000 acres (12 
percent) more than a take-it-or-leave-it offer (i.e., non-auction program) would have 
enrolled for the same budgetary cost.    
Finally, the third chapter considers the online advertising word auction.  The 
pricing determination and assignment problem must occur for over 2,000 consumer 
searches each second.  Theory is developed where asymmetric advertisers compete 
and an advertiser-optimal equilibrium bidding strategy is presented that is robust to 
this asymmetry.  Within this rich strategy space, it is shown that advertiser 
subsidization can be revenue increasing for the search engine.  Using a novel dataset 
of more than 4,500 keyword bids by three firms on four search engines, a simulation 
of the auction environment illustrates that bidder subsidization is indeed revenue 
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Ask most undergraduate economic majors what a “market” is and they would 
respond: “a place where scarce goods and services are priced and sold.”  Expand your 
questioning to other economists, and you will hear more nuanced answers that relate 
market participant behavioral assumptions to the current market systems and their 
combined ability to achieve desired market outcomes.  For example, Adam Smith, 
assuming a competitive market with many consumers, would describe how an 
invisible hand leads the market to socially efficient outcomes despite the 
economically selfish behavior of market participants.1
                                                 
1 For purposes of this dissertation, efficient outcomes are defined with respect to assignment and price.  
The efficient assignment is one where the market participants with the highest values can buy the 
goods (or those with the lowest values sell the goods).  The efficient price is that price that clears the 
market, i.e., the price that produces zero excess supply or demand. 
  Frederich Hayek, leader of the 
Austrian School, would probably make the point that markets price goods and 
services valued by society and efficiently ignore goods and services not valued by 
society.  In response, Herman Daly might respond with behavioral economic results 
to show that socially valuable goods and services can be ignored when market 
participants are myopic and financial markets are incomplete with respect to future 
generations.  Then there are many economists who would argue about the role of 
government interference and market rules for ensuring efficient outcomes.  And the 
discussion could go on and on – each offering a slightly different take on how 
markets achieve desired outcomes based on some assumed behavior of market 




undergraduate.  But many economists would argue about how well markets work 
today given the range of consumer attitudes and markets in operation.   
Enter the market designer.  Market design is the development of mechanisms 
that improve market efficiency by building on an understanding of the interaction 
between human behavior and market rules.  In many markets, market design might be 
limited to determination of the price or the unit for sale.  For example, in a 
competitive market such as food prices at a grocery store, the market design question 
may involve how to optimally bundle products or incorporate discounts to encourage 
consumers to purchase new products.  Alternatively, in the design of a highway 
congestion market where the government could be considered a monopoly provider 
of highway services, the design questions might include the toll fees, the interval of 
collection, and toll exemptions (e.g., high occupancy lanes) to achieve a socially 
efficient outcome.  These are one class of market design problems. 
A second and significantly more complicated class of market design problems 
involves situations where neither the buyer nor seller is a price taker, and the market 
is responsible for determining the socially efficient price and assignment of goods and 
services to market participants.  In these cases, the market designer establishes rules 
for operation of the market such that the naturally occurring market forces, or 
invisible hand, can arrive at an optimal assignment and price.  This area of economic 
research has recently started to receive significant attention (Roth 2002; Horowitz and 
Gayer, 2007; Cramton 2008; Ausubel et al., 2009).  The fundamental question 
throughout this line of research is how different market rules influence participant 




The two standard paradigms for solving the efficient assignment and pricing 
problem in economics are the matching market and the auction.  Typically, matching 
markets are used in situations where price is difficult to determine or deemed by 
society to be repugnant to determine.  Typical matching markets involve the matching 
of medical interns to residency programs or prospective undergraduate students to 
colleges or children to elementary schools or college students to dormitory rooms 
(Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Roth and Peranson, 1999; Roth 2007; Ausubel and 
Morrill, 2008).  In all cases, there are multiple differentiated goods with participants 
who are able to express an ordinal preference ranking over those goods.  Determining 
a cardinal (e.g., price) ranking may be awkward and, more importantly, not binding.2  
For example, even if parents could determine how much they would pay to have their 
daughter attend public school X, these parents would never be charged to attend the 
public school.  Thus, ordinal rankings are all that is necessary for the operation of 
these matching markets.3
Alternatively, auction markets are used when market participants are 
accustomed to describing their demand or supply in terms of price.  The canonical 
example of a one-sided auction market is the estate sale where an auctioneer accepts 
bids for estate assets.  When neither side of the market is a price taker, these markets 
are modeled as a two sided auction where buyers and sellers simultaneously submit 
their demand and supply schedules.  A good example of a two sided auction is the 
determination of the opening morning price for any of the thousands of stocks bought 
and sold on the NYSE or NASDAQ.  Each morning before the opening of the market, 
  
                                                 
2 Non-binding cardinal ranks might result in participants misrepresenting their cardinal values. 
3 Matching markets are robust to cardinal ordering of preferences or where prices are involved.  See 




the NYSE or NASDAQ market managers accept sell and buy prices from multiple 
bidders for all stocks.  And the opening price is the equilibrium price necessary to 
clear the market (i.e., eliminate excess demand/supply).  These two specific auction 
examples are fairly straightforward and are widely believed to achieve socially 
efficient outcomes with fairly simple market rules.   
 There are many situations, however, where market efficiency is threatened by 
complications in the market layout or participant attributes.  Several examples of 
complications that may result in market failures include: 
• Asymmetric Information.  There are times when one party in a market has 
significantly more information about a good being auctioned than other 
parties.  The achievement of efficient outcomes depends on equal access to 
information by all market participants.  However, if one party misrepresents 
their knowledge such that they can manipulate the assignment or price, the 
outcome may be sub-optimal. 
• Asymmetric Demand.  At times, market participants will have different 
demand schedules that are not substitutable with a competitor’s demand 
schedule or that involve complementarities.4
                                                 
4 For a good summary of auctions that incorporate this type of complementary demand, see Cramton et 
al., 2006. 
  For example, in a 
telecommunication spectrum auction, some participants desire licenses across 
the entire United States; whereas, others only need licenses in a particular 
metro or regional area.  Similarly, in an auction for airport landing slots, some 
airlines only want slots during peak times with other airlines needing a large 




• Market Power.  In highly concentrated markets there may be insufficient 
competition to determine an efficient market price or assignment.  For 
example, a single very large buyer may misrepresent their demand to win the 
goods at a very low price.  Or the large player may use pressure to force the 
smaller players into tacit or outright collusion, resulting in an inefficient price 
and assignment.  
• Externalities.  The market may fail to price either positive or negative 
externalities associated with a given product.  For example, the price for 
electricity did not originally include the price associated with carbon 
emissions during the production of electricity.  This market failure could have 
resulted from ignorance about the negative environmental repercussions of 
carbon emission or the myopia of market participants with respect to the 
impact of global warming on future generations.    
 
There are many other situations where poorly designed markets might result 
in sub-optimal outcomes.  Instead of describing all the situations where markets fail, 
it is easier to point to seven attributes that a well-running market should possess.  
These are adapted from Cramton (2007b).   
1. Efficient price formation. The market should produce reliable and stable price signals 
based on market fundamentals.  
2. Transparency. The market should be highly transparent. It should be clear how the 
pricing and assignment is done, and why one offer to buy is accepted and another 





3. Neutrality. All participants (large or small) should be treated equally.  
4. Risk management. The market should minimize risks for market participants, yet be 
responsive to long-run market fundamentals. The market should shield participants 
from short-term transient events and address counterparty risk. 
5. Liquidity. The market should promote a secondary market, such that goods or 
services traded in the market are liquid for owners. 
6. Simplicity. The market should be simple for participants, for the market operator, and 
for the regulator. 
7. Consistency. The market should be consistent with, or improve upon, best-practices 
in other relevant markets.  This might mean that the units being traded in the market 
are standard or easily interchangeable with other markets and that strategies can be 
implemented that incorporate multiple markets.   
 
With this background, I turn to the three empirical market design examples 
considered in this dissertation.  In each of the three markets, the market manager had a 
particular objective in mind that required innovative market design elements to influence 
buyer/seller behavior.  Each chapter evaluates how the market designer changes behavior and 
the implications of this changed behavior on market efficiency.  The first example conforms 
to the case above where the firm is free to set the price but wants to do so in such a way as to 
effect a particular type of consumer behavior.  In the second two examples, the market 
operators do not know the optimal price or allocation of goods and thus must use an auction 
to solve the price determination and assignment problem.  In both of these auctions, the 
established market rules are important for achieving the optimal outcome. 
 The first chapter explores the funding of a public good within the context of 
charitable fundraising.  The specific market considered is the sale of a charitable membership 




that they can capture the maximum value from donors’ altruism.  Typically, charities assume 
that altruism with respect to a charity increases with the quality of the charity.  However, 
communicating charitable quality to the public is difficult and is thus primarily accomplished 
through the minimum membership level established by the charity.  This chapter contains all 
of the interesting components of a market design problem: the established price conveys 
information about quality and, as a result, drives consumer behavior in the market.  The 
chapter disentangles price and quality using price discounts from a standard level to fund the 
public good. 
 Specifically, co-author Professor Andreas Lange and I tested three donation requests 
across 720,890 potential donors: a request to become a member of the organization when the 
minimum membership level is $35, $25, and $25 represented as a special $10 discount from 
the standard $35 level.  We concluded that the use of a discount provides potential donors 
with both a higher quality signal (the undiscounted level) and a lower price and this generates 
the most donations from the most donors.  Our analysis of the market design implications of 
this mechanism goes further.  The fundraising literature commonly assumes that potential 
donors differ along various dimensions, specifically their donation history, demographics, or 
affinity toward the organization.  However, all of the literature to date analyzes fundraising 
mechanisms as if all potential donors interact similarly with the mechanism in question, i.e., 
use of a discount.  In this analysis, we identify two distinct types of donors – those who have 
donated time in the past and those who have only donated money in the past.  We find that 
these two pools of donors interact differently with the discount mechanism.  For example, 
framing the charity’s membership price as a discount increases response rates and decreases 
conditional contributions from former volunteers, but not from past money donors. This 
chapter thus demonstrates the importance of conditioning fundraising strategies on the 




 The second chapter, co-authored with Professor John Horowitz and Professor Lori 
Lynch, moves to a market design question where assignment and price determination 
problems are best answered using an auction.  This chapter explores the market design 
elements associated with pricing a non-market good, similar to altruism discussed in the first 
chapter.  Here, though, the state of Maryland is interested in quantifying the propensity to 
own or farm land for each landowner or farmer.  The market design question is how to design 
an auction where the state purchases landowner’s development rights for the least cost.  
Development rights vary across landowners based on the fundamentals of the quality of the 
land, the proximity to development, and, most important, on each landowner’s individual 
propensity to own (or farm) their land.  The market design solution uses a reverse auction 
where landowners compete to sell their development rights to the state using a normalized 
price that allows the state to select those landowners willing to take the largest discount from 
the base price.   
In this auction, run by the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation 
(MALPF), the base price is unknown at the time of bidding and determined by an appraisal 
based only the fundamentals of land quality.  Those land owners willing to accept the largest 
percent reduction from the base price will win the auction and receive payment in exchange 
for their property’s development rights.  We collected a unique dataset from 22 auction 
rounds with over 300 unique parcels to analyze the auction results.  To model the bidding 
behavior in this common value auction, we develop a reduced-form model that incorporates 
the potential for differing private signals about the true development rights value.  We also, 
however, allow bidders to differ in their affinity for farming and thus their willingness to 
accept a reduction on the sale of the development rights of their land.  Our model 
disentangles these two factors and demonstrates that by capitalizing on different affinities for 
farming between landowners, the MALPF market performs better than competing land 




Finally, in the third chapter, I – working alone this time – consider a market that is 
significantly more complex than the two analyzed in the previous chapters: the online-
advertising word auction.  In this market, advertisers bid for position in a list of advertisers 
that appears following any consumer search on a search engine.5
 This chapter of the dissertation involves the evaluation of a number of market design 
solutions to address this problem.  First, I evaluate the robustness of the current market to the 
presence of asymmetric advertisers – those advertisers who want to sell something, brand 
themselves, or generate more visitors – and their differing advertising objectives.  Traffic 
bidders rank the top position as their best choice, branding bidders rank the bottom as the best 
choice, and transaction bidders may rank any position in between as their best choice.  I 
conclude that an equilibrium bidding strategy exists that is optimal for the advertisers and is 
socially efficient.   
  The pricing determination 
and assignment problem must occur in real time for over 61 billion keyword searches 
annually or approximately 2,000 searches each second.  This large volume of transactions 
requires a set of market rules that transparently assigns advertisers to positions and quickly 
determines a price that these advertisers should pay to remain in that position.  The auction 
must be easy to understand by advertisers and, if designed well, should have a socially 
efficient equilibrium. 
 Within this rich bidding environment, I then evaluate an innovative program whereby 
certain advertisers are subsidized to participate in the keyword auctions.  I theoretically show 
that it is least costly for search engines to subsidize transaction bidders who preferentially bid 
on high quality words and may optimally appear in the middle of the list of advertisers.  I 
prove that in some cases this subsidization strategy will increase search engine revenue.  
                                                 
5 As described in detail in the chapter, when a consumer performs a search for any keyword or 
combination of keywords on a search engine (e.g., Google, Microsoft Bing, Yahoo!, Ask), they are 
taken to a page that displays organic results and paid advertiser results.  This chapter describes the 




Finally, using a novel dataset of more than 4,500 keyword bids over two years by three firms 
on four different search engines, I simulate the auction environment to show that capping the 
bids of these subsidized bidders can also improve the likelihood of increasing search engine 
revenue. 
 Common to all three chapters described above is the use of market rules to influence 
participant behavior and ultimately market outcomes.  The intent of this dissertation is to 
demonstrate both the breadth of markets where market designers can play a role and the 
efficiency benefits achievable when market designers are involved.     
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Chapter 1: Charitable Memberships, Volunteering, and 
Discounts: Evidence from a Large-Scale Online Field 
Experiment 6
By:  Andreas Lange and Andrew Stocking 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
The year 2007 marked the first time that more than $300 billion were donated 
to charity with individual donations accounting for more than 80% of this total 
(Giving USA, 2008).  To solicit these donations, charities are aggressively turning to 
the internet due to its low marginal cost of use and rapid implementation time7 (COP, 
2008). However, there remains significant uncertainty within the fundraising 
community as to which rules from offline fundraising translate online and how to 
incorporate new features enabled by the internet into the charity’s optimal fundraising 
strategy.  Recent empirical publications on the determinants of giving have studied 
mail, phone, and door-to-door solicitation.8  There are almost no studies, however, 
that consider the internet as a means of solicitation.9
                                                 
6 We are grateful to Mike Price and John List for valuable comments on the paper.  The authors would 
also like to thank M+R Strategic Services for their help and suggestions in implementing the field 
experiment. 
  For economists, the internet 
provides a unique opportunity to actively contribute to a rapidly growing industry 
using field experiments that can be easily, inexpensively, and identically implemented 
7  Notably, Barack Obama raised roughly $450 million dollars during his 2008 Presidential campaign 
with a large fraction of that coming online.  In January 2008, the Obama campaign raised $32 million 
total with $28 million coming from online sources. 
8  For example, Falk (2007) uses postal mailings, Shang and Croson (2006) use phone solicitation, 
while Landry et al. (2006) employ a door-to-door strategy.  
9 Chen et al. (2006) is a notable exception. They conduct an online experiment soliciting visitors to a 
charity’s website using a pop-up. This experiment yielded 24 donors who contributed a total of $1,128. 





across large populations.  As such, in this paper we conduct a natural field experiment 
with a sample of over 700,000 subjects, including donors and volunteers, to better 
understand the role of discounts and memberships in charitable fundraising.  
Fundraisers generally believe that an individual who has donated money in the 
past, regardless the amount, is much more likely to donate money in the future.  This 
effect, commonly called the “warm list” effect, has been recently discussed in the 
empirical literature with respect to offline donations (Landry et al., 2009).  There is 
much less known, however, about anticipated money donations from those who have 
volunteered in the past, i.e., donated time.  One unique feature of the internet is the 
ease with which charities can solicit and use individual time donations to accomplish 
their legislative, policy or other communication objectives.  While it might be 
expected that past volunteers are also more likely to donate money in the future, to 
the best of the authors’ knowledge, this topic is unstudied in the empirical or 
experimental economics literature. 
Understanding how donation dimension affects the propensity to give, 
charities can optimize their solicitation appeals by targeting different donor types 
with specific mechanisms. We therefore define an “augmented warm list” which 
includes both the magnitude and the dimension of past donations.  We demonstrate its 
beneficial use for targeted fundraising using the example of different pricing schemes 
for membership offers. In particular, we study the role of price discounts.  
The analysis of linking donations with charitable memberships represents a 
unique contribution to the economic literature and complements a rich literature that 




1984).  Andreoni (1989, 1990) introduced a model of impure altruism to the public 
goods model where donors receive some extra utility (i.e., warm glow) from their 
donations.  Building on this, the recent economic literature considers a variety of 
specific private incentives to motivate contributions to public goods.10  For example, 
gifts may lead to increased donations if they trigger reciprocity from the potential 
donors, or if their receipt is conditioned on donations exceeding a certain threshold, 
gifts may induce agents to contribute in order to obtain (or buy) the offered good.  
The ideal gift or conditional good would be one that  (i) has no or low costs to the 
charity,11
The use of price discounts has been well-studied in the marketing literature 
with respect to for-profit applications (e.g., Thaler 1985; Blattberg and Neslin 1989; 
Folkes and Wheat 1995, Gupta and Cooper 1992, Crewal et al. 1998).  Discounts are 
observed to work via different mechanisms: (i) announcing the undiscounted higher 
price may serve as a quality signal and thus may enhance demand;
 (ii) is difficult to obtain without making a contribution to the charity; (iii) 
has a high consumption value for the agent such that, if charged, agents are willing to 
pay a high price, (iv) triggers a large increase in warm-glow or reciprocity.  
Charitable membership and its associated benefits, potentially meet all of these 
criteria.   
12
                                                 
10 Morgan (2000), Morgan and Sefton (2000), Landry et al. (2006), Lange et al. (2007) show the 
potential welfare-enhancing effects from introducing fixed-price lotteries to charitable fundraising. 
Falk (2007) and Landry et al. (2008) consider the role of gifts in triggering increased donations.   
 (ii) offering the 
11 This includes opportunity costs: even if goods are donated to the charity, the nonprofit might have 
alternative ways to sell the good and thereby to generate income to the charity. In order to be beneficial 
to the charity, the good must induce increases in giving in excess of those opportunity costs. 
Vesterlund (2003) discusses an additional mechanism by which this may occur: seed money or goods 
and prices which are donated to the charity may serve as a signal to subsequent donors about the 
quality of the charity. 




discounts may create some perception of savings; (iii) lowering the price may 
increase demand due to a downward sloping demand curve. The first two 
mechanisms are primarily short run in nature because consumers are expected to 
update their beliefs and reference-points.13
Returning to our initial premise, we combine these two mechanisms to 
determine the effect of offering the charitable membership with and without a price 
discount on 1) response rate (i.e., growth of the warm list) and 2) profitability (i.e., 
total dollars raised).  We do this by making identical membership offers to two 
treatment groups except that one group must make a donation of at least $35 to 
receive the membership and the second need only make a donation of at least $25 
which was said to represent “a special $10 discount” from the standard membership 
level.  The literature suggests that there may be price effects related to the private 
benefits from donations.  Harbaugh (1998) shows the potential benefits from selling 
reputation signals at different price points and Landry et al. (2009) consider gifts that 
are only given if donations exceed a minimum donation threshold.  To disentangle the 
effect of the discount from possible unrelated price effects, we include a third 
treatment group that is offered an identical membership for a minimum donation of 
  The authors were unable to identify, 
however, any peer-reviewed literature that connects discounts with charitable giving 
or charitable memberships despite the increased use of these two mechanisms by 
charities. 
                                                 
13 That is, in the short run unexpected price discounts may provide demand boosts due to reference-
dependent preferences (e.g., Heidhus and Köszegi 2008), while in the long-run these effects might be 
smaller as the quality signal may be diluted by continuous price discounts (Folkes and Wheat 1995, 




$25 without the mention of the special discount.  We also develop a theoretical model 
in Section II that allows us to derive hypotheses as to the results. 
Our online field experiment was conducted on an unprecedented scale and 
raised a total of $77,026 from 1,691 donors.  Framing a $25 threshold price to 
become a member as a special discount from a standard $35 level induces a 
significantly larger proportion of people to donate and become members without 
reducing the total dollars raised.  Thus the discount increased the size of the charity’s 
warm list without compromising profitability.  Without the discount framing, we find 
that $25 and $35 minimum donation levels for a membership induce a similar 
proportion of people to donate; however, the overall donation amount was 17% less 
with the lower membership threshold.  Interestingly, this price effect suggests that a 
charity could therefore exploit the relatively inelastic demand for membership by 
requiring a larger minimum contribution to receive membership benefits.  These 
results conform to our theory. 
This is not, however, the entire story.  We believe that our study is the first to 
explicitly consider the interaction between fundraising mechanism and mode of 
previous contributions to the charity. Volunteering or the donation of time accounts 
for roughly 55% of total giving in the United States (Salamon et al. 2007) to combine 
with financial contributions to represent 5.1% of US GDP.  Using a complete history 
of the treatment pool’s online contributions of time and money to the charity, we 
analyze the heterogeneity of response with respect to the above treatments.  We show 
that previous time and money donors respond to the discount treatment quite 




undiscounted $35 minimum membership threshold; whereas, past time donors 
contribute at a conditional level consistent with the undiscounted $25 minimum 
membership threshold.  Those who have only given money in the past donate at an 
unconditional level that is higher than the undiscounted $35 threshold; those who 
have given both money and time donate at an unconditional level equal to the $25 
threshold.  These differences within the discount treatment do not appear when 
presented with the $25 minimum threshold without the discount.  This demonstrates 
differences in the perception of charitable discounts by past time or money donors.  
Furthermore, it demonstrates the importance of studying the effectiveness of charity 
fundraising mechanisms along different modes of giving.  
The remainder of our study proceeds as follows.  The next section provides 
the theoretical framework, which illustrates behavioral motivations for giving. 
Section III introduces our field experimental design.  Section IV describes our 
findings and we conclude in Section V. 
 
II. Theoretical Model 
We provide a simple model to illustrate the most important determinants of 
giving behavior. We use a variant of Andreoni’s (1989, 1990) impure altruism model 
and include consumption utility from a private good which in this case is the 
membership in the organization.  
Agent i∈Ω  receives utility from consuming a numeraire good, iy , a private 




(possibly) some extra utility (warm-glow) ( )i if g  from her own contribution to the 
public good ig .  Agents might also perceive the membership as a gift from the 
organization, depending on the way the membership is offered (e.g., with a discount).  
We model the resulting reciprocity component of utility as a function of both the 
contribution level and the perceived consumption value of the membership: 
( , )i i ir g m . Importantly, the extent to which membership offers trigger reciprocal 
actions might depend on the historical interaction between donors and organization as 
will be described below. 
Assuming additive separability of these different utility components, agent i ’s 
utility facing a budget constraint i i iy g w+ ≤  and receiving expected membership 
benefits im  is defined as:  
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )i i i i i i i i i i i i i iU g m w g m h g G f g r g m−= − + + + + +  (1) 
where ( )•ih  and ( )•if  are twice continuously differentiable, non-decreasing and 
concave, and 2 2/ 0ir g∂ ∂ ≤ , 
2 / 0ir g m∂ ∂ ∂ ≥ , and i jj iG g− ≠= ∑ . The optimal solution 
to maximizing (1) for a given im  is denoted by ˆ ( )i ig m .  The assumptions ensure that 
ˆ ( ) / 0i i ig m m∂ ∂ ≥ .  
We assume that the membership is awarded if contributions exceed a 
threshold T . Taking this threshold into account, the agent’s optimal contribution 
level is denoted by * ( , )i ig m T . This optimal contribution may fall into three regions: 
(I) the threshold is not binding and the agent chooses to contribute at a higher level 




the threshold, (III) the agent is not willing to contribute at the threshold level and 
therefore does not receive membership benefits.  The agent’s willingness-to-pay for 
the membership is then given by: 
{ }ˆ( ) max | ( , ) ( (0),0)i ii i i i i iWTP m g U g m U g= ≥  (2) 
Note that ˆ( ) ( )i i i iWTP m g m≥ . We can now formally state the optimal donation 
when offering a membership of quality im  at a threshold of T : 
 *
ˆ ˆ( ) if ( )
ˆ( , ) if ( ) ( )
ˆ (0) if ( )
i i i i
i i i i i i
i i
g m T g m
g m T T g m T WTP m





We illustrate the effect of the threshold level T  on contributions * ( , )i ig m T  in 
Figure 1 for a representative individual.  If the threshold level is below the 
contribution level ˆ ( )i ig m , a marginal increase in T  naturally has no effect (Region 
I). In Region II, the threshold exceeds the unconditional contribution level, but falls 
short of the willingness-to-pay such that the agent decides to contribute exactly the 
minimum donation level.  If T  exceeds the willingness-to-pay (Region III), 
contributions fall to the voluntary contribution level without being a member ( ˆ (0)ig ) 
which may be zero.  
For a given perceived membership value im , we would therefore expect the 
number of donors (i.e., response rate) to be downward sloping in the required 
minimum donation level (price effect).  The impact of this price effect on average 




than the threshold T  may still contribute (if ˆ (0) 0>ig ), but at a lower level; (ii) other 
subjects whose WTP still is larger than the required threshold increase their 
contributions in order to obtain the membership.  
In addition to this price effect, the threshold price for membership may serve 
as a quality signal.  This link between prices and perceived product quality has been 
established in several economic studies (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Bagwell 
and Riordan 1991; Gerstner 1985).  We therefore assume that the expected value of 
membership benefits to the individual will depend on the announcement of the 
threshold (T ):  ( ) 0i im M T= > .14
A higher (expected) quality of membership may increase donations via two 
distinct channels: it may trigger increased donations via the reciprocity term of 
equation (1) as 
 




Furthermore, a higher (expected) quality increases the consumption value  of the 
membership and therefore the willingness-to-pay to consume the product (quality-
consumption effect). 
With our experimental design we attempt to provide insights into the price and 
quality effects. For this we will compare donations at a high threshold level 
( * ( ( ), )high highi ig M T T ) with those at a reduced threshold level (
* ( ( ), )low lowi ig M T T ), as 
                                                 
14 Similarly, treatment relevant information like the announcement of a threshold for the membership 
might influence the perceived quality of the charity and thereby the utility from the public good or 
from the own contributions. To simplify the presentation, we abstain from modeling those effects 
explicitly.  




well as consider a discount treatment where a threshold of lowT  is announced as a 
price discount from highT  ( * ( ( ), )high lowi ig M T T ).  
When comparing individual contributions at a high vs. low threshold level, i.e.  
* ( ( ), )high highi ig M T T   vs.   
* ( ( ), )low lowi ig M T T . 
the quality effect and the price effect interact (see Figure 1).  An increased threshold 
( ( )highi i im M T m′ ≡ > ) increases ˆ ( )i ig m′  and may also increase the willingness-to-pay 
( 2T ′ ).  As a result, the higher threshold generates larger contributions for subjects 
contributing above the threshold (quality-reciprocity effect), or at the threshold (price 
effect or quality-consumption effect). A negative net effect might prevail if the 
threshold highT  exceeds the corresponding willingness-to-pay for membership. (i.e., if 
T  becomes so high that the charity moves into Region III of Figure 1 for a large 
fraction of the potential donors despite the possible shifting of Region III to the right).  
These predictions are summarized in Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1: Due to the interaction of quality and price effect, an increase in the 
minimum donation level (threshold) required for membership has an ambiguous 
effect on the number of donors and conditional contributions.  Conditional on 
contributing above the threshold, conditional contributions increase in the 
minimum donation level  if this minimum level provides a quality signal.  
We now turn to the role of discounts and compare the contribution level 
where the lower threshold ( lowT ) is framed as a discount * ( ( ), )high lowi ig M T T  to the 




in a higher participation rate as more people are acquiring the membership (price 
effect). The effects on conditional contributions are ambiguous as some agents may 
move down along the threshold if a discount is offered (stay within Region II in 
Figure 1)), while others start contributing at the (lower) threshold level (move from 
Region III into Region II). 
A similar effect occurs when a price lowT  is announced as a price discount 
from highT : that is * ( ( ), )high lowi ig M T T  vs. 
* ( ( ), )low lowi ig M T T .  The increased quality 
may induce more people to be willing to pay the minimum contribution level such 
that participation should increase. The effect on individual contributions is predicted 
to be positive, while the conditional contributions are ambiguous as newly entering 
agents may drive down the average.  We therefore can formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Formulating a minimum contribution level for membership as a 
price discount from a standard higher level increases participation compared to the 
higher threshold (due to price effect), but also compared to a lower threshold not 
announced as a discount (due to quality effect). The effect on conditional 
contribution levels is ambiguous.   
Complementary to these main treatment effects which are the focus of the 
current study, we are interested in the heterogeneous treatment affects based on 
certain donor characteristics. We use the remainder of this section to discuss 





Heterogeneity of the donor pool – Money vs. time donors 
While much of the fundraising literature focuses on financial contributions, 
donors are also often requested to contribute time.  In the following, we discuss how 
previous money or time donors may differ in their reaction to a (money) fundraising 
attempt.   
Subjects who make money or time contributions in the past should be more 
likely to give than non-donors as their valuation of the public good ( '( )ih • ) and/or 
their warm glow from giving is larger ( '( )if • ). This effect is well-known in the 
fundraising literature as a reason to value warm-lists.16
ˆ ( ) > highi ig m T
  Subjects who previously 
donated money might also be anchored by their previous donation such that their 
reaction to price changes is less elastic. For example, a donor who always contributed 
$40 in response to donation requests might not change her contributions if 
membership benefits are given at $25 or $35; whereas, a donor who has never 
donated money in the past is not anchored by their first gift. As such, past money and 
time donors may differ in their reaction to manipulations in the price required for 
membership benefits. In terms of our model, previous money donors may be more 
likely to have .  Similar differences between subjects may occur with 
respect to the price effect when framing a lower threshold as a discount.   
Price discounts might, however, also work through the reciprocity channel. 
That is, the discount might be interpreted as a nice offer from the charity such that an 
                                                 
16 Landry et al. (2009) identify warm-list benefits in a field experimental setting. They show that the 
warm-list value depends on how donors are solicited: warm list value is significant when charities ask 





individual agent might reciprocate gifts by increasing donations. In aggregate, this 
could result in a higher response rate and in larger conditional donations. This type of 
reciprocal gift exchange has been demonstrated in the field (e.g. giving post cards in 
exchange for money donations as in Falk (2007)) as well as in the lab (gift exchange 
game).  
If the interaction between donors and the charity is repeated, however, actions 
by the charity may also be interpreted as a reaction to past donor behavior. That is, a 
price discount could potentially also be seen as a “thank you” by past donors. As 
such, a discount may trigger less reciprocal action among previous donors than non-
donors.  We argue that this “thank you” effect is also more likely to occur for 
previous time donors than for those who previously gave money.  As argued above, 
donations from money donors may react less elastically to price changes. 
Furthermore, giving a money discount as a “thank-you” for a money donation may 
seem illogical to money donors who view the donor/charity relationship as one of 
raising money.  Conversely, past time donors might be expected to interpret the 
discount as an indication of value placed on their time-donations by the charity and 
thus a reasonable “thank-you” for volunteering.  Consequently, price discounts may 
trigger a stronger reciprocity reaction from past money donors and “thank-you” 
reaction from past time donors.  We therefore formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Former time donors are more likely to reduce their conditional 
contributions as a reaction to price discounts than past non-donors and former 




With the establishment of these hypotheses, we now turn to the experiment 
design and results. 
 
III Experimental Design 
Following our theory, we designed a large scale natural field experiment with 
the goal of understanding how discounting a charitable membership affects the 
response rate, the unconditional donation level and the conditional donation level.  
The study was conducted online with 702,890 individuals.  In addition to the 
experimental data, we obtained information on previous time and money donations 
from the individuals to the charitable organization.  
The charitable organization is a large left-leaning advocacy organization that 
fights for civil liberties in the United States.  The organization qualifies as a 501c(4) 
under IRS tax code which means donations to the organization cannot be deducted 
from income for federal tax purposes.  It possesses an online email list with more than 
1 million subscribers.  This list serves as the basis for all of the organization’s online 
fundraising efforts as well as other communications between the charitable 
organization and the individual. 
Our experimental pool consisted of the 702,890 individuals who have not 
been a member of the charitable organization in the past and are thus referred to as 
Prospects by the organization.  Some of these Prospects (10,077) have made financial 
donations in the past to the organization, but these individuals were not considered 




organization’s PAC or 52717
The usual communications between the organization and their email list 
consist of three primary types of activities: 1) fundraising appeals which request 
financial contributions and emanate from the fundraising department; 2) action alerts, 
surveys, and event invitations which request non-financial contributions of time and 
emanate from the policy department; and 3) education or other general notifications 
which are informational in purpose and come from the policy or communications 
department.  Requests for contributions of time to support the lobbying efforts of the 
organization represent a large majority of the communications.  These emails notify 
the list subscribers of some situation that the charitable organization believes is 
important to their constituency and ask the subscribers to take “action.”  Typically 
“action” involves a 10-15 minute process whereby the member visits a page on the 
charitable organization’s website and personalizes a letter for emailing or faxing to 
; or b) too small to be considered a member.  
Membership to the organization in 2008 usually requires a donation of at least $35.  
Donors making gifts below this level are not considered members for fundraising 
purposes.  During typical membership drives, these non-donors and sub-$35 donors 
are requested to become a “member” of the organization by giving a gift of at least 
$35.  The only additional tangible benefit to “membership” for the individual is the 
receipt of a quarterly magazine which is not emphasized during the membership 
process.  The organization mainly promotes the psychic or altruistic benefits of 
membership. 
                                                 
17 A PAC (political action committee) or 527 represent two different legal representations of the 
nonprofit that allow for different activities, mostly related to electioneering, for the nonprofit.  Each 





one or more of their elected officials.  Approximately 268,504 list subscribers had 
donated time in the 12 months prior to the experiment.  
In our experiment, we therefore carefully take the donation history of 
individuals into account and differentiate between time-donors (alternatively referred 
to as activists in the language of the organization) and money-donors. 
Our experiment involved three treatments for which we divided the pool of 
Prospects into three equally-sized groups.  Table 1 describes the demographic 
breakdown of the three groups based on information collected from a subset of the 
sample during previous surveys.18
                                                 
18 While the demographic makeup of the list based on survey participation may be biased due to survey 
selection issues, it can be used to demonstrate the identical nature of the three groups since selection 
into the three groups was done orthogonally to any survey participation variable. 
 Table 2 summarizes the past behavior of the three 
prospect groups.  All characteristics balance across the three treatments.  For 
example, past money donors are evenly divided across the three groups in terms of 
number (1.35%), average conditional donations ($88.30), and number of past 
donations (1.37).  The “Messaging and Time-Donation (Action) Behavior” rows 
describe the communication relationship between the charitable organization and the 
individual.  On average the organizations sends 62 messages per year to list 
subscribers and members make on average 1.6 time donations in the form of actions.  
Finally, the table describes the activist (time donor) breakdown of the three groups.  
Activists are described within the organization as being 1) Super Activist if they 
made more than 4 time donations in the last 12 months; 2) Active if they made 1-3 
time donations in the last 12 months, joined the email list within the past 6 months, or 




not meet either the criteria for Super Activist or Active.  As Table 2 shows, the three 
activist groups are evenly divided across the three treatment groups.  For the 
remainder of this analysis we will combine the Super Activist and Active groups into 
a single group of time donors. 
The experiment consisted of sending three sequential fundraising emails to the 
experimental pool.  Each email consisted of identical language with the exception of 
the treatment language, which appeared in three different places in the email.  If an 
email recipient clicked on any of the links in the email, they were taken to an online 
donation page that reinforced the treatment language.  At this point in the process, the 
individuals decided whether to enter their donation amount, credit card information, 
and submit a donation or abandon the process and not make a financial contribution.  
The general theme of the appeal was to ask Prospects to become a member within the 
next few days to support the organizations general outreach and education work in the 
2008 general election (approximately 90 days in the future).   
The first email was sent on a Sunday (day 1), the second email was sent on the 
following Thursday (day 4), and the third email a week later on the next Thursday 
(day 11).  The first two emails urged members to become a member by day 4 
midnight.  The third email extended the deadline to midnight on day 12.  Prospects 
who donated any positive amount were removed from subsequent mailings.  
Treatment language did not vary across the three messages within each treatment or 
control group.  Results are aggregated across the three messages for the treatment and 
control groups.  




• Control: “Become an [organization] member with a gift of $35 or more.” 
• Treatment 1: “Become an [organization] member with a gift of $25 or more.” 
• Treatment 2: “Become an [organization] member with a gift of $25 or more – 
that's a $10 discount off our normal membership.” 
Given that none of these Prospects had been members before, it is reasonable 
to assume that those who were offered the $25 membership were not aware that the 
price was normally $35.  The donation landing page reinforced this by stating 
“Minimum membership” next to the $35 or $25 donation level for the Control and 
Treatment 1 group, respectively.  In Treatment 2, the phrase “Special $10 Discount 
on Minimum Membership” appeared next to the $25 donation level. 
In all treatments, the webpage included radio buttons from among which 
donors could select when making a donation. The ask strings for the treatments were 
as follows: 
• Control:  $35, $50, $75, $100, $250, $500, Other 
• Treatment 1 and 2: $25, $50, $75, $100, $250, $500, Other 
The “Other” radio button had a text box into which donors could write any number 
they wanted above $10. These ask strings mimic the strings typically used by the 
organization in fundraising.19
                                                 
19 Ideally, we would have liked to offer identical ask strings for all treatments. However, the charity 
did not want to have a $25 ask in the $35 membership treatment (Control), as this was thought to 
confuse potential donors. Donors who wanted to make a contribution less than indicated by the 
minimum radio button, therefore had to choose the “other” option. This option to make a donation less 
than the minimum threshold was used by 3.8% of donors in the control (where the minimum button 
was $35), while 1.1% (1.7%) used this option in Treatment 1 (Treatment 2) where the minimum button 




Finally, all donors in any group who made a gift of $20 or more were given 
the option to receive a branded picture frame. The language for the second sequential 
email stated “If you donate before midnight, we'll send you a magnetic picture frame 
as our gift.”  The language for the other two messages was similar. Donors who did 
not want the frame could check a box at the bottom of the donation page stating: 
“Please don’t send a frame: use my full donation to fight for [cause].” 
 
IV.  Experimental Results 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for our experimental treatments. 
Throughout this section, we discuss four different indicators: 1) “Response Rate” is 
the total number of donors conditional on being solicited (in %); 2) “Dollars given, 
unconditional” are the average dollars of all gifts for all solicited Prospects; 3) 
“Dollars given, conditional on giving” are the average dollars of all contributions 
conditional on giving; 4) “% who said “no frame” is the percent of donors who 
checked the box at the bottom of the donation page to not receive the picture frame.  
For example, Table 3 shows that we contacted 231,183 subjects in the control 
treatment, of which 521 decided to give which corresponds to a response rate of 
0.23%.  Those donors contributed an average of $45.21 and 62.2% (324 donors) 
requested not to receive the picture frame.  In total, our study raised $77,026 from 
1,691 individuals across the three treatments.20
                                                                                                                                           
was $25. Overall, the “Other” box was used 5%, 4.5% and 3.9% in the Control, Treatment 1, and 
Treatment 2, respectively. 
   
20 In the empirical analysis, we exclude one donor in Treatment 1 who made a donation of $10,000.  





Decreasing Minimum Donation Level 
As stated in the introduction, we establish a baseline for the effect on 
membership demand from dropping the membership minimum threshold without 
announcing a discount.  This will allow us later to disentangle the price and quality 
effects in the discount treatment.  Comparing the Control and Treatment 1 in Table 3 
shows that a reduction of the minimum level from $35 to $25 leaves the response rate 
unchanged at 0.23%, while the conditional contributions decrease from $45.21 to 
$36.32.  This immediately leads to the following result: 
Result 1:  A change in the donation threshold for obtaining membership decreases 
average unconditional and conditional contributions, while the participation rate 
remains unaffected. 
Further evidence for this result can be seen in regression 1 from Tables 4, 5, 
and 6.  Table 4 (regression 1) shows that the difference in the participation rate for 
donors in Treatment 1 relative to the Control is statistically insignificant.  However, 
the conditional donation amount was approximately $9 lower (Table 5 regression 1) 
and thus the unconditional contribution amount was statistically significantly lower 
by $0.02/Prospect (Table 6).   
These results provide an empirical answer to the theoretically ambiguous 
effects described in Hypothesis 1: conditional contributions decrease with a decrease 
in the threshold.  A $10 decrease in the threshold produces a $9 drop in the 
                                                                                                                                           
eliminated.  The largest gift after this was a $1000 gift in Treatment 1; 3 $500 gifts in Treatment 2; and 




conditional donation.  Mapped to the theory, this suggests that many donors are 
operating in Region II of their demand curve (as illustrated in Figure 1), i.e. 
contribute at the threshold level.  However, given that the conditional donation 
averages approximately $10 above the threshold, there are also donors in both 
treatment groups donating above this threshold and thus operating in Region I of their 
demand curve.21
These results already suggest an interaction between price and perceived 
quality of the charity.  Changing the donation threshold does not change the response 
rate between the two treatments.  As described by the theory, this could be because (i) 
the willingness-to-pay for membership is greater than either of the thresholds used in 
this study for most of the treatment group; or (ii) lowering the minimum donation 
threshold does not induce more subjects to give because it simultaneously reduces the 
willingness-to-pay.  This later effect would indicate an interaction between price and 
perceived quality (i.e., willingness-to-pay).  A second observation that supports the 
presence of a price-quality interaction as described in Hypothesis 1 is shown by the 
fact that a significantly larger fraction of donations are above the threshold in the 
Control treatment (36.7% above $35) than in Treatment 1 (26.5% above $25).  If 
there were no interaction effect, this relationship should be reversed.  
   
                                                 
21  In the Control (Treatment1, Treatment2), 36.7% (26.5%, 25.4%) of donors give above the 
threshold; the differences between the Control and Treatment 1/Treatment 2 are statistically significant 
at the 0.5% level.  Unconditionally, 0.083% (0.060%, 0.068%) gave above the threshold in the Control 
(Treatment 1, Treatment 2).  The difference between the Control and Treatment 1 (Treatment 2) is 
statistically significant at the 0.5% (10%) level; whereas, the difference between Treatment 1 and 




In terms of the theoretical model, this suggests that – for some subjects – the 
higher threshold resulted in an increase in their utility-maximizing donation amount, 
or * *( ( ), ) ( ( ), )high high low lowi i i ig M T T g M T T> . 
 
Effect of a Special Discount 
With this impact of a price change now characterized, we can consider the 
role of a price discount as implemented in Treatment 2.  A comparison with the 
Control corresponds to the pure price effect of our theory, a comparison with 
Treatment 1 to the quality effect. Table 3 supports Hypothesis 2 by showing that 
under the discount treatment we observed an increased response rate compared to 
both Control and Treatment 1 (0.27% in Treatment 2 vs. 0.23% in Control and 
Treatment 1). The conditional donations in Treatment 2, however, are smaller than in 
the Control treatment ($37.94 vs. $45.21), but almost identical to those in Treatment 
1 ($36.32).  This leads us to formulate the following result on the pure price effect: 
Result 2: Framing a lower membership threshold as a discount from a given standard 
level decreases conditional donations, but increases the participation rate such that 
average unconditional donations are stable. 
Further evidence for Result 2 can be found in the first regression in Tables 4, 
5 and 6. The response rate for Treatment 2 is statistically significantly greater than for 
either the Control or Treatment 1 (1% level of significance).  Specifically, introducing 
the discount causes the response rate to increase by 0.04 percentage points above a 




the charitable membership price by 29% triggered an increase in participation of 
18%. However, the reduction in conditional donations (significant at 1%), leads to an 
insignificant change in average unconditional contributions (Table 6).  
This result is consistent with our theoretical model: the response rate is 
predicted to increase if the utility-maximizing gift for many Prospects at the high 
threshold is zero (i.e., * ( ( ), ) 0high highi ig M T T =  at $35=
highT ), but positive with a $10 
discount (i.e., * ( ( ), ) 0high lowi ig M T T >  at $25
lowT = ).  That is, the result indicates that 
the quality signal in the discount treatment may be determined by $35=highT .   
Comparing the discount Treatment 2 to Treatment 1 (i.e. considering the 
quality effect), we see that the unconditional amount raised per Prospect in Treatment 
2 is statistically larger as more donors give (significant at 5% in Table 4 and 6, 
respectively) while conditional contributions are equivalent between these two 
treatments.  
The results, therefore, suggest that it is beneficial to frame a given minimum 
donation level as a discount from a higher level. Going to the lower minimum level 
without framing it as a discount may decrease conditional donations, but does not 
increase the participation rate.  Alternatively, a price discount appears to increase the 
participation rate while showing no effect on the unconditional donation rate, thus 
making their use beneficial. In the long-term, the relative benefits (Control vs. 
Treatment 2) depend on the future donation behavior of the additionally attracted 





Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
We now explore the potential benefits from using discounts in charitable 
fundraising at a deeper level, that is, if this mechanism has particular benefits for 
specific subsets of prospects.  For this, we differentiate our subject pool by means of 
their previous interaction with the charity; in particular, if they have donated time or 
money in the past.  We denote past time donors as Active/Activists with Inactive 
being those who did not donate time in the past. Past money donors are denoted by 
M-Donor while NoM-Donor describes those who did not donate money in the past.22
Our analysis thus far has not shown a significant change in gross income 
(unconditional contributions) to the charity from using a price discount (Treatment 2 
vs. control).  Splitting the sample based on previous interactions, Table 6, regression 
(4) shows important differences for the treatment effect: while unconditional 
donations do not change for NoM-Donors, they do decrease for donors who gave time 
and money in the past ($0.39 lower), but increase for money donors who were 
inactive ($0.30 higher). 
   
A charity could therefore profit by differentiating its fundraising strategy 
based on knowledge of previous Prospect interactions. That is, while money donors 
who did not give time should be contacted via the discount treatment, the charity 
could lose money by contacting money donors who had given time with the discount 
treatment. 
                                                 
22 As a sensitivity analysis, we also considered using actual past donation amount instead of the binary 




Result 3:  An optimal fundraising strategy differentiates fundraising mechanisms by 
donor types. That is, the charity should exploit information on if and how (money or 
time) subjects have contributed in the past.  
Result 3 establishes the benefits from targeted fundraising.  We now study the 
causes of the differences across donor types in a more detailed way.  For this, we 
again consider the effects on participation (Table 4) and conditional contributions 
(Table 5). We first consider former time donors (activists) regardless their previous 
money donations.  Regression 2 from Tables 4 and 5 show that former time donors 
contribute under the discount treatment at a higher rate (0.035 percentage points 
higher), but with a lower conditional donation amount ($9.77 lower).  This effect is 
primarily driven by those time donors who did not give money in the past 
(Active*NoM-Donor). This can be seen from regression 4 in Tables 4 and 5.  While 
the conditional donation results for activists appear invariant to subdividing them by 
past money donations ($8.04 and $9.78 lower for Active*M-Donor and Active*NoM-
Donor, respectively) only activists who have not donated money exhibit a statistically 
significant increase in response rate for the discount offer (0.039 percentage point 
increase).  As a result, the unconditional donation amount (regression 4 from Table 6) 
for the discount offer is statistically indistinguishable for activists who are not money 
donors and statistically lower ($0.39 lower) for activists who are money donors.   
Different results prevail for subjects who did not donate time in the past 
(Inactive).  These Prospects do not exhibit an elevated participation rate for 
Treatment 2 like their active counterparts.  Also unlike their active counterparts, the 




statistically indistinguishable from the Control (regression 2, Table 5).  This is 
consistent with the discussion above regarding repeated interaction between charity 
and donor.  Whereas activists may consider the discount to be a “thank you” for 
previous action, inactives have done nothing to warrant a “thank you” from the 
charity and thus may view the discount as a gift that should be reciprocated.  As a 
result, inactives donate at a higher conditional contribution level than actives when 
presented with the discount.  This inactive effect with respect to the response rate and 
conditional donation is invariant across both subgroups of inactive past money donors 
and inactives who have not donated in the past.   
Turning to past money donors, we focus on those who have only interacted 
with the charity along the single dimension of money (i.e., no time donations).  
Relative to the Control treatment, we observe an increase in the response rate (0.021 
percentage point) and conditional contribution amount ($12.20 increase) for these 
inactive M-donors in Treatment 2, though neither are statistically significant.  As a 
consequence, inactive M-Donors were the only group to donate unconditionally more 
at a significant level in the discount treatment relative to the control ($0.30/prospect 
more).   
We summarize these results as follows: 
Result 4:  The effect of framing a lower threshold level on participation and donation 





(i) Past time-donors who had not given money before respond to the discount at a 
higher rate and lower conditional gift leaving the unconditional donation level 
unchanged.  
(ii) Time-donors who also gave money in the past react to a discount on membership 
with a marginally lower conditional gift, but no change in response rate relative to 
the control, such that unconditional contributions decrease. 
(iii) Past money-donors who did not give time respond to a discount with positive (but 
insignificant) increases in both participation and conditional contributions such that 
unconditional gift are significantly increased.   
(iv) Prospects who had interacted with the charity along neither a time nor money 
dimension are unaffected by the discount treatment relative to the control. 
Taken together, Result 3 and 4 suggests that a charity can benefit from 
offering the discount treatment to those prospects who have interacted with the 
charity in only one dimension, i.e., past inactive money donors and past active non-
money donors. For the former an immediate increase in contributions results while 
for the latter the benefit potentially is given by an enlarged donor pool.  The charity 
would do no harm to offer the discount to those prospects who had never interacted 
with the charity. 
These differences in behavior are consistent with Hypothesis 3: time-donors 
may see the discount as a “thank you” for previous actions and therefore decrease 




to non-donors. Furthermore, past money-donors react differently to the discount 
which uses the same (monetary) dimension as the initial donation.  
These findings indicate that for the analysis of repeated reciprocal 
relationships it is necessary to comprehensively analyze exchanges in the different 
dimensions of the commodity space (money, time, consumption goods).  It is 
therefore important for charities to keep track of all former interactions with potential 
donors:  the value of “warm-lists” to a charity stems from the potential to discriminate 
future solicitation attempts based on the whole history of interactions. Traditionally, a 
“warm list” is defined as a group of people who have made at least one past 
contribution to the charity, agnostic to the specifics of the past contribution.  Given 
the results described above, we therefore formulate the following definition of an 
“augmented warm list”: 
Definition:  An “augmented warm list” is a list of the contact information for those 
who have agreed to accept communications from the charity along with their 
historical time and/or money contributions to the charity. 
The benefits of an augmented warm list to a nonprofit are clearly delineated in 
the above discussion. Table 7 summarizes these effects for all treatments. From Table 
4, we see that on average past time-donors contribute at a rate that is 2.6 times (0.41 
percentage points above) the contribution rate of inactive donors.  Past money-donors 
contribute at a rate that is 14.5 times (3.05 percentage points above) the contribution 
rate of non-money donors.  The average unconditional donation of past time-donors is 




unconditional donation of past donors was $1.45 greater than that of non-donors.  
Overall, we obtain the following result: 
Result 5:  Subjects on a warm list are more likely to contribute and give – on average 
– larger donations per contact than those not on the warm list.  Past money donors 
are more likely to donate money relative to past time donors.   
The analyses conducted here do not consider any temporal dimension to the 
augmented “warm list”. Intuition suggests that a donor whose last money or time 
donation lies more in the past is not as “warm” as a more current donor.  Exploring 
the lapse rate of a “warm list” is a subject of future research. 
 
Donor Quality 
The previous results provide strong evidence for the value that past donors to 
the charity have for future fundraising drives. For the long-run analysis, it is therefore 
important to see if the marginal donors attracted by the price discount will make 
future contributions at a frequency and magnitude relative to donors attracted in the 
Control treatment. Intuitively, enlarging the donor pool must come at a cost for the 
charity as individual motivations to give must be lower for the marginal donor. 
While a full analysis of donor quality can only be done through the long term 
analysis of donor behavior, we can gain insights into the “cost” and possible 
motivation of a donor based on their acceptance or rejection of the donation-
conditional picture frame.  Table 3 indicates that the fraction of donors who reject the 




59.3% in Treatment 1).  Table 7 further indicates a larger rejection rate among past 
money and time donors in all treatments but one.  We formulate the following result: 
Result 6:  Warm list subjects do not only generate larger revenues to the charity by 
contributing more, but also generate less fundraising costs: the additional gift is the 
more likely to be turned down the more past donations (money/time) a subject has 
made.  The rejection rate of the gift is smaller if membership is framed as a discount. 
For all donors, the rejection rate of the frame averaged 59.1%.  Table 8 
displays the marginal effects from a probit regression on the binary decision to accept 
the picture frame for various groups and treatments.  When the $25 minimum 
membership is framed as a discount, there is a statistically significant increase in the 
frame acceptance rate by 6.0 percentage points relative to the 41% acceptance level 
for the control.  Past activists were 7.1 percentage points more likely to accept the 
frame under the discount treatment relative to the control.  Similarly, those who had 
not donated money in the past were 6.5 percentage points more likely to accept the 
frame under the discount treatment.  Both of these results are statistically significant.  
These results suggest that former time-donors joining the charity under the discount 
treatment might be of lower value to the charity.  In the short run, sending more gifts 
is costly to the charity.  In the long run, their future contributions will be decisive. 
Past money-donors are most beneficial to the charity. Not only do they 
contribute at a higher rate, they are also less likely to accept the additional gift.  
Consistent with intuition, they are high quality donors as their motivation to help the 
charity (e.g., their public good utility or warm-glow) is manifested in the same 




increasing number of donors, the marginal donor has an increasingly lower intrinsic 
motivation to give and needs increasingly greater extrinsic incentives to give.   
 
The Effect of Political Environment 
Having established that fundraising mechanisms work different depending on 
time and money donation history, it is natural to check differences due to political 
environments since time donations are largely linked to actions addressing elected 
officials.  A link between political voting patterns and the effectiveness of fundraising 
mechanisms was suggested by Karlan and List (2007). They find that a matching 
grant treatment was ineffective in Blue states, but quite effective in Red states.23
We therefore finally study the links between donation behavior and voting 
outcomes in the 2008 Presidential Elections. That is, Blue refers to states won by 
Barack Obama, while Red states are those won by John McCain.
  
24
These results indicate that observed differences in reactions to specific 
fundraising mechanisms at the state level could be driven by different compositions 
  The results of this 
analysis are presented in Table 9-11 and show no significant difference in donation 
behavior linked to the political outcome if controlling for the specific donor types. 
That is, the donor types react similarly to the respective treatments in Blue and in Red 
states.  
                                                 
23 They defined Blue and Red states relative to the 2004 Presidential Election outcome. Following 
popular terminology, Blue states are those won by the Democrat (here, John Kerry) and Red states are 
those won by the Republican (George W. Bush).   
24 Our results are invariant to defining Blue and Red according to the 2004 Presidential Election 
outcome.  Similarly our results do not change when we use actual vote percentages for the two 




of donor types at the state level. While donor type characteristics are balanced for our 
study as shown in Table 12, any analysis of fundraising mechanisms with other 
charities might involve a different composition of donor types across states.25
 
 Our 
results call for a careful interpretation of aggregated effects in the literature, in 
particular when relying on smaller samples.  
V.  Conclusion  
We conducted an online natural field experiment with 702,890 subjects 
designed to analyze the charity membership as a fundraising instrument.  Due to the 
low cost and ease of use which allow for a much larger pool of experimental subjects 
than other experimental settings, we thereby propose using online fundraising 
platforms as a new and extremely beneficial way to conduct natural field 
experiments.  
We found that donation behavior is affected by the minimum donation level 
required for membership. Reducing the minimum donation threshold did not lead to 
more subjects donating, but to lower average donations. While such a reduction is 
thereby extremely costly to the charity, we showed that by framing the reduction as a 
special discount the reduction in conditional contributions can be offset by attracting 
more donors.  
These general findings suggest that the use of discounts as a charitable 
organization marketing instrument can be beneficial. Our results are consistent with 
                                                 
25 For example, a charity may do political organizing in particular states to combat ballot measures 




the economic literature relating prices to quality: a charity that requires a larger 
donation to become a member appears to be signaling that it is a higher quality 
charity and thus membership has a higher value to the individual.  In addition, our 
results suggest that there is a range of thresholds such that the charity can increase the 
threshold without reducing the response rate.  Identifying the optimal threshold and 
whether that threshold is specific to a particular charity is beyond the scope of this 
experiment but appears to be warranted given our results. 
This analysis also highlights for the first time the important distinction 
between donor types (financial or volunteer) and their differing reaction to 
fundraising mechanisms.  This suggests that not only is there value in having a warm-
list of previous donors, but also in denoting the nature of past donations as either 
money and/or time donors.  Our results show that charities could benefit from 
differentiating fundraising mechanism across donor types.  The differing effects of 
discounts on past time vs. money donors furthermore indicate that it is important to 
understand fundraising as a multi-dimensional activity.  A full understanding of the 
economics of charities can only be achieved if different modes of giving as well as 
their interaction with fundraising mechanisms are studied. This paper provides a first 
step in this direction. 
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VII. Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 Demographic Comparison of Control and Treatment Groups 





All 702,890 231,183 236,234 235,473
1 Gender (% Female) 60.9% 61.1% 60.9% 60.8%
2 Age 42.7 (14.6) 42.7 (14.6) 42.7 (14.5) 42.8 (14.6)
>25 10.3% 10.4% 10.3% 10.3%
25-35 35.4% 35.5% 35.3% 35.5%
35-50 21.3% 21.3% 21.4% 21.3%
50+ 32.9% 32.8% 32.9% 32.9%
3 Party Affiliation
Democrat 73.5% 73.5% 73.2% 73.8%
Republican 3.6% 3.3% 4.0% 3.4%
Other 22.9% 23.2% 22.8% 22.7%
4 Ethnicity
White 84.7% 84.1% 84.9% 84.9%
African American 2.6% 2.6% 2.4% 2.6%
Hispanic 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.2%
Other 7.7% 8.2% 7.6% 7.2%
5 Relationship Status
Single 37.6% 38.2% 37.0% 37.7%
Married 11.5% 11.3% 11.4% 11.7%
Partnered / Civil Unions 48.2% 47.9% 48.7% 48.1%
Other 2.7% 2.6% 2.9% 2.5%
6 Region
Midwest 21.4% 21.3% 21.5% 21.5%
Northeast 21.4% 21.5% 21.5% 21.2%
South 29.2% 29.1% 29.1% 29.3%
West 28.0% 28.2% 27.9% 28.0%
7 2004 Election (% Living in Blue State) 57.4% 57.6% 57.4% 57.3%
2008 Election (% Living in Blue State) 78.2% 78.3% 78.1% 78.1%  
Note: not all information reported above is available for every prospect.  Specifically 
Gender is available for 54% of file; Age 28.2%; Party Affiliation 1.5%; Ethnicity 1%; 







Table 2 Behavioral Comparison of Control and Treatment Groups 





1 Time on File (yrs) 2.38 (1.73) 2.37 (1.73) 2.38 (1.73) 2.38 (1.73)
Money Donor Behavior
2 % Previous Money Donors 1.35% 1.35% 1.36% 1.34%
3 Average M-Donation, cond on giving 88.3 (248.5) 91.2 (287.5) 85.9 (210.7) 87.8 (242.4)
4 No. of M-Donations, cond on giving 1.37 (0.954) 1.36 (0.873) 1.37 (1.01) 1.37 (0.976)
5 Months Since Last M-Donation, cond on giving 18.8 (17.9) 18.3 (17.5) 18.9 (17.9) 19.2 (18.2)
6 No. of M-Donations, unconditional 0.0184 (0.192) 0.0182 (0.186) 0.0186 (0.197) 0.0183 (0.193)
7 Average M-Donation, unconditional 1.19 (30.6) 1.23 (35.0) 1.16 (26.5) 1.17 (29.8)
Messaging and Time-Donation (Action) Behavior
8 No. of Msgs/yr 62.2 (32.5) 62.2 (32.4) 62.3 (32.7) 62.1 (32.3)
9 No. of Time-Donations (Actions)/yr 1.64 (2.90) 1.64 (2.88) 1.64 (2.92) 1.65 (2.90)
10 No. Msgs/yr, cond on 1+ Action 66.06 (27.1) 66.0 (26.8) 66.1 (27.4) 66.0 (27.1)
11 No. T-Donations/yr, cond on 1+ Action 2.36 (3.22) 2.35 (3.20) 2.36 (3.24) 2.37 (3.22)
12 No. Msgs to M-Donors/yr 81.8 (44.0) 82.0 (45.4) 82.1 (44.0) 81.2 (42.8)
13 No. Actions from M-Donors/yr 2.89 (3.73) 2.85 (3.68) 3.00 (3.84) 2.83 (3.66)
14 Activist (T-Donor) Category
Super Active (4+ time donations/yr) 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Active (1-3 time donations/yr) 34.2% 34.3% 34.3% 34.1%
Inactive (0 time donations/yr) 61.8% 61.7% 61.7% 61.9%  
Note:  Activist Category is available for 100% of prospect file. 
 







Response rate 0.23% 0.23% 0.27%
Dollars given, unconditional 0.10 0.08 0.10
Dollars given, conditional on giving 45.21 36.30 37.94
% who said "no frame" 62.2% 59.3% 56.2%
observations 231,183 236,234 235,473







Table 4 Probit, marginal effects (dependent variable=donated (binary)) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) Add'l Tests
1 T1 (d) 1.616e-05 (1) ≠ (2)***
[1.468e-04]
2 T2 (d) 4.355e-04***
[1.497e-04]
3 T1*Active (d) 7.417e-05 (3) ≠ (4)**
[1.250e-04]
4 T2*Active (d) 3.514e-04***
[1.363e-04]
5 T1*Inactive (d) -2.205e-04 (5) ≠ (6)**
[1.980e-04]
6 T2*Inactive (d) 2.684e-04
[2.176e-04]
7 Active (d) 4.111e-03***
[2.986e-04]
8 T1*M-Donor (d) 6.640e-06 (8) = (9)
[4.146e-04]
9 T2*M-Donor (d) -3.252e-05
[4.103e-04]
10 T1*NoM-Donor (d) 1.313e-05 (10) ≠ (11)***
[1.414e-04]
11 T2*NoM-Donor (d) 4.669e-04***
[1.451e-04]
12 M-Donor (d) 3.049e-02***
[3.329e-03]
13 Active*M-Donor (d) 6.576e-02***
[7.596e-03]
14 Active*NoM-Donor (d) 3.697e-03***
[2.973e-04]
15 Inactive*M-Donor (d) 2.742e-02***
[6.065e-03]
16 T1*Active*M-Donor (d) 2.898e-04 (16) = (17)
[3.934e-04]
17 T2*Active*M-Donor (d) -7.706e-05
[3.256e-04]
18 T1*Inactive*M-Donor (d) -7.868e-04** (18) ≠ (19)**
[3.082e-04]
19 T2*Inactive*M-Donor (d) 2.124e-04
[6.369e-04]
20 T1*Active*NoM-Donor (d) 3.411e-05 (20) ≠ (21)***
[1.191e-04]
21 T2*Active*NoM-Donor (d) 3.899e-04***
[1.350e-04]
22 T1*Inactive*NoM-Donor (d) -8.828e-05 (22) ≠ (23)*
[1.970e-04]
23 T2*Inactive*NoM-Donor (d) 2.520e-04
[2.123e-04]
Baseline Obs Prob 2.40E-03 1.60E-03 2.10E-03 1.40E-03
Observations 702,890 702,890 702,890 702,890
Psuedo R-squared 4.922e-04 5.542e-02 4.272e-02 9.165e-02
Marginal effects; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1





Table 5 OLS (dependent variable=conditional contribution) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) Add'l Tests
1 T1 (d) -8.914*** (1) = (2)
[2.455]
2 T2 (d) -7.271***
[2.361]
3 T1*Active (d) -9.295*** (3) = (4)
[2.716]
4 T2*Active (d) -9.765***
[2.634]
5 T1*Inactive (d) -7.225 (5) ≠ (6)*
[5.719]
6 T2*Inactive (d) 2.759
[5.279]
7 Active (d) 0.985
[4.367]
8 T1*M-Donor (d) -13.01** (8) ≠ (9)*
[5.711]
9 T2*M-Donor (d) -3.312
[5.755]
10 T1*NoM-Donor (d) -7.990*** (10) = (11)
[2.716]
11 T2*NoM-Donor (d) -7.773***
[2.589]
12 M-Donor (d) 5.347
[4.505]
13 Active*M-Donor (d) 6.453
[6.307]
14 Active*NoM-Donor (d) 0.371
[4.853]
15 Inactive*M-Donor (d) 2.571
[9.913]
16 T1*Active*M-Donor (d) -13.90** (16) = (17)
[6.239]
17 T2*Active*M-Donor (d) -8.039
[6.529]
18 T1*Inactive*M-Donor (d) -9.227 (18) = (19)
[14.96]
19 T2*Inactive*M-Donor (d) 12.20
[12.18]
20 T1*Active*NoM-Donor (d) -8.277*** (20) = (21)
[3.017]
21 T2*Active*NoM-Donor (d) -9.783***
[2.883]
22 T1*Inactive*NoM-Donor (d) -6.741 (22) = (23)
[6.224]
23 T2*Inactive*NoM-Donor (d) 0.683
[5.857]
24 Constant 45.21*** 44.42*** 44.23*** 43.93***
[1.748] [3.907] [1.934] [4.347]
Observations 1690 1690 1690 1690
R-squared 0.00767 0.0109 0.00964 0.0111
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1





Table 6 OLS (dependent variable=unconditional contribution amount) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) Add'l Tests
1 T1 (d) -0.0195** (1) ≠ (2)**
[0.00808]
2 T2 (d) 0.000101
[0.00809]
3 T1*Active (d) -0.0367*** (3) ≠ (4)*
[0.0131]
4 T2*Active (d) -0.0124
[0.0131]
5 T1*Inactive (d) -0.00912 (5) ≠ (6)*
[0.0103]
6 T2*Inactive (d) 0.00839
[0.0103]
7 Active (d) 0.182***
[0.0118]
8 T1*M-Donor (d) -0.399*** (8) ≠ (9)***
[0.0694]
9 T2*M-Donor (d) -0.118*
[0.0697]
10 T1*NoM-Donor (d) -0.0145* (10) ≠ (11)**
[0.00812]
11 T2*NoM-Donor (d) 0.00184
[0.00813]
12 M-Donor (d) 1.447***
[0.0498]
13 Active*M-Donor (d) 2.038***
[0.0644]
14 Active*NoM-Donor (d) 0.148***
[0.0119]
15 Inactive*M-Donor (d) 0.714***
[0.0781]
16 T1*Active*M-Donor (d) -0.375*** (16) = (17)
[0.0900]
17 T2*Active*M-Donor (d) -0.392***
[0.0906]
18 T1*Inactive*M-Donor (d) -0.425*** (18) ≠ (19)***
[0.109]
19 T2*Inactive*M-Donor (d) 0.300***
[0.109]
20 T1*Active*NoM-Donor (d) -0.0295** (20) ≠ (21)*
[0.0132]
21 T2*Active*NoM-Donor (d) -0.00377
[0.0132]
22 T1*Inactive*NoM-Donor (d) -0.00547 (22) = (23)
[0.0103]
23 T2*Inactive*NoM-Donor (d) 0.00570
[0.0103]
24 Constant 0.102*** 0.0324*** 0.0824*** 0.0261***
[0.00574] [0.00731] [0.00578] [0.00733]
Observations 702890 702890 702890 702890
R-squared 8.3E-06 8.5E-04 0.00289 0.00403
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1











Cross Section A: Past Time-Donors (Activists)
Response rate 0.47% 0.49% 0.57%
Dollars given, unconditional 0.21 0.18 0.20
Dollars given, conditional on giving 45.41 36.11 35.64
% who said "no frame" 62.8% 59.8% 55.8%
observations 88,444 90,595 89,614
donors 417 445 507
Cross Section B: No past time donation (Inactives)
Response rate 0.07% 0.06% 0.09%
Dollars given, unconditional 0.03 0.02 0.04
Dollars given, conditional on giving 44.42 37.20 47.18
% who said "no frame" 59.6% 57.1% 57.9%
observations 142,739 145,639 145,859
donors 104 91 126
Cross Section C: Past Money-Donors
Response rate 3.08% 3.09% 3.05%
Dollars given, unconditional 1.53 1.13 1.41
Dollars given, conditional on giving 49.57 36.57 46.26
% who said "no frame" 65.6% 65.7% 63.5%
observations 3,112 3,202 3,147
donors 96 99 96
Cross Section D: Not Past Money-Donors
Response rate 0.19% 0.19% 0.23%
Dollars given, unconditional 0.08 0.07 0.08
Dollars given, conditional on giving 44.23 36.24 36.45
% who said "no frame" 61.4% 57.9% 54.9%
observations 228,071 233,032 232,326





Table 8 Probit, mfx (dependent variable=accept conditional gift (picture frame)) 
(1) (2) (3) Add'l Tests
1 T1 (d) 2.900e-02 (1) = (2)
[3.054e-02]
2 T2 (d) 5.979e-02**
[2.931e-02]
3 T1*Active (d) 3.113e-02 (3) = (4)
[3.396e-02]
4 T2*Active (d) 7.077e-02**
[3.295e-02]
5 T1*Inactive (d) 2.478e-02 (5) = (6)
[7.128e-02]




8 T1*M-Donor (d) -3.334e-04 (8) = (9)
[7.183e-02]
9 T2*M-Donor (d) 2.188e-02
[7.285e-02]
10 T1*NoDonor (d) 3.546e-02 (10) = (11)
[3.383e-02]
11 T2*NoDonor (d) 6.487e-02**
[3.222e-02]
12 PastM-Donor (d) -4.317e-02
[5.538e-02]
Baseline Obs Prob 4.09E-01 4.09E-01 4.09E-01
Observations 1690 1690 1690
Pseudo R-squared 1.841e-03 2.175e-03 4.083e-03
Marginal effects; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1






Table 9 Probit, marginal effects (dependent variable=donated (binary)) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Active M-Donor Active*NoM-Donor InActive*M-Donor InActive*NonM-Donor
T1 (d) 7.193e-03 -7.528e-05 -8.529e-03* -4.323e-05
[7.549e-03] [3.891e-04] [4.686e-03] [1.469e-04]
T2 (d) -1.138e-03 1.007e-03** 1.509e-03 1.394e-04
[7.436e-03] [4.002e-04] [4.840e-03] [1.503e-04]
C*Red (d) 4.808e-04 -8.837e-04* -2.738e-04 1.079e-04
[1.196e-02] [5.303e-04] [7.544e-03] [2.428e-04]
T1*Red (d) -8.655e-03 -1.339e-04 3.638e-03 2.807e-05
[9.927e-03] [5.698e-04] [1.039e-02] [2.350e-04]
T2*Red (d) -1.695e-03 -6.231e-04 -4.315e-04 1.198e-04
[1.176e-02] [4.960e-04] [7.452e-03] [2.243e-04]
Baseline Obs Prob 4.22E-02 4.58E-03 1.35E-02 7.89E-04
Observations 5595 240655 3826 290946
R-squared 9.479e-04 1.120e-03 8.906e-03 8.458e-04
Test T1=T2 T1 = T2 T1 ≠ T2*** T1 ≠ T2** T1 = T2
Marginal effects; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Table 10 OLS (dependent variable=conditional contribution amount) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Active M-Donor Active*NoM-Donor InActive*M-Donor InActive*NonM-Donor
T1 (d) -14.31*** -8.021** -6.562 -8.767
[4.320] [3.280] [30.03] [10.02]
T2 (d) -7.408 -10.02*** -7.648 -3.083
[4.547] [3.115] [23.54] [9.477]
C*Red (d) -0.475 -4.496 -9.687 -4.921
[7.177] [5.309] [38.77] [14.54]
T1*Red (d) 1.836 -5.411 -16.88 2.963
[7.060] [4.904] [46.96] [15.33]
T2*Red (d) -3.782 -3.730 103.0*** 7.994
[7.403] [4.589] [38.16] [13.11]
Constant 50.48*** 45.36*** 48.44*** 45.80***
[3.189] [2.324] [17.34] [7.018]
Observations 237 1110 54 231
R-squared 0.0331 0.0103 0.0579 -0.0160
Test T1=T2 T1 = T2 T1 = T2 T1 = T2 T1 = T2
Marginal effects; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1





Table 11 OLS (dependent variable=unconditional contribution amount) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Active M-Donor Active*NoM-Donor InActive*M-Donor InActive*NonM-Donor
T1 (d) -0.321 -0.0381* -0.447 -0.00799
[0.367] [0.0208] [0.459] [0.00970]
T2 (d) -0.351 -0.00757 -0.0494 0.00365
[0.369] [0.0209] [0.453] [0.00969]
C*Red (d) 0.00399 -0.0543* -0.169 0.000554
[0.590] [0.0311] [0.722] [0.0150]
T1*Red (d) -0.274 -0.0276 -0.0757 0.00309
[0.573] [0.0307] [0.684] [0.0148]
T2*Red (d) -0.214 -0.0432 1.768** 0.0138
[0.587] [0.0308] [0.746] [0.0148]
Constant 2.068*** 0.200*** 0.781** 0.0340***
[0.261] [0.0148] [0.326] [0.00689]
Observations 5595 240655 3826 290946
R-squared -0.000504 0.0000182 0.00104 -0.00000495
Test T1=T2 T1 = T2 T1 = T2 T1 = T2 T1 = T2
Marginal effects; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Table 12 Composition of Blue and Red State List Members 
Blue States Active Inactive Totals
M-Donor 1.1% 0.7% 1.8%
Non M-Donor 43.9% 54.3% 98.2%
Totals 45.0% 55.0%
Red States Active Inactive Totals
M-Donor 0.9% 0.7% 1.6%
Non M-Donor 46.4% 52.0% 98.4%






Figure 1 Discount Theory. 
Note: The solid line represents an individual’s demand curves based on one specific 
membership signal.  As the charity announces a higher threshold for receiving the 
membership benefit (T), the individual adjusts their beliefs about the expected value of the 
membership and thus operates along the demand curve depicted by the dotted line (i.e., 
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Chapter 2: Competition-based Environmental Policy: An 
Analysis of Farmland Preservation in Maryland26
 
 
By:  John K. Horowitz, Lori Lynch, and Andrew Stocking 
 
I. Introduction 
A large proportion of environmental problems stem from private land use 
decisions that do not incorporate negative externalities. Such problems include 
biodiversity loss and threat of species extinction due to land conversion, carbon 
release due to deforestation and land cultivation practices, and nonpoint water 
pollution from agriculture, flood control, and loss of amenities such as scenery, local 
climate, and wildlife viewing.  Indeed, it seems that a large portion of U.S. 
environmental problems would be solved if land use decisions could be optimized to 
include environmental externalities.  
This prominent role for land use is important because the legal means used to 
regulate land use in the U.S. are very different from those used to regulate pollution.  
In the case of pollution, federal regulations directly limit what polluters can do.  In 
contrast, land use in the U.S. outside of urban areas is much more loosely regulated.  
Instead, the primary policy tool has been to pay landowners to undertake the actions 
that we as a society would like them to undertake.  The general principle is that for 
pollution, the environmental rights are held by the public, in the hands of the 
government, whereas for land use the rights are inherent in the property.  This 
difference affects the policies and policy implementation issues that must be 
                                                 






considered in addressing land use issues.  
 Due in part to the property rights movement and the shift away from 
regulations since the 1970’s (Echevarria 2005), policymakers have sought voluntary-
enrollment land use policies with low budgetary costs but that are nonetheless cost-
effective.  The most promising of these are competition-based policies in which 
landowners compete for shares of a fixed budget in return for implementing 
environmentally desirable land uses.  A prominent example is the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP), a Federal program under which landowners submit bids to 
take environmentally sensitive agricultural land out of production for a 10 or 15 year 
period.  Lowest bids (per environmental benefit) are enrolled first, with enrollment 
continuing until the budget is exhausted.  Non-U.S. examples include Australia’s 
Auction for Landscape Recovery, the U.K.’s Challenge Funds and initial auctions for 
greenhouse gas reductions, and Germany’s Grassland Pilot.  Competition-based 
policies are likely to be important components of future U.S. policies for two major 
environmental issues: nonpoint water pollution and carbon sequestration.   
Although competition-based schemes have many desirable properties there is 
much that remains unknown about the bidders’ behavior and its implications for 
policy design.  Auctions modeled on environmental policies have been studied 
extensively in laboratory and field experiments.  Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann 
(2007) conducted induced-value, private-value experiments to compare two bid 
acceptance rules for conservation auctions, and Cummings, Holt and Laury (2004) 
conducted induced-value, private-value experiments to study selection rules for the 




information structure rather than work with the complex real-world information 
structure that characterizes most auctions.  Such information structures may distort 
bidding and may therefore cause competition-based programs to be potentially more 
costly than other voluntary-enrollment programs with more certain and 
straightforward payment structures.  This paper attempts to shed light on this question 
using data from an actual competition-based policy. 
Competition-based real-world land use programs such as the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP) have been the subject of some theoretical work (Smith 1995; 
Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997) but only a small number of empirical 
articles have made use of the auction paradigm.  Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts 
(2005) estimate a reduced form model of the CRP and infer reservation values from 
assumptions based on the portion of the reservation value that is observable.  Vukina 
et al. (forthcoming) also use a reduced form model to examine how plot-specific 
environmental scores, which increase the probability of winning, ceteris paribus, 
affect bids.  Our auction set-up and rich data allows us to estimate a broader set of 
relationships related to bidder behavior including the impact of competition, potential 
winner’s curse as well as infer the underlying reservation values.   
This paper studies bids in the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation 
Foundation (MALPF) program, an innovative program in which Maryland farmers 
compete to sell their right to develop their land to the State while retaining ownership 
of their land.  The State then retires these development rights, ensuring that the 




The MALPF program, like other competition-based policies, relies on the 
principles that underlie auction theory which posits that participant behavior depends 
on the underlying information structure.  Several unique features of this auction allow 
us to identify the informational components.  Using data from 24 auction rounds over 
19 years, we examine the effects of competition, information, and bidder entry and 
selection on bidding behavior in the MALPF auction.  We find that on average bids 
are 5 to 15 percent above the underlying reservation value and show that increased 
competition (in the form of lower budgets or more bidders) reduces this mark-up.  We 
also find evidence that bidders adjust for a possible winner’s curse by increasing their 
bids by 8 to 14 percent.   
This framework then allows us to back out the underlying distribution of 
reservation values.  This distribution of values constitutes the supply curve for 
MALPF enrollment.  We use the inferred reservation values to compare the 
performance of the MALPF auction to an alternative policy under which 
administrators make a take it or leave it offer to all potential enrollees.  We find that 
the MALPF auction enrolled 5 to 12 percent more acres than this alternative for the 
given budget. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes the 
details of the MALPF auction.  Section III describes the empirical model.  Section IV 
describes the data.  Section V discusses the results and Section VI uses the results in a 
comparison to an alternative farmland preservation policy.  Concluding remarks are 





II. MALPF Auction Design 
Maryland established the MALPF program in 1977.  It was one of the nation’s 
first statewide programs to restrict development on agricultural land by purchasing 
from landowners their rights to develop their property.  Preservation is achieved 
through the attachment of a “conservation easement,” a restriction on the deed that 
proscribes most forms of development, essentially in perpetuity.  The enrolling owner 
of a parcel is free to sell the land but future owners continue to be bound by the 
development restriction.  By 2003 the MALPF had preserved 228,854 acres, which is 
4 percent of State land and 10 percent of its agricultural acres.  Acquisition 
expenditures for these development rights for the fiscal year 2002 were $37.6 million, 
with a statewide average per-acre cost of $1,960.   
We study bids from Carroll County, an urbanizing county just west of 
Baltimore.  We chose this county because: (i) it experienced substantial development 
pressure during the period of study yet also had 178,000 acres of agricultural land at 
the start of our study period, (ii) it actively promoted the MALPF auctions, and (iii) 
there were no other competing preservation programs during the study period that 
paid compensation.27
In each round of bidding, eligible landowners submit offers to sell their 
parcels’ development rights.  After the offers are submitted, the program pays for two 
professional appraisals of the market value of the unconstrained property.  The state 
    
                                                 
27The Conservation Reserve Program operates in Carroll County but the maximum rental rates over 
this time period were not high and enrollment was quite low.  Therefore, the CRP’s impact on 
agricultural value calculations and enrollment decisions is likely to have been essentially non-existent.  
The Maryland Environmental Trust accepts donations of development rights.  Landowners who donate 





selects the appraisal “which in their judgment reflects the most accurate value” 
(MALPF, 1984).  A new appraisal is conducted each time a parcel is bid.  Parcel 
values for parcels re-bidding a second or third time can change substantially from 
round to round.   
The program then computes the agricultural value of the property (that is, its 
value if it were constrained to remain in agriculture) based on specified rules.  The 
state calculates the “market easement value” as the difference between the property’s 
unconstrained market value and its agricultural value.  The landowner’s submitted 
offer is then converted into a ratio by dividing it by the market easement value.  
These ratios are ranked and the program purchases development rights starting with 
the lowest ratio offer.  The landowner is paid the amount of his offer, with exceptions 
described below; thus, this program is a type of first-price auction.  The program 
works its way up this line-up of ratios until the annual budget is exhausted.  In this 
way, the program buys development rights that are the least expensive relative to the 
assigned market easement value.  Because of the auction-like approach we refer to the 
landowners’ offers as bids. 
The ratio approach represents an innovative design feature for farmland 
preservation.  If the state were to purchase development rights from the lowest 
bidders, it would preserve those properties that were least likely to be developed, 
although it would be able to enroll the most acres.  By comparing bids to the market’s 
assessment, the state acquires easements that are cheapest relative to the market price; 
this adjustment is presumably no longer biased toward low development probability 




implicit objective function.  The selection rule does not account for the effect of 
preservation of a given parcel on the development rates of other parcels, nor for other 
public goods provided by the parcels. 
Like all government programs, the MALPF program has twists that 
complicate the analysis.  For ratios greater than one, the program may offer to 
purchase the development rights at the market easement value, assuming the budget 
has not been exhausted by parcels with ratios less than one.  For these parcels, this 
payment would be lower than the landowner’s requested payment.  Landowners can 
either accept this offer or decline it.  The administrator selects these parcels for 
auxiliary offers based on unspecified criteria and not necessarily on the lowest-ratio-
first rule. 
Participants who are not accepted can re-bid in any future round.  Multiple 
rebidding is allowed and indeed is common.  
The program had an escape clause under which, if after 25 years a landowner 
can demonstrate there exists no profitable agricultural use and is willing to refund the 
MALPF the current value of the development rights, the landowner may petition to 
remove the restrictions.  This clause has never been utilized and considerable 
opposition exists toward allowing any parcel to exit.   
 
III. Estimation Model and Equations 
 This section provides a conceptual model that defines the informational 
structure of the auction, lays out our research questions, and forms the basis for our 





Land market   
 We start with a standard model of land conversion.  Let V(t) represent the 
discounted value of services on a given parcel were it to be developed at time t.  This 
value is assumed to follow a random walk process.  Development results in foregone 
profits from agriculture.  Let x represent annual net returns from agriculture on this 
parcel; for simplicity these returns are assumed non-stochastic.  Let ρ be the risk-free 
discount rate.  Consequently, the market value of the land absent any opportunity for 
development is X = x/ρ.   
 The landowner’s decision is the date τ at which to develop the parcel.  When 
the parcel is converted the landowner gives up the remaining stream of x, valued at 
Xe-ρτ.  The parcel is converted when V(t) exceeds X plus the option of waiting for a 
higher offer.  Thus the value of an undeveloped parcel given current realization V is: 
  ( ){ })(1max)( τVeeXEVF ρτρτ
τ
m −− +−=  (1) 
The cost of land conversion is assumed to be zero in this model but such a cost would 
not change the underlying structure of the problem.  Making agricultural returns 
stochastic would complicate the presentation but again would not change the result. 
 This is a standard investment under uncertainty problem, solvable by methods 
described in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and regularly applied in the land conservation 
context (Plantinga, Lubowski, and Stavins 2002).  The solution, described by Dixit 
and Pyndick (1994) is βaVXVF m +=)(  where ( ) ββ ββ −− −= 1)1/(Xa  and β > 1 is a 




value, M, is the difference between the value of an undeveloped parcel, )(VF m , and 
the value of the land restricted to remain undeveloped, X: 
 Market easement value ( ) )(VMaVXVF m ==−= β  (2) 
where M depends on the observation of V. 
 Since the MALPF program is based on both the landowner’s and “the 
market’s” valuation of a parcel’s development right, it is necessary to consider how 
these values may differ.  There are two possible sources.   
 First, landowners may derive utility from owning and operating the farm 
beyond the agricultural income it provides.  This utility would make them less likely 
to convert the land at the “cash flow optimal” date to convert.  We model this effect 
by multiplying agricultural income by an individual-specific parameter ψi in the 
landowner utility function.  Thus landowner i’s value for his land is given by: 
 ( ){ }( ) max 1 ( )f iF V E X e e Vρτ ρττ ψ τ− −= − +  (3) 
again with the expectation conditional on the current observation of V.  We use 
superscript f to denote the farmer’s valuations; the m subscript denotes the market’s 
valuation.  We expect ψi > 1, since this corresponds to landowners placing additional 
value on farming utility.28
                                                 
28Lynch and Lovell (2003) find both agricultural income indicators and non-consumptive values affect 
the likelihood of enrollment.  These variables include farm size, cropland use, a child planning to take 
over the farm, and the share of family income from the farm. 
   � i may also be interpreted as representing the individual’s 
private observation of agricultural income, with ψi > 1 indicating that agricultural 
income is higher than the market belief.  A higher ψ represents a greater weight on 





agricultural potential. In other contexts, �  also forms the basis of the unobserved 
likelihood that the parcel will be developed.  This likelihood is a common concern in 
the design of land use policies (e.g., Sánchez et al. 2006) 
 We assume ψi is known to the individual bidder but is unobserved by the 
administrator or by other bidders and is distributed independently of ψ-i and of V(t).  
It thus operates as an independent private value which forms the basis of the 
landowner bid, as in Milgrom and Weber (1982).  For ease of notation, we drop the i 
subscript.   
 Equation (3) has solution βψ VaXVF f
f +=)(  where 
( ) ββ βψβ −− −= 1)1/(Xa f .  When the farmer observes the same V as the market his 
valuation of the parcel’s development right is: 
  MaVXVF
f θψψ ββ ≡=− −1)(  (4) 
with βψθ −≡ 1 .  When ψ > 1 we have θ < 1, which implies that for any observation of 
M the landowner requires less than the market easement value for his development 
rights.     
 Second, the market and the individual landowner may have different 
observations of V(t) and thus of β)(taV .  Such disagreement about land values is a 
natural element of any market although it is missing from the standard asset pricing 
model.   
 One way to incorporate this difference is to have both parties draw separate 
observations of V(t), which then correspond to different assessments of β)(taV .  Let 
the landowner’s assessment be denoted D = β)(taV f , where V




V(t), analogous to the (un-superscripted) V(t) in equation (2).   The landowner’s 
reservation value for his development right, from equation (4), is then:   
  Landowner easement value ≡ Dθ  (5) 
 This formulation makes clear the two elements that constitute the landowner’s 
reservation value: the extra utility he derives from owning and operating the farm, θ, 
and his observation of the price his unconstrained property would receive on the 
market, D.       
 
Bidding   
 
 To participate in the MALPF auction an eligible landowner submits a bid, bi, 
that represents the one-time payment he would accept in return for his parcel’s 
development rights.  After the bid, appraisals are conducted to determine M.  For each 





bR =  (6) 
This ratio Ri forms the basis for selecting the winning bids.  Winning bidders are paid 
the amount of their bid, with the exceptions described in Section 2.  Based on (6), the 
probability of acceptance at R �  1 is [ ]MRb ~~ Prob * ⋅≤ where R* is the (random) cut-
off ratio, M is the market appraisal (which is unknown when the bid is submitted) and 
a tilde denotes a random variable. 
 To construct the bid, a landowner should first construct the value of his 
development right conditional on bid acceptance and therefore conditional on the ex 




landowner adopts the market easement value as his ex post valuation.  The 
landowner’s expected value of his development right conditional on winning when 
submitting bid b would then be: 
  )~~|~()(~ * MRbMEbv M ⋅<= θ  (7) 
 Under this assumption, there is a common value between the landowner and 
the program administrator (e.g., Haile, Hong, and Shum, 2003).  Our common value 
is different from standard models in which different bidders share a common value 
but its effect on bidding is comparable.  Since b must be above �D, equation (7) 
implies that the expected value of the easement conditional on winning is above the 
unconditional expectation, E(�M) = �D. 29
 The informational assumption underlying (7) is not the only possible 
assumption.  Rather than treat the market observation M as “correct” in forming his 
ex post valuation, the landowner may treat (5) as a true reservation value that need not 
be updated based on appraisers’ assessments of M.  In this case, there would be no 
common value element to the auction and no winner’s curse.  An intermediate case 
would be that landowners use M as informative but not definitive and therefore use 
Bayesian updating on D.  In each case, (7) would be modified accordingly. 
  
 Because of these possibilities we allow for a winner’s curse correction in our 
econometric model and estimate its magnitude.  Note that we do not assume that the 
winner’s curse exists; we merely accommodate the possibility in our estimation and 
                                                 
29We do not consider the case where other bidders’ information affects the ex post valuation other than 
indirectly through the realization of the cut-off ratio, R*.  An alternative assumption would be that M is 
less informative if all bidders have D < M than if the D’s are distributed around M.  Likewise, we do 






interpretation.   
 Expression (7) is analogous to the winner’s curse correction in standard 
common value auctions (Milgrom and Weber 1982; Athey and Haile 2002).  
Landowners whose bids are selected will be those who have most underestimated the 
market value, ceteris paribus, yielding a winner’s curse (under the assumption that M 
is at least partially informative for the landowner’s ex post valuation).  They therefore 
have an incentive to correct for this risk by bidding as if they have values above �D.  
The more that the landowner relies on M in formulating his ex post valuation, and 
assuming that she incorporates this anticipated information in her bid, the greater is 
the bid above �D. 
  
Entry and Selection  
 
 To illustrate bidder entry and selection we write out the bidder’s objective 
function and use its notation to derive the final component of our model.  We do not 
derive the optimal bidding strategy because of both the complex information 
environment and the dynamic nature of the auction.  Expression (7) allows us to write 
the objective function for a risk neutral bidder facing a one-time auction as: 
  ( )( ) ( ) [ ][ ] kofferProbbMbvbED MRb −Φ⋅−+Φ−−= )(
~)1()(1)~max),( , θθπ  (8) 
The bidder selects his bid to maximize the expectation of profits from winning 
outright (the first term) or being made an offer less than his bid ex post (second term).  
�  represents the cumulative distribution of the product R*� M, Prob[offer] is the 
probability that an ex post offer of M < b is made, and k is a bid preparation cost.  In a 




 In the MALPF program, bidders are faced with the additional decisions of 
when to enter the auction and when to rebid.  Computational derivation of this result 
is complex and beyond the scope of this paper and thus we describe the results only 
heuristically.   
 Consider bidder entry.  We assume that landowner surplus falls as θ increases 
(��/�� < 0) which corresponds to the assumption that surplus falls with decreasing 
private utility from farming or owning land.  Although this is a standard assumption it 
is difficult to establish definitively given the complexity of the winner’s curse.  Under 
this assumption we argue, again heuristically, that lower θ’s lose more surplus, ���, 
from waiting for the next round.  This framework further yields �b/��i > 0, which 
implies that lower �’s are more likely to win a given auction.30
 These conditions together suggest that the lowest reservation price bidders 
enter the auction earlier and win more frequently when they do enter.  As these 
bidders leave the bidding pool, the remaining pool of potential and actual bidders 
contains a larger fraction of higher reservation price bidders.   This relationship forms 
   
the basis for our identification of reservation values since the pattern of bids and 
ratios over time allows us to trace out the underlying distribution of θ’s.  This 
distribution in turn forms the supply curve for development rights. 
 
                                                 
30Formally, this condition relies on D being sufficiently independent of �i.  When entry is costless, D 
will indeed be independent of �i even under more general assumptions about the winner’s curse, 
because D contains all landowner information about M.  Therefore, no landowner believes he has a 





Estimation Setup  
 We specify a reduced form bidding function based on the above model.  Bids 
will be above the reservation value, θD, due to the information rent that bidders 
accrue from their private values, represented by γ, and to the winner’s curse 
correction captured by (7), represented by ω.  Our breakdown of bids into a winner’s 
curse correction and a mark-up over the conditional reservation value due to 
competition is useful for intuition, although it is not strictly consistent with the 
theoretical model in (8), which does not yield a clear distinction between the two 
components.       
 We specify a functional form in which these mark-ups enter multiplicatively 
above the reservation value.  The bidding function is thus:   
  iitit Db ωθγ )(=  (9) 
Equation (9) includes bidder and auction-round subscripts, i and t, to make clear how 
components vary across observations. 
 We cannot directly observe the elements of (9) but we do observe related 
variables that allow us to infer their values:   
 
Private Values (θ).   Although we do not observe individual �i’s, we can infer the 
average � among first-bidders in each bidding-round, a sequence we denote as { )(tθ } 
where t indexes the bidding round.  Following the discussion above, we note that as 
cumulative acceptances increase, there are fewer bidders left in the pool and these are 
bidders with higher values of �.  Bidders with high �’s, relative to the remaining pool, 




the low range of remaining �’s.  Therefore, the range of �’s in a given auction round 
should be relatively narrowly distributed around “local mean” )(tθ , which will be an 
increasing function of the number of previously accepted parcels, denoted CAt for 
cumulative acceptances.  This component of our reservation price estimation strategy 
relies on the assumption that bidders are drawn from an otherwise invariant 
underlying distribution.  We therefore restrict our main regressions to first-time 
bidders.  We adopt the general specification: 
 )ln( )(tθ = � - exp (φ1�(CAt+10)) (10) 
We expect bids to be increasing in cumulative acceptances, φ1 < 0. 31
)ln(1 )0(θ+
    The parameter 
� measures the lower bound of �’s since � = .   
 
Information Rent Mark-up (�).  Following the standard independent private values 
paradigm, we allow information rent mark-up, �, to depend on the competitiveness of 
a given auction round.  There are multiple possible measures of competition, such as 
the number of bidders or the (negative of the) available budget per bidder.  We label 
these generically as COMPt.  Let ln(�(t)) = �0 + �1COMPt.  Greater competition 
implies that bids will be lower, yielding the prediction �1 < 0.  We assume that �(t) is 
the same for all bidders in a given round.   
 
                                                 
31We were able to identify one Carroll county parcel whose development rights were donated before 
the MALPF program began.  Other unidentified parcels may also have donated their rights. Thus, we 
add 10 parcels to cumulative acceptances to account for an estimated 0.5 percent of land that was 





Winner’s Curse Correction (� ).  The winner’s curse correction, � , sets the bid 
above the unconditional estimate of the easement value to compensate for the fact 
that the winners will be those who have most under-estimated their market easement 
value.  Theoretically consistent specifications of the winner’s curse correction are 
difficult to derive.  Gordy (1998) notes that closed-form equilibrium bidding 
functions are quite rare except for the simplest of common value assumptions.  
Paarsch (1992) describes the assumptions that yield a multiplicative or additive 
winner’s curse correction but these derivations assume a different information 
structure from the MALPF setting.   
 We use a multiplicative specification in (9) and define ln(� ) = � 0.32
Relationship with �.  The winner’s curse correction ω should be higher for 
bidders with a low �i because individuals with low �i’s are more likely to have their 
bid accepted for a given signal Ff.  Therefore, if their bid is accepted, they must have 
a lower ex ante estimate of the market easement value relative to its draw.  They 
should shade their bids upward further to account for this greater winner’s curse.  
This effect applies to bidders within a round, however, and not across rounds.  The 
  In 
general, we expect �  to be (i) decreasing in �, (ii) increasing in competition, and (iii) 
decreasing in bidder experience.  We briefly consider each of these issues.  The 
intuition for each of these claims can be gleaned directly from (7), although the full 
winner’s curse correction comes from (8).  Interactions among competition, 
experience and θ greatly complicate formal statements about the winner’s curse.   
                                                 
32An alternative specification would use an additive mark-up �(�D+� ).  An additive mark-up has the 
valuable property that it is a greater percentage mark-up for low reservation values, which are the ones 






range of �’s within a round is much smaller than the range of �’s over the entire set of 
rounds.  Therefore, this effect is likely to be small.   
Relationship with competition.  The winner’s curse correction should be 
higher as competition increases because greater competition means that the cut-off R* 
will tend to be lower and therefore winning bidders will have underestimated M to a 
greater degree.  For example, we might write ln(� ) = � a + � bCOMPt, with � b > 0.  In 
this case, the estimated parameter �1 in (11) might be interpreted as measuring the net 
effect of the competition and winner’s curse effects, as Hong and Shum (2002) 
discuss, and may be positive or negative.     
Relationship with bidding experience.  Second-bidders should be more 
informed about their parcel’s market easement value than first-bidders due to the 
appraisals that were conducted following their first bid.  As a result, second-bidders 
should have smaller winner’s curse corrections.  To examine this assumption we 




 These substitutions now allow us to specify the estimated regression, 
assuming that M is an unbiased estimate of the landowner’s ex ante beliefs, yielding 
ii MDE =)( .  Taking the log of equation (9) and adding an error term produces: 
  ititit CAMCOMPb εφγα ++⋅−+⋅+= ))10(exp()ln()ln( 110  (11) 
where �0 = �0 + � 0 + �.   
 It is straightforward to interpret the slope coefficients in this model, �1 and φ1.  




set of identification procedures is necessary because each of the relevant relationships 
has a constant term that cannot be distinguished without such structure.   
 When the auction is at its most competitive (represented by COMPmax) we 
should have � �  1, which implies �0+�1COMPmax �  0.  Thus, we specify �0 = –
�1COMPmax.  We discuss the specification of COMPmax in Section IV. 
 In the calculations below we first assume ω0 = 0, which then yields ζ = α0 – γ0.  
The assumption of � 0 = 0 captures two possible scenarios.  First, the assumption may 
be valid if there is no winner’s curse.  This would occur if the value the landowner 
places on his development right is unaffected by the state’s declaration of the land’s 
value; in other words, a pure independent private values setting.  Using the notation 
of (7), let v~ = )~~|( * MRbDEM ⋅<θ .  Because D is nonrandom at the time of bidding, 
the conditional expectation is exactly equal to the unconditional expectation, hence no 
winner’s curse.  Second, equation (7) could be correct but individuals fail to condition 
their expectation in forming their bids.  In other words, they suffer the winner’s curse.  
This is not an uncommon finding in the experimental literature (Kagel and Levin 
2002), although empirical analysis of high-stakes auctions usually finds at least some 
correction for the winner’s curse (Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter 2003).  (The 
implications of this second explanation are quite different from the first.  Since we 
find at least some winner’s curse correction, we leave further discussion of this issue 
to a separate paper.) 
 An alternative approach is to use bidder experience to estimate � 0.  We 
estimate the analog to (11) using second-bidders, who are more experienced than 




recognizing both that second bidders were rejected in the first round and have chosen 
to rebid and that the timing of the second bid is endogenous.  Our heuristic model of 
entry provides a straightforward approach.  Second-bidders should re-enter precisely 






  It is therefore sufficient to treat second-bidders as equivalent to first-bidders 
but with a different winner’s curse correction.  Let ln( ) = ))10(ˆexp(ˆ 1 +⋅− tCAφζ  
with ln( tθ̂ ) derived from a separate first-bidder regression.  We then estimate: 
 ittittit MCOMPb εθγα +−++= )
ˆln()ln()ln( )(11  (12) 
 Let �1 = � 1 + �0 + � where � 1 is the winner’s curse correction for second-
bidders. Suppose that �1 reflects only information-rent effects and is unaffected by the 
winner’s curse.  Since our econometric results suggest this to be the case, we feel 
comfortable in imposing it here.  Then we can identify �0 as described above.  If we 
assume that second-bidders are perfectly informed then � 1 = 0 and we can identify � 
using the same procedure as for first-bidders.  Using this � estimate we can then infer 
� 0, the winner’s curse correction for first-time bidders.  These assumptions yield the 
prediction �1 < �0 which serves as an additional test to their validity. 
 
                                                 
33Our arguments further imply that second-bidders should have �’s in the upper range of the �t’s at the 
time of first bid and that the greater the lag after which a second bidder enters, the higher his bidder 






Alternative specifications.  The estimated � distribution depends on the functional 
form.  We estimated two alternative specifications to (11). The first uses logged 
cumulative acceptances: 
 ititit CAMCOMPb εφγα ++⋅++⋅+= )10ln()ln()ln( 210  (13) 
We then calculate )exp()10( 2)( ζθ
β+= tt CA .  We expect φ2 > 0.   
 We also estimated a specification in which we replaced �M with F-�X, from 
(4).  This specification applies when the landowner, in forming the expected value of 
his development right conditional on winning, takes the market observation of mF~  as 
correct but does not update any market assessment of X.  That is, the reservation 
value conditional on winning is ))~(*~|~(~ XFRbXFEv mm −<−= ψ  with the 
expectation taken over mF~ .  This expression is identical to (7) whenever the 
landowner and the market share identical assessments of X. 
 Since �  �  1 we use the functional form �  = 1+exp(φ3+ φ4(CAt+10)).  We 
converted the results to � using � = � 1-� where � comes from the underlying stochastic 
process, as in (2).  The estimated equation is: 
  iit
m
tit XCAFCOMPb i εφφγα +⋅+++−++= ))))10(exp(1(ln()ln( 4310  (14) 
We expect bids to be increasing in cumulative acceptances, which requires φ4 < 0.  




We collected a unique data set that includes parcels that satisfied the 




starting with the program’s inception in 1977 to 1999.  Because of the timeframe, we 
returned to the original parcel-level files via microfiche to track each parcel through 
each round of bidding.  Changes of ownership presented the largest data integrity 
challenge.  We constructed a panel dataset with an observation for each agent-parcel 
in each bidding round.  The final data set is carefully constructed to ensure that we 
correctly followed each agent-parcel combination.  By checking the MALPF’s annual 
published reports, which publish the number of bidders and total acquisition 
expenditures, against the sum of accepted bids based on the parcel histories, we were 
able to ensure that we had as complete a record as possible of all bids.  Final data 
include bids, parcel sizes, appraisals, agricultural values, and outcomes, as well as 
assorted parcel characteristics.  We convert all dollars to $2002 using the Northeast 
Housing CPI.   
Several events in the early 1990’s affected the operation of the MALPF 
auction.  Between 1990 and 1995, to ease the administrative pressure of one bidding 
round per year, the state decided to accept bids twice during each fiscal year. Thus, 
we have two round of bidding for some of these years.  A state budget crisis led the 
state to rescind the MALPF budget after bids had been submitted in the first round of 
1991 and thus no bids were accepted.  No MALPF auctions were held for two years, 
although a few bids were submitted in the second round of 1991 and the first round of 
1992.  Funding was restored in 1993.  In the first round of 1993, offers were made to 
35 bidders on hold from the first round of 1991 bidding (those who would have been 
accepted had funding been available). And regular bidding began again in the second 




In total, we analyze the bids in 22 auction rounds between 1980 and 1999.  A 
second, competing preservation program became active in the County around 2000 
which did not use an auction format.  Therefore, we chose to use the data prior to this 
event. Data summaries are provided in Tables 1 and 2.   
There are 306 unique agent-parcels with submitted first bids (a total of 574 
bids are included in the dataset when multiple bids are counted).  We lose first bid 
observations for three reasons.  (1) The state did not conduct appraisals for all bids in 
all years, primarily because the bids were high relative to the budget, (3 first bids 
lost).  (2) In rounds with no budget (1991 and 1992), no appraisals were conducted 
(21 first bids lost).  (3) Some bids are clearly wild guesses or pure gambles.  We drop 
bids with ratios greater than 3.31, the highest ratio ever accepted (5 first bids lost).  
The remaining usable first bids equaled 277.   
The MALPF changed the formula by which agricultural values were 
calculated twice, once in 1990 and again in 1996.  To adjust agricultural values to a 
common formula in this model, the post-1996 formula is assumed to be correct, since 
the changes were adopted by program administrators solely to make the values closer 
to the true value of agricultural production on the land.  We estimated a model of 
average per-acre agricultural values on dummy variables for pre-1991 and for 1991-
1996 and used the coefficients to calculate a consistent agricultural formula.  The 
formula we use is X = {0.263Xt, t�1991; 0.638Xt, 1991� t�  1996; Xt, 1996� t�1999} 
where Xt is a given parcel’s agricultural value per-acre as reported by the program.  
We subtract this adjusted measure of X to obtain M = F – X. 




measurement error in X.  First, the regression coefficients to adjust X were essentially 
invariant to the sample we used to estimate them.  In other words, these changes in X 
were “across the board” and not restricted to any class of bidders, such as those with 
large parcels or rebidders.  Second, other adjustments to X (such as no adjustment or 
half-adjustment) yielded results that were nonsensical, such as bids being far below 
the estimated reservation values.  This suggests that landowners’ assessment of 
agricultural value were closest to those computed under the post-1996 formula.  
Third, our estimates of equations (11) and (14) yielded quite similar results.  These 
expressions are identical if and only if the X’s are measured correctly.   
In the analysis of competition, we consider two possible budgets: (i) a 
statewide program budget for the given bidding round that was publically available as 
bids were being prepared.  Since counties received more-or-less constant shares of 
this budget, this statewide figure is a good measure of budget availability in a given 
round; and (ii) acquisition expenditures at the county level for the previous bidding 
round, inflated for the previous year.  Acquisition expenditures in 1985, for example, 
were inflated using the July 1985 CPI.    
 
V.  Results 
Competition Effects 
 Program administrators are often eager to know the role of competition in 
reducing bids.  Some situations might naturally have few eligible bidders, so policy-
makers would like to know how successful an auction might be in driving down 
procurement costs.  In other situations, administrators may be able to increase the 




auction more widely.  They would then like to know whether the costs of these 
actions would likely be covered by the savings generated from lower bids.  Finally, 
administrators may want to use the effects of competition to argue to policymakers 
that a competition-based design is worth the increased complexity. 
 We examined several measures of competition: (i) the total number of bidders 
in each round, (ii) the State’s announced budget for each round divided by the 
number of bidders, and (iii) the County’s expenditure on parcels in the previous round 
divided by the number of bidders. Each competitiveness measure is also associated 
with a value for COMPmax, needed to identify �0.  When competitiveness is measured 
by the budget or expenditure per bidder, we set COMPmax = 0, since the most 
competitive auction has a zero budget; this then yields �0 = 0.34
 Endogenous competition is a problem in many empirical auction analyses.  
The largest potential problem in our context arises when competition is measured by 
the number of bidders. A large budget may attract more bidders but leave the budget-
per-bidder unchanged, therefore yielding no change in the likelihood of a given bid 
being accepted and thus no change in the auction’s competitiveness.  Endogeneity 
problems are probably less severe when competition is measured in terms of budget-
  When 
competitiveness is measured by the number of bidders, we set COMPmax = 60, which 
is above the highest number of bidders we observed, 53.  This latter assumption is 
somewhat ad hoc and for this reason, among others, we rely mostly on the budget and 
expenditure measures. 
                                                 
34These values for COMPmax are out-of-sample.  Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts (2005) note that 
predictions based on an out-of-sample regressor are typically undesirable.  Such prediction is 





per-bidder and therefore we focus our attention on these regressions.  Year-to-year 
variation in the funds allocated to the MALPF reflects both variation in state revenues 
and in the conversion of agricultural land.  Although these phenomena may be 
correlated with bidder valuations, this correlation should be captured by the market 
easement value.  Therefore, these budget measures are likely to be exogenous 
regressors. 
Still, to account for potentially endogenous numbers of bidders, we developed 
regressions to predict both number of bidders and budget-per-bidder.  (See Haile, 
Hong, and Shum (2003) for a discussion of instruments used to address endogeneity.)  
Much of the variation in the number of bidders depends on the State and County’s 
promotion of the MALPF program and on publicized problems or successes.  Both 
elements have distinct time components which we capture through period dummies.  
Intuition also suggests that successful bidders will beget more bidders in subsequent 
rounds and therefore we include as an instrument the number of bidders accepted in 
the previous round.  Results are shown in Table 4 for the full 24 bidding rounds.   
 We use the predicted values from Table 4 either directly, as a predicted 
number of bidders, or indirectly to construct the State budget per predicted bidder, 
predicted State-budget-per-bidder, County expenditure (at t-1) per predicted bidder, 
and predicted County expenditures at t-1 per bidder at t.   We refer to these latter four 
measures generically as budget-per-bidder.   
 Results are shown in Tables 5 and 6.  All of the predicted competition 
variables show that greater competition leads to lower bids.  The possible 




possible choices.  Table 6 shows alternative specifications with two measures of 
competition: state budget per predicted bidder and predicted County expenditures (at 
t-1) per bidder (at t).  These results are therefore most directly comparable to 
regressions 2 and 4.    
 To judge the magnitude of the effects and demonstrate the range of estimates, 
we calculated for each regression the implied mark-up above the reservation value at 
the median level of competitiveness, denoted �median.  We find �, the bid multiplier, 
ranges from 1.05 to 1.39, depending on our measure of competition.  For the more 
appropriate budget-per-bidder measures of competition, we find �’s ranging from 
1.05 to 1.15.  In other words, MALPF bids are roughly 5 to 15 percent above bidders’ 
conditional reservation values. 
 We also calculated the predicted percentage change in the median bid due to 
one additional bidder, holding the budgets fixed.  This number represents, roughly 
speaking, the value to the auctioneer of attracting one more bidder.  We found that 
one additional bidder on top of the mean 23 bidders reduced bids by 0.1 percent to 1.4 
percent, with a mode of 0.2 percent.35
 
  This calculation has the advantage that it does 
not depend on identification of �0.  Its interpretation does, however, rely on the 
additional bidder being the same as existing bidders.  In dollar terms, for example, in 
1999, the average bid per acre of $2,839 would have been lower by $2.84 to $39.75 
per acre.   
                                                 
35It is difficult to know how these findings compare to other auctions since this calculation is rarely 
reported in the literature.  Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) found that adding one more bidder resulted in 
bids that were 3.2 percent closer to the reservation value.  This number may be higher than ours 





Private Values Distribution 
 
One of our main objectives is to estimate the distribution of �, the bidder-
specific parameter that captures the landowner’s taste for owning and operating a 
farm and thus forms the basis for his reservation value.  This private-value is the 
motivation for competition-based policies, which are designed to drive bids as close 
to the unobserved � as possible.  The distribution of � is a key element of participation 
in land use policies generally, not only those that are competition-based, and thus 
affects enrollment in all voluntary enrollment land programs.  This parameter is a 
crucial factor determining the probability of land conversion, which in turn is the 
main variable of interest in many environmental land use policies (Sánchez et al. 
2006).  Finally, � can also indicate the compensation that should be awarded for 
eminent domain takings, since it can be used as a measure of how much a landowner 
values owning her property above the market price.  
 We estimate this parameter using (11), (13), and (14).  Results from these 
regressions are presented in Tables 5 and 6.  In all cases, the coefficients are 
consistent with higher cumulative acceptances leading to higher bids: φ1 < 0 
(regressions 1-5 using equation (11)), φ2 > 0 (regressions 6 and 7 using equation 
(13)), and φ4 < 0 (regressions 8 and 9 using equation (14)).   
 With these results we can infer the distribution of �’s, using the group-means 
implied by equation (10) and first making the assumption that the winner’s curse 
correction is zero.  Graphs of the implied distribution functions are shown in Figure 1 
for regressions 1 through 5 and Figure 2 for regressions 4 and 6 through 9; regression 




estimated � ’s from regression 12 to �’s, using � = � 1-�, where �/(�-1) is the trigger 
between investment value and investment cost from (1).36
Recall that � < 1 and that lower values of � represent higher values for farm 
ownership and thus lower reservation easement values.  Figures 1 and 2 show 
distributions of �’s that are far below one.  Among regressions 2-7, which use the 
most appropriate measures of competition and do not require the additional parameter 
β, the highest �’s at the end of the period we analyze are below 0.80.  These relatively 
low values are perhaps not too surprising since the program is never valuable in 
expectation to a risk-neutral bidder with � = 1; the program is designed to attract and 
enroll low � farmers.  Our findings are a bit surprising, however, since they suggest 
that all of the parcels could have been obtained with a take-it-or-leave-it offer of 0.80, 
even under a conservative assumption of no winner’s curse correction.  In contrast, 
the median ratio among accepted parcels over this period was 0.89.   
   
Our estimates of the � distribution are robust to functional form and 
competition measure.  They are, however, sensitive to auxiliary assumptions about 
the level of competition that would drive bids to the reservation value and, in 
regressions 8 and 9, to the value of β, sometimes called the volatility parameter.  For 
example, the highest value of )0(θ̂  comes from regression 8.  If we instead take �=2 
for this regression then �(0) = 0.37, which is quite similar to the regressions based on 
(9).   
 
                                                 
36We apply Dixit and Pindyck’s notation (1994, p. 142) with parameters from Quigg’s study of land 





Winner’s Curse   
MALPF auction bidders would appear potentially vulnerable to a winner’s 
curse since landowners bid without knowing the state’s appraisal of the easement 
value. This market easement value should be informative to bidders and bids that are 
selected are those that are lowest relative to this value.  Bidders who recognize the 
winner’s curse should raise their bid above their unconditional reservation value.    
More informed bidders should be less vulnerable to a winner’s curse.  An 
obvious instrument for bidder information is the comparison between first and second 
bidders.  Therefore, to get a rough estimate of the winner’s curse correction, we 
estimated (12) using only second-bidders, using results from regressions 2, 3, 4, and 5 
for )(
ˆ
tθ , and compare the results to the same regressions for first-bidders  There are 
109 second-bidders with full data.  Estimates are shown in Table 7.   
We find substantially smaller intercepts for second-bidders in all four cases, as 
expected.  If we assume that second-bidders are perfectly informed and that the 
winner’s curse correction for first-time bidders is invariant to all other factors, then 
the difference 10 ˆˆ αα −  is a measure of the winner’s curse correction.  Based on Tables 
5 and 7 we find winner’s curse corrections of 8-14 percent of the reservation value.   
We have some evidence that the winner’s curse correction is indeed invariant 
to other factors.  Initially, we suspected that greater competition would increase the 
winner’s curse correction and therefore lead to higher bids (e.g., Pinkse and Tan 
2005).  If these conditions held then �1 should be larger in magnitude for second-
bidders than first-bidders.  We find the opposite result, however, since the 1̂γ s in 




conclude that the effect of competition on the winner’s curse correction is non-
existent and allows us to focus on models with a winner’s curse correction that is 
invariant to all factors except bidder information. 
A more sophisticated analysis of the role of information and experience would 
be valuable but lies beyond the scope of this paper.  Joint estimation of first- and 
second-bidders would appear to be the most valuable approach but multiple sample 
selection issues would arise under this treatment, including whether offers were made 
to bidders at b > M and whether they were accepted.  We therefore leave this topic for 
future research. 
 
VI. Comparison to Alternative Policy 
This section describes alternatives to competition-based environmental policy 
and presents our assessment of one prominent alternative to the MALPF auction, the 
take-it-or-leave-it offer, based on the results of Section V.   
It is useful first to define categories of non-competition-based voluntary-
enrollment programs.  One such category is formula-based payments or point 
systems, in which the state offers a payment to enrollees that is based solely on 
observable parcel characteristics.  Formula-based payments are used for the 
Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program, and have begun to achieve popularity 
in farmland preservation programs (Maryland Rural Legacy Program, Ohio’s 
Agricultural Easement Purchase Program) and are also the main format of programs 
internationally (see Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007).  The take-it-or-leave-it offer is a 




the way most land ownership transactions are conducted.  This is also the method by 
which non-governmental organizations such as The Nature Conservancy acquire 
property or development restrictions.   
Our analysis of the MALPF auction leads naturally to the question of whether 
auctions might be expected on theoretical grounds to be generally superior to a 
formula-based or negotiation-based approach.  The MALPF auction is similar to 
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) in which an English auction with N+1 bidders is 
compared to an auction with N bidders in which the auctioneer makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the winner after observing all submitted bids.  They argue that 
regardless of the information structure, the pure auction always yields higher 
expected revenue than any take-it-or-leave-it offer with fewer bidders.  This finding 
suggests that the MALPF set-up might be superior to any take-it-or-leave-it approach, 
although there remain many differences between their model and the real world 
MALPF auction.     
 A few empirical papers have addressed environmental policy questions 
similar to ours.  Stoneham et al. (2003) analyzed auctions for conservation contracts 
in Australia and compared the existing auction with an alternative take it or leave it 
offer.  They assumed that bids were equal to reservation values rather than inferring 
them.  In this case, an auction always does better than a take-it-or-leave-it offer.  
Connor, Ward, and Bryan (2007) examined a second Australian program and 
compared an auction format to various uniform payment schemes and negotiated 
payments, but did not analyze bids econometrically and did not attempt to infer 




irrigation rights in the Georgia Irrigation Auction and suggested that the rights could 
have been obtained more cheaply if landowners had been allowed to revise their bids 
after an initial bidding round. They did not analyze bids econometrically and their 
recommendation is based on their induced-value auctions.  Messer and Allen (2008), 
examining a land preservation auction in Delaware that is similar to the MALPF 
auction, use existing bids and benefit measures to show the consequences of 
alternative parcel selection procedures.  They also did not analyze bids 
econometrically and did not consider how bidding behavior might change if an 
alternative selection rule were used.  Reichelderfer and Boggess (1988) addressed a 
similar question for the CRP.  
We compare the MALPF program to a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) offer under 
which the state would offer to purchase development rights from all interested 
landowners at a set percentage of their market easement value.37  We selected this 
policy for comparison because it contains the same elements as the current MALPF 
program yet does not rely on competition among enrollees.38
                                                 
37In the real world, policymakers would have to worry about running into the budget constraint if too 
many landowners were willing to accept the take-it-or-leave-it offer.  The TIOLI policy would then 
have to include some sort of rationing rule, such as first-come-first-served.  In our simulations we can 
choose the TIOLI offer that would exactly meet the budget, so this concern does not arise.  We thank a 
referee for pointing out this important distinction. 
  The TIOLI would be 
less expensive than the current set-up if the MALP auction’s bids were greatly above 
landowners’ reservation values (due either to high information rents or a large 
 
38The Delaware Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation (DALPF) program is a competition-based 
program under which appraisals occur before the bidding thus eliminating the largest potential 
opportunity for a winner’s curse (DALPF 2007).  Landowners submit ratio bids in a sealed-bid first-
price auction.  The DALPF purchases the easements with the lowest ratios until the budget is 





winners’ curse correction) and if the distribution of reservation values were relatively 
flat.  These conditions can be verified only through empirical analysis.   
Let t be the announced ratio offer.  A bidder is predicted to accept the offer if 
his θ is below t.  He would be paid tM and his surplus from the program would be (t-
θ)M.  To assess the TIOLI we then find the lowest t that would result in acceptances 
totaling approximately $53.3 million, the amount spent by the state in Carroll County 
over the period of study.  Using regression 4 as an example, we find that t = 0.602 
would cost $53.3 million and would enroll 24,896 acres. 
We next simulate MALPF auction bidding.39
In other words, the MALPF auction would enroll as much as 3,000 more acres 
  We multiply the reservation 
values θM by a uniform mark-up, γ.  We use a uniform mark-up because otherwise 
we must simulate budgets and competition year-by-year.  Accepted bidders are paid 
γθM; we first assume no winner’s curse correction.  We rank bidders based on θ and 
sum the bids, starting with the lowest θ, until acceptances total $53.3 million.  Again 
using regression 4 as an example and a mark-up of 1.06, we find that all bidders with 
θ below 0.67 would be accepted.  The program would cost $52.6 million and would 
enroll 27,841 acres.  (Because the θ’s form a step function it is not possible to hit the 
budget-target dead on.)   
                                                 
39For the comparison we simulate the bids rather than use actual bids and enrollments for multiple 
reasons: (1) Actual enrollments depend on yearly budgets and competition, which do not have direct 
counterparts in the TIOLI.  (2) Actual enrollments include rebidders but the proper comparison is with 
first bidders.  (3) The regressions are an unbiased representation of bidding behavior but not an 
unbiased representation of winning bids.  This affects the simulation because actual bids include an 
error term; because accepted bids are more likely to have large negative errors they are not a 
representative sample for comparison with TIOLI.  We can either simulate these errors in constructing 
a simulated TIOLI (for comparison with actual auction enrollment and costs) or can simulate the bids 
so that they are directly comparable to the TIOLI.  We chose the latter approach.  (4) Changes in the 




for the given budget than the comparable TIOLI approach, or roughly 12 percent 
more acreage.  Other regressions yield similar results, with the MALPF auction 
consistently enrolling more acres for the given budget.  In addition, an added plus is 
that when using the MALPF auction approach, the administrator does not need to 
know the distribution of θ’s.  Under the TIOLI when the distribution of θ’s is not 
known, the administrator must guess the right t to meet the budget. 
The degree of superiority of the auction mechanism is sensitive to 
assumptions about the winner’s curse.  If we assume that bidders apply a winner’s 
curse correction of, say, 12 percent then the true reservation values are lower than the 
values shown in Figure 2 by 12 points.  Under this assumption about reservation 
values, the TIOLI would enroll 26,547 acres for $52.5 million.  The MALPF auction 
calculations remain unchanged.  Thus, even when bids contain a winner’s curse 
correction, the MALPF program remains superior to the TIOLI.  The MALPF auction 
would enroll 1,300 more acres for the given budget with a 12 percent winner’s curse 
correction, or a little over 5 percent more acreage.  In other words, even though the 
TIOLI’s relative performance is improved when we assume auction participants 
correct for a winner’s curse, the MALPF continues to outperform the TIOLI. 
 
VII. Concluding Comments 
 
The unique set-up of the MALPF program has allowed us to estimate several 
components of landowner bidding behavior.  Our model includes an independent 
private value component and a possible common value component between each 




We find that bids are 5-15 percent above the conditional reservation value.  
Our finding is similar to a field experiment on which the Georgia Irrigation Reduction 
Auction is based which found that hypothetical water rights sold for 7-12 percent 
above reservation values (Cummings, Holt, and Laury 2004).  We further find 
consistent evidence that greater competition leads bidders to reduce their bids.  Policy 
makers have been motivated to adopt competition-based policies based on this 
theoretical feature which we uncover empirically to be true.  We find that each 
additional bidder reduces bids by 0.1-1.4 percent, or $2.84 - $39.75 per acre.  This 
suggests efforts to encourage more competition among bidders are worthwhile.  
Because of the prominent role for the market easement value in the MALPF 
auction, we considered the possibility that bidders adjust for a possible winners’ 
curse. Through a comparison of first-time bidders with more informed repeat bidders, 
and correcting for endogeneity in the timing of a second bid, we estimate that first-
time bidders adjust for a possible winner’s curse by increasing their bids between 8 
and 14 percent.  Our finding suggests that a modification to the MALPF program to 
conduct appraisals before bidding, as under Delaware’s DALPF auction, might lead 
to lower bids by reducing a key source of uncertainty.    
We derive and demonstrate a unique approach to inferring reservation values 
based on bidder entry and selection.  These reservation values allow us to compare 
the MALPF auction with an alternative policy that does not involve bidding, called a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer.  We find that the MALPF program would enroll 5 to 12 
percent more acreage for a given budget than an “ideal” take-it-or-leave offer.  In 




in this instance.  The MALPF approach also has the advantage that the administrator 
does not need to know the underlying distribution of landowners’ valuations to reach 
the budget target.   
Many empirical issues warrant further exploration.  These include possible 
bidder collusion, asymmetric bidders, within-round distribution of �, bidding by re-
bidders, and the decision by bidders with ratios above one to accept a payment of 
R=1.  Each of these topics would shed light on bidder behavior and thus potentially 
lead to better design of the MALPF auction and competition-based policies more 
generally.  We leave these issues for future research. 
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IX.  Tables and Figures 
 

















bids used in 
estimation 
1980 $5,208 $3,528 11 11 11 
1981 $10,221 $4,647 32 32 32 
1982 $10,933 $2,977 35 22 21 
1983 $12,174 $3,048 53 38 36 
1984 $8,762 $1,953 42 24 24 
1985 $11,666 $1,565 29 14 13 
1986 $13,627 $1,911 17 7 7 
1987 $13,539 $1,096 20 17 15 
1988 $12,740 $1,931 12 3 3 
1989 $17,064 $3,682 27 19 19 
1990 $24,794 $6,006 25 24 23 
1990-2* $17,835 $1,821 6 2 2 
1991 $0 $0 29 22 22 
1991-2 $0 $0 1 1 0 
1992 $0 $0 4 1 0 
1993 $6,795 $558 0 0 0 
1993-2 $8,008 $867 22 13 4 
1994 $7,120 $812 25 4 4 
1994-2 $6,605 $806 30 5 3 
1995 $6,535 $1,342 30 4 2 
1995-2 $6,720 $795 21 1 1 
1996 $12,030 $3,074 26 7 7 
1997 $18,872 $3,199 22 6 4 
1998 $22,986 $5,734 34 25 21 
1999 $25,466 $2,522 21 4 3 
Mean $11,188 $2,155 23 12 11 
Total $279,701 $53,875 574 306 277 
*In 1991 the MALPF Program funding was cut to cover a statewide budget deficit; however, the 29 
bidders from 1991 were ranked and the lowest bids were funded in 1993 Round 1.  All bidders in 1991 
Round 2 and 1992 were summarily rejected.  No bids were accepted in 1993 Round 1.  Normal bidding 






























1980 1.39 $3,407 2.10 10 10 $3,410 
1981 1.15 $2,169 2.43 18 28 $1,963 
1982 1.00 $1,613 0.95 16 44 $1,390 
1983 1.26 $1,619 1.00 17 61 $1,332 
1984 1.30 $1,528 1.00 11 72 $1,334 
1985 1.20 $1,337 1.00 10 82 $1,175 
1986 1.34 $1,305 3.31 12 94 $1,346 
1987 1.52 $1,766 1.35 7 101 $1,591 
1988 0.92 $1,662 1.20 7 108 $1,683 
1989 1.29 $2,703 1.70 16 124 $2,520 
1990 1.23 $3,827 1.79 20 144 $2,855 
1990, 2nd 
round 1.16 $3,202 1.65 6 150 $3,202 
1991 1.17 $3,139 1.31 6 156 $3,593 
1991, 2nd 
round . $2,290 . 0 156 $0 
1992 1.58 $2,676 0.00 0 156 $0 
1993 . . . 0 156 $0 
1993, 2nd 
round 0.86 $2,512 0.92 5 161 $2,053 
1994 0.97 $2,428 0.59 1 162 $2,504 
1994, 2nd 
round 0.83 $2,548 0.68 3 165 $1,906 
1995 0.93 $2,679 0.74 3 168 $2,475 
1995, 2nd 
round 0.92 $2,482 0.84 5 173 $1,481 
1996 0.92 $2,287 0.87 10 183 $2,120 
1997 0.92 $2,639 0.94 17 200 $2,197 
1998 0.90 $2,980 0.87 16 216 $2,395 







Table 3 Summary Statistics for Variables Included in Regression Analysis 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. n 
Tables 5, 6, & 7 (first bidders)       
Bid per acre 2282 2021 1120 563 11444 277 
ln(Bid per acre) 7.64 7.61 0.41 6.33 9.34 277 
Number of bidders 31.7 30 10.99 6 53 277 
State budget/bidder 529 402 340 208 2972 277 
County exp/bidder 91.6 73.6 84.3 25.3 1001 277 
Market easement value 3556 3377 1123 1432 10153 277 
Cumulative acceptances 90 82 63.08 0 222 277 
ln(Cumulative acceptances+10) 4.33 4.52 0.83 2.3 5.45 277 
       
Table 4 (rounds)       
Number of bidders 24 25 11.88 1 53 24 
State budget/bidder 604 432 600 0 2972 24 
County exp./bidder 117.0 73.1 196.4 0 1001 24 






Table 4 Estimated Coefficients for Predicting Three Measures of Competitiveness:   
Number of Round (n = 24) 
 Dependent variable 
 
Number of bidders in 
round t 
#A 
State budget at t per 
bidder at t 
#B 
County expenditure at 
t-1 per bidder at t 
#C 
County 






announced for t 
-7.82 x 10-5 
(0.26) -- -- 
# accepted 






















    
Prob. > F 0.0076 0.0008 0.000 






Table 5 Estimated Coefficients for ln(Bid per acre), first-time bidders only 
(equation (11), n = 277) 












�1: Predicted Bidders (#A) 
-0.014 
(5.85) -- -- -- -- 
�1:  State Budget at t per 
Predicted Bidder (#A) -- 
0.00031 
(6.69) -- -- -- 
�1:  Predicted State-Budget-per-
Bidder (#B)  -- 
0.00023 
(3.27) -- -- 
�1: County Exp. at t-1 per 


















      
�median
b 1.39 1.13 1.10 1.06 1.05 
)0(θ
b 0.31 0.42 0.35 0.40 0.38 
      
R2 0.56 0.58 0.53 0.52 0.53 






Table 6 Estimated Coefficients for Alternative Specifications of ln(Bid per acre),  






















�1:  State Budget at t per 





�1:  County Exp. at t-1 per 











(10.34) -- -- 










     
�median
b 1.15 1.07 1.14 1.07 
)0(θ
b 0.38 0.36 0.59c 0.52c 
     
R2 0.55 0.47 0.57 0.50 
a t-ratios in parentheses.  b These estimates include Goldberger’s correction (Goldberger, 1968).  







Table 7 Estimated Coefficients for ln(Bid per acre), second-time bidders only (equation (12), n = 
109) 









�1: Predicted Bidders (#A) -- -- -- -- 
�1:  State Budget at t per 
Predicted Bidder (#A) 
0.00026 
(3.18) -- -- -- 
�1:  Predicted State-
Budget-per-Bidder (#B) -- 
0.00004 
(0.53) -- -- 
�1: County Exp. at t-1 per 




Exp.-per-Bidder (#C) -- -- -- 
0.00017 
(0.88) 
)ˆln( )(tθ  from #2 from #3 from #4 from #5 
     
10 ˆˆ αα −  0.12 0.08 0.12 0.14 
     
R2 0.44 0.49 0.48 0.50 










































































By:  Andrew Stocking 
 
I. Introduction 
Auctions are increasingly being used in both government and private contexts 
to exchange goods and services.  Cramton (2007) estimates that over 450% of world 
GNP (~$30 trillion in 2000) is traded each year through auctions and the applications 
continue to grow41.  Auctions have the benefit of a rich economic theoretical 
literature and significant flexibility such that they can handle many different types of 
products and significant variation in expressiveness by auction participants42
One specific implementation of an auction to buy goods is the online 
advertising auction, which is currently used by Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft, Ask, 
among others to allocate search engine advertising space to advertisers.  Stated 
simply, the objective of the search engine is to solve a searching consumer’s need.  
The more successful the search engine is in meeting consumer needs, the more the 
search engine will be used for consumer search in the future and the more revenue the 
search engine will earn.  For each of the 9.82 billion searches completed annually on 
search engines in the US (or 61.04 billion searches worldwide), these search engines 
.   
                                                 
40 Special thanks to Andreas Lange, Peter Cramton, Lori Lynch, John Horowitz, Larry Ausubel, Susan 
Athey, and Michael Ostrovsky for comments and conversations.  Thanks also to Rebecca Young, 
Marya Gomez, Jeff Regen, Cecilia Snyder for providing access to their data. 
41 Recently the Federal Aviation Administration has considered using an auction to allocate takeoff and 
landing slots in New York’s airports.  More relevant to this discussion, the last 5 years have witnessed 
the growth of online advertising (search engines) or goods (eBay, Amazon) auctions. 





attempt to solve the searching consumer’s need by displaying both organic results 
according to their proprietary search algorithm and advertisements based on real-time 
continuous auctions for each search term.  The keyword or “adword” auction 
determines the order to display advertisers and the associated cost charged to each 
advertiser.  These auctions accounted for 40 percent or $8 billion of total online 
advertising spending in 2007.  This figure is projected to increase to $25 billion by 
2012 (Klaassen, 2007).   
 Given the relative newness of these markets, economic research is just starting 
to materialize and generally followed one of two bifurcations.  First, computer 
scientists have analyzed these auctions from an algorithmic perspective.  Due to the 
complexity of the strategy space they are forced to work under very confining 
assumptions toward the goal of estimating lower bounds on optimal revenue for the 
search engine (see for example, Roughgarden and Sundararajan, 2007; Goel, et al., 
2008).   
 The second strain of research is the one I will extend with this analysis.  In 
this area of the literature, economists have analyzed optimal search algorithms from 
the consumer perspective (Athey and Ellison, 2008) and optimal bidding behavior 
under a simplified version of the current adword auction setup (Edelman et al., 2007; 
Varian, 2007, Aggarwal et al., 2006).43
                                                 
43 For purposes of this analysis, “consumers” will refer to the individuals performing the search and 
asking a question of the search engine; “advertisers” or occasionally “bidders” will refer to the firms 
engaged in the strategic bidding process; “search engines” or “platforms” will refer to the search 
engine hosting the market which caters to both consumers and advertisers. 
  Their research extends a rich literature on 
auction design (Ausubel and Cramton, 1999; Maskin, 1992; McAfee and McMillan, 




further extends their analysis by relaxing two simplifying assumptions in an effort to 
make the adword auction models richer in inputs and conclusions.  This more robust 
model, as presented below, represents the first contribution to the literature. 
 The first relaxed assumption relates to the homogeneity of keywords.  In the past, 
specific keywords have been characterized as homogenous in their value to advertisers 
(Edelman et al., 2007; Varian, 2007).  That is, advertisers have a marginal value per click that 
is independent of the keyword on which advertisers are bidding.  I enlarge this equilibrium 
bidding environment such that advertisers must select both keywords on which to bid and 
their respective bids for those keywords.  This is an important extension because keywords 
vary by their specificity and relevance to an advertiser’s product.  The existence of a 
continuum of keyword specificity and relevance with respect to any advertiser is then used by 
the search engines to determine the quality-weight of the advertiser’s bid.  This heightens the 
importance of understanding how advertisers select the “quality” of the keywords on which 
they are bidding.  Thus, the enlarged equilibrium model allows one to model the advertiser’s 
profit-maximizing selection of keywords when advertisers are asymmetric over their 
advertising strategies. 
 Asymmetric advertising strategies are the second extension to the current 
models.  I begin by deconstructing the advertising firm’s objective function to allow 
them to vary in the value they receive from advertising.  Stated simply, the objectives 
for online advertisers can be aggregated into three categories: those advertisers who 
are most interested in branding, traffic, or transactions where advertiser value is 
measured in terms of impressions, clicks, and actions/purchases, respectively.  
Realistically, an advertiser’s true objective function is likely to be a weighted 
combination of these three components; however, I will assume that advertisers fall 




 Each of these advertiser-types is present on the internet, though in different 
proportions.  Historically advertising in newspapers, the radio, and television has 
been thought of as primarily a mechanism for branding.  This is due to the fact that 
there was no explicitly trackable action44
 Since the advent of the internet, traffic – or number of visitors – has been an 
important metric in determining the value of a website.  Over the past decade, many 
of the large acquisitions of online entities have been based exclusively on volumes of 
website traffic, independent of the revenue of the firm.
 following an advertisement and thus 
advertisers relied simply on the number of people reached as a proxy of the 
effectiveness of the advertisement.  This is not true on the internet because there are a 
number of trackable actions, including visitors (traffic) and purchases (transactions).  
Thus, those advertisers only interested in branding represent a small fraction of the 
firms advertising on the internet.  They are primarily large firms with recognizable 
brands.   
45
                                                 
44 Coupons are a notable exception.  Advertisers could publish coupons and track the redemption over 
a period of time to understand the efficacy of the advertising outlet. 
  In general there are two 
types of advertisers seeking traffic.  The first is composed of community sites that 
rely on traffic to create a vibrant community; these advertisers often have answers to 
consumers’ needs and are thus are complementary to the search engine’s mission.  
The second and significantly larger group of traffic advertisers is composed of 
aggregator sites.  These sites sell advertising to specific targeted groups of advertisers 
45 While difficult to disentangle the exact valuation method for most acquisitions, it’s clear from press 
statements and other information that traffic is a big factor in the equation.  iVillage.com was acquired 
for $600 million by NBC in 2006 because NBC wanted to “access a critical mass of Web users” 
(Davis, 2006).   iVillage reportedly had 14.5 million visitors and $91 million in revenue.  Similarly 
MySpace was purchased for $580 million by Fox in 2005.  At the time MySpace had 90 million 




(e.g., Caribbean travel firms, machine parts, low price airline travel) and then 
advertise on search engines to attract people to their search engine-like site.  As such, 
these traffic advertisers are substitutes for the search engine.  Their goal is to attract 
advertisers and consumers away from the search engine on which they are advertising 
such that, in the future, consumers will come directly to their aggregator site.  As 
might be expected, the nature of these advertisers as substitutes makes them 
unattractive to search engines as market participants.   
 The final type of advertiser is the transaction and conversion advertiser.  
These advertisers would appear to be most directly interested in solving a consumer’s 
need and thus are the most complementary to any search engine’s mission.  That is, 
one can reasonably assume that a consumer who makes a purchase from an advertiser 
has accomplished what she set out to do when initiating the search.  A transaction 
could include buying a book from Amazon.com, signing up for newsletter of NPR, or 
making a donation to World Wildlife Fund.   
 With these two model extensions in place, I make a second contribution to the 
literature by describing how the subsidization of advertisers affects search engine 
revenue.  Outside of the search engine context, the subsidization of bidders and in 
particular, bidders who might otherwise not participate in the auction, has been 
studied from a number of different perspectives (Ayres and Cramton, 1996; Higgins 
and Roberts, 2009).  Following Bulow and Klemperer (1996), it is well-established 
that adding an 1stn +  bidder to a second price auction is superior to allowing the 
auctioneer to negotiate the best price possible with the n original bidders.  




auctions even if the 1stn +  bidder is subsidized by the auctioneer to participate.  In 
both cases, this result holds because of the additional competition brought to the 
auction by the 1stn +  bidder.  This mechanism also holds in the case of keyword 
auctions, but a second mechanism for increasing revenue may also be present: the 
addition of a high-quality advertiser.   
 The analysis of advertiser subsidization is inspired by an innovative program at 
Google that entices a relatively small player in terms of time and financial resources – the 
charitable organization – to become an active participant in the adword auction when they 
might otherwise have not participated.  Between its inception in 2003 and 2008, this program 
provided subsidies valued at more than $100 million to over 5,000 nonprofits (Wynes, 2008).  
Based on optimal bidding strategies for advertisers, I will elucidate the conditions under 
which subsidization of advertisers is a revenue positive activity for search engines. 
 At the conclusion of the theoretical analysis, I use actual keyword auction data 
and the associated auction outcomes to verify the direction and determine the 
magnitude of the effects in the developed model.  The novel data set comes from 
three different advertising firms across four different search engines.  With this, I 
show that the model developed here is robust to different advertisers and different 
search engines.  This is the third contribution to the literature.  Finally, I will use this 
data and regression results to illustrate through simulation when advertiser 
subsidization is revenue enhancing for search engines.  This is the fourth contribution 
to the literature.  This analysis complements the existing literature and sets the stage 





II.  Online Adword Auction Description 
The general format for online advertising auctions is well-characterized in the 
literature (Athey and Ellison, 2008; Edelman et al., 2007; Varian, 2007, 2009; Lahaie 
et al., 2007; Aggarwal et al, 2006).  Given the large volume of transactions and the 
revenue implications for the search engines, there is significant incentive by the 
search engines to implement continuous enhancements or improvements to the 
current auction design.  As a result, several of the above publications describe auction 
implementation features that are no longer in use.  Here I will describe the current 
implementation, noting where it differs from those described in the above 
publications. 
 Following a consumer search on any of the popular search engines (Google, 
Yahoo!, MSN, Ask, among others), the consumer is shown a combination of organic 
search results and paid search results.  Organic search results are results generated by 
the search engine’s proprietary algorithm intended to deliver to the consumer the 
locations on the internet most relevant to the consumer’s search terms.  The search 
engines are not paid for displaying these organic results in contrast to the paid search 
advertisements which also appear.  These two types of results are separated on the 
results page such that the consumer can easily differentiate advertisements from 
organic results (see Figure 1).  As would be expected, the consumer is free to click on 
none of the advertising links or one or more of the links.  The number of 
advertisements shown to the consumer varies, but is usually less than 2046
                                                 
46 The average advertisements per search for Google, Yahoo! and MSN in June 2008 were 4, 5, and 8 





Consumer welfare, as described in the literature (Athey and Ellison, 2008), is 
improved when the combination of organic and paid results answer whatever question 
the consumer had in mind when initiating the search.  As a result, the search engine 
wants to present a combination of organic and paid results that have the highest 
likelihood of answering a consumer question.  This motivation will become important 
later during the discussion of how different firm-types contribute to consumer welfare 
and why the search engine might choose to subsidize one particular type of firm. 
 The presentation of advertisements begins with advertisers selecting specific 
keywords that, if searched for, will result in the display of their advertisement and a 
link back to their website.  When bidding on keywords, advertisers submit the 
following four items: 1) the keyword; 2) the specific text of an advertisement to be 
displayed in the paid results area following a consumer search using that keyword; 3) 
a link back to a page on the advertiser’s website called the landing page; and 4) an 
amount the advertiser is willing to pay for each click on their link within the 
advertisement.  In addition, advertisers can specify daily budgets for how much they 
want to spend.  Search engines implement two strategies with respect to maximum 
budgets: Standard or Accelerated47
                                                                                                                                           
showed 6.5, 6, and 8 paid advertisements, respectively (Stokes, 2008).  However, in the data from 
Section V, the search engines report up to 170 positions for some keywords. 
.  Under the Accelerated delivery method, the 
advertiser’s ad is displayed until their budget is exhausted and then not displayed 
again until the next day when a new budget is in effect.  Under the Standard delivery 
method, search engines “throttle” display of the advertisement such that the ad does 
not appear every time the associated keyword is searched, but appears frequently 





enough to exhaust the daily budget by the end of the day.  Designing an optimal 
allocation algorithm for search engines using the Standard strategy is a difficult 
problem that has been well-studied in the computer science literature (Goel et al., 
2008).   
 Advertisers are charged by the search engine anytime their ad appears and the 
corresponding link receives a click.  This type of payment scheme is referred to as 
pay-per-click (PPC) or cost-per-click (CPC) and differs from traditional advertising 
which charges advertisers based on the view or impression.  Television, radio, or 
some online banner advertisements are sold using view- or impression-based 
advertising models which is often referred to as pay-per-view (PPV) or cost-per-1000 
impressions (CPM) advertising48.  There is a third advertising model that charges 
advertisers only after a transaction has been completed.  For example, Amazon.com’s 
affiliate program reimburses online websites some percentage (e.g., 5%) of the 
purchases made by customers driven to Amazon by that website.  This is referred to 
as the pay-per-action (PPA) or cost-per-action (CPA) model49
 From the search engine perspective, the most important auction design 
questions relate to the ordering of advertisers and the payment made by each 
advertiser following a click on their advertisement.  Ordering is important because in 
the current auction implementation, the order is the only mechanism used by the 
search engine to signal the quality of advertisers with respect to consumer search.  A 
.  Today, most search 
engines employ the CPC model of pricing for adword auctions. 
                                                 
48 In search engine advertising, an impression or view of the advertisement is created anytime a search 
is done which results in the display of the advertisement. 
49 see Agarwal, Athey, and Yang (2009) or Dellarocas and Viswanathan (2008) for more information 




transparent ordering will induce consumers to click on the highest quality advertiser 
most often with decreasing likelihood for lower quality advertisers (Athey and 
Ellison, 2008).  Given that increasing clicks translate directly to higher search engine 
revenue, a search engine will have more control over revenue if they provide a 
consistent and transparent ordering of advertisers.  In practice, search engines have 
suggested that advertisers are ordered efficiently from the top of the page to the 
bottom of the page.  From a consumer perspective, an efficient ordering places 
advertisers in order of likelihood of meeting their search need.  From the search 
engine perspective, efficiency is defined as an ordering that places the advertisers in 
order based on their revenue contribution to the search engine.  While these two 
efficiency definitions may seem at odds, recent search engine market design changes 
suggests they may be more similar than not. 
 Originally search engines ordered advertisers solely by their bid, which 
provides a first approximation of maximal search engine revenue when consumers 
expect the advertisers to be ordered by likelihood of meeting their need.  However, 
search engines found that this approach was not an optimal long term strategy.  The 
ordering largely ignored any propensity of the advertisement to meet the consumer’s 
need, and included only the willingness for each advertiser to pay for a click.  While 
willingness to pay for a click may be related to the ability to meet a consumer’s need, 
it proved to be suboptimal for the search engines.  Thus, after a few searches and 
clicks, consumers were found to be less likely to click on advertisements, ostensibly 
because their prior belief about the utility of a click (i.e., the advertiser meeting their 




search engine revenue.  To address this problem, search engines have recently 
modified their objective to be more aligned with the consumer’s efficient ordering.  
Search engines now rank advertisers by quality-weighted bids (i.e., ordering based on 
the product of the quality-weight and the bid).  This is an attempt by the search 
engine to balance short term gains against long run profits.  In addition, it 
demonstrates the convergence of the consumer and search engine definitions of an 
efficient ordering.   
 Quality-Weight ( q ).  Search engines initially defined the quality-weight 
almost exclusively based on the click through rate (CTR)50 of the advertisement; 
however, since consumers expect an efficient ordering, advertisements at the top of 
the page are likely to receive more clicks than those at the bottom of the page.  
Consequently, CTR is an endogenous (and unstable) measure of quality from the 
consumer perspective.  Ordering advertisers by CTR-weighted bids provides a very 
clear ordering according to the advertiser’s revenue contribution to the search engine 
in the short term.  But if this CTR-weighting does not correspond to true quality in 
terms of meeting the consumer’s need, over time the CTR will fall as consumers 
update their beliefs downward about the ability of the advertisement to meet their 
needs.  To address this problem, various search engines implemented a detailed 
proprietary algorithm for defining quality that is based on a variety of factors that 
attempt to determine a more accurate measure of quality with respect to meeting 
consumer’s needs.51
                                                 
50 Click through rate (CTR) is defined as the probability of an advertisement receiving a click 
contingent on it being shown to consumers.   
  Search engines assign a unique quality-weight to every 
51 One search engine, Google, claims that they are continually refining their Quality Score formulas; 




advertiser-keyword pair.  The product of this quality weight and the advertiser’s 
willingness to pay for a click is believed to result in an ordering that is more 
consistent with the consumer’s definition of efficient ordering.  It should be noted that 
an ordering based exclusively on the quality-weight ignores the advertiser’s 
willingness to pay, which in a competitive marketplace should also be correlated with 
their ability to meet a consumer’s need.  That is, the advertisers are ordered by the 
search engine’s best estimate of their ability to meet the consumer’s need.  And as a 
result, this approach to ordering should not cause a degradation of consumer clicks 
over time and is thus consistent with the effective long term revenue contribution to 
the search engine.   
 A second mechanism implemented by search engines to improve revenue is 
the use of bidder- and word-specific reserve prices assigned by the search engine.  
These reserve prices serve two purposes: 1) they guarantees revenue to the search 
engine from auctions with little competition or from the lowest ranked bidder in each 
auction, assuming the number of bidders is less than the number of slots; 2) they 
serve as a second mechanism through which the search engine can enforce minimum 
quality guarantees to protect the consumer.  I will assume that these bidder- and 
word-specific reserve prices are only used by the search engine to ensure every 
advertiser pays a positive amount per click and advertisers are ordered by decreasing 
quality-weighted bid. 
                                                                                                                                           
relevance of the landing page, the ease of navigation of the landing page, the load time for the landing 
page (i.e., time it takes a user to view the landing page after clicking on an advertising link), the 
number of links on the landing page, the relevance of the keyword to the ads used by the advertiser, 




 Following a click on an advertisement, the associated advertiser is charged the 
least she would have to pay to remain at that position given the quality of her 
advertisement.  More generally, each advertiser pays the expected revenue of the 
advertiser below them at the time of the click divided by their own quality (i.e., 
advertiser i pays 1 1i i ib q q+ + where position 1i +  is below position i  and 1ib +  is the bid 
of the advertisers in position 1i + ).  A higher quality weight allows the advertiser to 
pay less while maintaining a high position.  This auction environment means that an 
advertiser can bring two currencies to the auction with which she can increase her 
position: the bid (b ) and the keyword quality-weight ( q ).  These can be increased 
together to achieve a top position, or an advertiser can use high word quality-weight 
to offset lower bids.  The obvious result of this approach is that advertisers are not 
necessarily ranked by their bids alone, unless all advertisers have the same quality 
ranking.  I now turn to two components of quality for the advertisers:  keyword 
specificity and keyword relevance. 
Keyword Specificity (θ ).  As the name suggests, keyword specificity relates to 
the specificness of the keyword52
                                                 
52 When an advertiser places a bid for a keyword, the advertiser can specify whether they are bidding 
for the keyword using a Broad, Phrase, or Exact match (Google terminology but other search engines 
use similar language).  The Broad match is the default option and will display the advertisement when 
similar keywords are searched, using search engine algorithms to determine similarity.  For example, if 
one bids for the keyword auction design using a Broad match, the associated advertisement will appear 
following searches for design auction, designing auctions, how to design an auction, and building 
auctions.  The phrase match is more targeted in that the advertisement only appears when searches are 
conducted for the keyword(s) in the order specified by the advertiser with or without the addition of 
lead or lag words.  For example, bidding for the keyword auction design would display the associated 
advertisement following searches for good auction design, auction design examples, or what is auction 
design but not design auctions.  Finally, the exact match only shows an advertisement when a 
consumer enters a search query that includes exactly the keyword(s) bid on without additional words.  
This is an area of the auction design that is under constant flux, as search firms are constantly 
optimizing the best approach to displaying advertisements to maximize consumer welfare. 




and “car” are less specific than “University of Maryland t-shirt”, “Combinatorial 
Auctions book”, and “Toyota Prius.”  As the keyword specificity increases, 
advertisers earn higher quality-weight from the search engine, ceteris paribus.   
Keyword Relevance ( R ).  This component of the quality-weight describes 
how relevant the purchased search term is to the advertisement.  For example, 
“Toyota Prius” is highly relevant to a Toyota dealership’s website, less relevant for a 
bookstore’s homepage even if they have books on the Prius, and not at all relevant for 
a cooking school.  More relevant keywords earn advertisers higher quality weights, 
ceteris paribus. 
As stated earlier, the exact formulation for calculating the quality-weight is 
proprietary and a function of many components; however, keyword specificity and 
keyword relevance are known to play both a direct and indirect role in the calculation.  
Directly, these attributes measure the relationship of the search term to the 
advertiser’s landing page and the likelihood that the advertiser is answering the 
question posed by the search.  Indirectly, search engines use the average quality-
weight for all of the keywords within an advertiser’s portfolio of keywords to adjust 
the quality-weight for each specific keyword.  That is, as the advertiser adds lower 
quality keywords (lower relevance or lower specificity words) to their portfolio, this 
lowers the quality-weight for every keyword in the portfolio.  The implications of this 





III.  Model 
I present a simple model for evaluating advertiser equilibrium strategies 
within an equilibrium framework.  This equilibrium is an enlarged concept relative to 
the existing literature which primarily considers bidding behavior given a particular 
keyword.  In practice advertisers are jointly selecting both keywords and a bidding 
strategy.  The model below is unique to the literature though some parts draw from 
the presentations in Edelman et al., (2007), Varian (2007) and Athey and Ellison 
(2008). 
 Firm j J∈  generates profit by selecting a series of keywords i I∈ and a 
bidding strategy *B  which places those keywords in position m M∈ .  The selection 
of a particular keyword influences profits through the corresponding quality of that 
keyword and other unknown firm and keyword characteristics that without loss of 
generality are assumed to implicitly depend on the keyword quality.  Thus, the overall 
keyword quality-weight for firm j  is modeled as a function of keyword specificity 
( iθ ) and relevance between the keyword and the firm ( ijR ). 
 ( ),ij j i ijq g Rθ=  (1) 
Where ( )jg •  is twice continuously differentiable and 0gθ ≥  and 0Rg ≥ .  For ease 
of exposition I will assume there are two word relevancies – high relevance and low 
relevance keywords – and that advertisers are only bidding on the highly relevant 
words (i.e., a car dealership is not bidding on keywords related to candy).  This 





In practice, keywords span a complete surface of relevancy and specificity values and 
advertisers are constantly attempting to determine the most relevant keywords for a 
given specificity (or vice versa).  Selection of the optimal quality keywords could be 
modeled as a probabilistic process by the advertiser, but this complication is 
unnecessary for this analysis beyond a brief discussion below with respect to search 
engine marketing (SEM) consulting firms. 
 Advertising firm profit is modeled as the benefit derived from consumer 
clicks on a portfolio of keywords net of the cost per click charged by the search 
engine.  In addition, advertisers incur an administrative fee ( ( )j nα ) associated with 
the cost of placing bids, tracking performance, and reporting and analyzing results 
which increases with each incremental keyword.  This administrative fee also 
captures the penalty levied by the search engine on the quality-weight for each of the 
keywords in the portfolio as the average quality of the marginal selected keyword 
falls.  Thus, the general profit function for firm j  is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )*,j i j j
i
B nπ αΘ = Π −∑  (2) 
Where iΠ  is the profit derived from the i  keywords bid on by the advertiser given 
the bidding strategy ( *B ) and a vector of keyword specificities (Θ ); { }# 0j in i b= >  
is the number of keywords purchased by firm j , and ( )jα •  is twice continuously 
differentiable, strictly increasing, convex ( 0jα′ ≥  and 0jα′′ ≥ ) and satisfies standard 
Inada conditions ( ( )
0
lim 0jn nα→ ′ = and ( )lim jn nα→∞ ′ = ∞ ).  In addition, equation (2) 




assumption stems from the fact that every search reaches a new person and thus the 
benefits are additive to the advertisers, i.e., reaching 20 consumers is twice as 
valuable as reaching 10 consumers.  This same logic does not apply on the television 
or radio where each incremental advertisement during a particular time slot reaches 
the same group of people and consequently, garners diminishing marginal returns.   
 Given this setup, each advertising firm will optimally purchase jN  search 
terms, where 0 jN≤ < ∞ .  In practice, firms that use an SEM consultant can often 
manage a much larger portfolio of words53
ˆ
jN
.  This is because the consultant is better at 
selection and organization of keyword portfolios that contain the maximum word 
quality.  Consider an example.  From the perspective of the search engine quality 
algorithm, there exists a complete cardinal ranking of quality-weights for every 
search term in the English language with respect to any particular advertiser.  Thus if 
the advertiser selects the highest quality words, she can at most select  words.  The 
selection of words with the maximum specificity and highest relevance, however, is 
probabilistic, and as a result each advertiser must employ some technology to select 
jN  words with the highest quality-weights where ˆj jN N≤ .  The success of this 
technology to select the highest quality-weighted words is observed in the 
administrative fee function ( ( )jα • ) since lower quality words lower the quality-
weight for all words. 
                                                 
53 Anecdotal evidence suggests that an advertiser working alone can typically manage a few thousand 
words; a search engine consulting firm (or advertiser with the technological capacity of a search engine 




 Figure 2 illustrates this example.  In this case, ( )x xnα′  is the administrative 
marginal fee schedule representative of Advertising Firm X’s ability to choose and 
manage the optimal quality words.  Without loss of generality, we assume that the 
marginal benefit from each keyword is fixed at Π .  Under scenario 1, Firm X 
purchases 1N  words and generates a profit equal to the size of region A.  Under 
scenario 2, Firm X decides to retain a search consulting firm to purchase and manage 
the keywords.  If this consultant has better technology for choosing and managing the 
words such that their administrative marginal fee schedule is ( )ˆx xnα′ , Firm X can 
instead purchase 2N  keywords and generate profits equal to the combined size of 
region A and B.  However, Firm X must pay the consultant their retainer fee, causing 
gains to be lowered.  This discussion provides a basis for bounding a firm’s 
optimization problem; i.e., firms will never choose to bid the reservation price for an 
infinite number of keywords.   
 
Asymmetric Advertisers 
The advertising firm profit function (denoted as iΠ  in equation (2)) for 
keyword i  must be deconstructed in order to consider the specific bidding strategies 
for each advertiser type.  I discuss each advertiser type below with their respective 
profit function, starting with those advertisers primarily interested in branding. 
 
Branding (B-type advertisers).  Translated to online search engine marketing, 




equivalent to the number of times a particular keyword is searched.  Thus, advertisers 
interested in branding are maximizing the following profit function for each of i 
auctions: 




i i i i ib
I CTR r q CPC r
θ
θ β θ Π = ⋅ − ⋅   (3)  
Where β  is the value of an impression to the advertiser measured in terms of 
$/impression; ( )iCPC r  is the cost per click to the advertiser and is simplified 
notation for ( ) ,1i i i mmb q q+  or the score of the advertiser in position 1m +  divided by 
own quality-weight; 1M +  denotes the first rejected advertiser; ( )iI θ  is the number 
of advertising impressions as a function of the keyword specificity; and 
( ), ,i iCTR r qθ  is the click through rate which is a function of keyword position on the 
page, the keyword specificity, and the average quality of all of the other 
advertisements on the page ( iq ).  These functions will be described in more detail 
below.  The value of appearing as a paid advertiser following a consumer search on 
keyword i  is: ( )i iv I θ β= ⋅ , assuming keyword i  is in the set of jN  optimally 
chosen keywords. 
 
Traffic (T-type advertisers).  Those advertisers who are interested in traffic are 
selecting keywords to maximize the number of clicks they receive from the search 
engine.  In other words, T-type advertisers maximize the following profit function for 
auction i: 




i i i i ib
I CTR r q CPC r
θ




Where τ  is the value of a visitor to the advertiser measured in terms of $/click; the 
other terms are as described above.  The only difference between equation (3) and (4) 
is the inclusion of the click through rate in both the benefit and cost side of the 
objective function.  This reflects the fact that traffic-focused advertisers achieve their 
value following receipt of the traffic, or a click, and thus have a value for keyword 
ji N∈ : ( ) ( ), ,i i iv I CTR r qθ θ τ= ⋅ ⋅ . 
 
Conversion (K-type advertisers).  These advertisers want to convert a searcher into a 
consumer on their site or encourage some type of online transaction (e.g., account 
registration).  Examples may include cars.com wanting to induce a car purchase, 
Greenpeace wanting a donation, or Care2.com wanting to consumers to subscribe to 
their newsletter.  Each of these advertiser’s objective is represented by the following 
profit function for auction i:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,
max , , ,
i i
i i i i i ib
I CTR r q CR r CPC r
θ
θ θ θ κ Π = −   (5)  
Where κ  is the value of a transaction to the advertiser measured in terms of 
$/transaction; ( ), iCR r θ  is the conversion rate which is a function of the position of 
the advertiser on the page and keyword specificity; and the other terms are as 
described above.  The value to the conversion advertisers from appearing in auction 






Position ( r ).  As described above, ceteris paribus, position is a weakly decreasing 
function of the advertiser score, defined as the product of the bid and the search 
engine-assigned quality-weight for that word/advertiser pair: 
 ( )i i ir f b q=  (6)  
Here ( )if •  is a piecewise constant function mapping real-valued bids to integer-
valued positions and monotonically decreasing (see Figure 3).  This function takes as 
inputs the bids54 i of all advertisers for a given keyword  and returns the position for 
each advertiser.  Given that position depends on the score, advertisers can compensate 
for low quality-weights with a higher bid and low bids with higher quality-weights.  
Thus, as described above advertisers are ranked by the product of their search-engine 
defined quality-weight and their own bid.  By convention, as the advertiser score for a 
particular word increases, the position (r) moves up the page since the top position is 
defined as rank or position one.  Thus, the highest score earns the top position and 
low scores result in positions further down the page. 
 
Impressions ( ( )iI θ ).  The number of impressions a keyword elicits is generally a 
function of the specificity of that keyword (θ ).  Consider for example a nonprofit 
dedicated to wolf preservation that is selecting keywords to advertise a request for 
donations.  Clearly the words donate to [nonprofit] or save wolves are more specific 
than gift or donate.  However, gift or donate are much more likely to be searched for 
                                                 





because their intended meaning is much broader than donate to [nonprofit].  
Exceptions to this rule exist, particularly following a natural disaster when donate to 
Red Cross might be both highly specific and generate many impressions for the Red 
Cross, but these exceptions occur only infrequently.  The impression function is 
assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, decreasing and the second derivative 
is positive for low specificity words (i.e., there is a long tail of low specificity 
keywords) ( ) 0I θ′ ≤ .  I use this heuristic model in Assumption 1 to define keyword 
specificity. 
 
Assumption 1. Specificity.  For any two keyword specificity types Hθ  (high 
specificity) and Lθ  (low specificity), specificity is defined such that ( )HiI θ < ( )LiI θ  
and thus when there exists a continuous distribution of specificities, ( ) 0I θ′ ≤ . 
 
Click-through-Rate ( ( ), ,i iCTR r qθ ).  The CTR is defined as a function of the 
position or rank, the keyword specificity, and the average advertiser quality on the 
page.  Inherent in this definition is the assumption that consumers do not glean any 
additional information beyond ordering from the advertisements (i.e., advertiser 
brand, advertiser text) as to the advertiser’s ability to satisfy a consumer’s need.  This 
is consistent with the assumption made by Edelman et al (2007)55
 
.   
                                                 
55 An analysis of the validity of this assumption requires a dataset of advertisers by keyword which can 
only be obtained from the search engines.  The data described below and used to validate the 
theoretical setup described here is a dataset of keywords by advertisers which will not support the 




To motivate an understanding of both the CTR and the conversion rate (CR), I will 
present a model of consumer behavior that extends the work of Athey and Ellison 
(2008) to consider two general groups of consumers instead of just one.  These two 
groups are composed of: 1) those consumers ( Ac ) who generally know what they 
want and have entered the appropriate search term; and 2) those consumers ( Bc ) who 
are unsure what they want and/or have entered a non-optimal search term such that 
the search results page may or may not contain the information they want.  Similar to 
Athey and Ellison’s setup, consumers receive a benefit of 1 if their need is met and 
incur a cost for clicking on an advertisement ( { }, ,zs z A B∈ ).  For the first group of 
consumers this cost ( As ) is drawn from a cumulative probability distribution 
( ) [ ], 0,1A A AG s s ∈  which is first order stochastically dominated by the search cost for 
the second group of consumers ( Bs ) that is drawn from a cumulative probability 
distribution ( ) [ ], 0,1B B BG s s ∈ .  The ability of an advertiser to meet a consumer’s 
need ( µ ) is modeled as the product of the quality-weight ( q ) and the value derived 
by the advertiser ( v ) from appearing in the auction and distributed on the CDF F  
with support [0, µ̂ ] where µ̂  is some upper limit on ability of an advertiser to meet a 
consumer’s need.  I assume that advertisers are sorted from top position to bottom 
position by this indicator ( q vµ = ⋅ ) where the top advertiser is most likely to meet 
the consumer’s need.  This is consistent with the interpretation that the current 
advertiser ordering is the search engine’s best estimate of the consumer efficient 
order.  Inherent in this setup is the assumption that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium 




strategy does not upset the ordering.  This generic probability of meeting a 
consumer’s need ( ( )F µ ) determines the probability that the advertiser meets the 
need of a consumer for the respective groups defined by ( )( )z z Fη φ µ=  where 
( )( ) ( )( )A BF Fφ µ φ µ≥ . 
 Intuitively this setup maps quite clearly to the behavior of the search engines 
with respect to the two groups of consumers.  The consumers in group B do not know 
what they want or if their search query is accurate.  Consequently, they also know 
that they are further from satisfying their need and only use clicks on advertisers to 
narrow their search.  Given that they may have to search again with a new and better 
defined search query, they are less disposed to clicking on advertisers.  This behavior 
is modeled by giving consumers in group B higher search costs than consumers in 
group A ( BG  first order stochastically dominates AG ) (see Figure 4).  Once a 
consumer from either group clicks on the advertiser, zη  is the probability that the 
advertiser meets the consumer’s need.  For the A group of consumers, “meeting their 
need” is obvious since they know what they want and have searched for that need 
appropriately.  For the B group of consumers, their “need” is less well defined.  They 
must determine if they want what their search query has produced since they may not 
know exactly what they want.  Alternatively, if they knew what they wanted but did 
not know the appropriate search term, they must determine if their search query 
produced what they truly wanted.  This explains why for any given advertiser, the 




than the probability that the same advertiser meets the need of a consumer from group 
B (see Figure 4).   
 The behavior of these two consumer groups is assumed to be independent.  
Given the decreasing likelihood that an advertiser will meet a consumer’s need for 
advertisers lower in the list, intuition suggests and Athey and Ellison show that the 
optimal consumer strategy is to follow a cascade model of search (2008).   That is, 
consumers will start clicking on the top advertiser and continue down the list of 
advertisers until their need is met ( zη ) or the expected utility from the next advertiser 
is less than their search costs.  In addition to this, I make the following assumption: 
 
Assumption 2. Retention.  A much larger fraction of consumers leave the search 
process because of negative expected utility rather than having their need met.  Stated 
mathematically: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , 1 , , 11 1A m A A m B m B B mG Gη η η η+ +− ≥ −  (7) 
Where ( ),1 z mη−  is the fraction of group- z consumers who have not met their need in 
the thm  position and ( ), 1z z mG η +  is the fraction of group- z  consumers who will click 
on the 1stm +  advertiser.   
 
The retention rate is the percentage of consumers who have not stopped 
clicking on advertisers, either because their need has not yet been met or because they 
still estimate a positive expected profit from clicking.  The retention assumption 




for group B consumers.  This is not a particularly demanding assumption.  Consider, 
for example, the following setup:  ( ) [ ]~ 0,1F Uµ , 110Aη µ ξ= + , 110Bη µ=  where 
both groups of advertisers have identically distributed search costs ( [ ], ~ 0,1A Bs s U ).  
As long as the maximum probability of an advertising meeting the need of a 
consumer is less than 0.9, condition (7) holds.  The maximum probability occurs for 
an advertiser where 1µ =  and thus condition (7) holds when or [ ]0,0.8ξ ∈  using the 
above setup.  If search costs are not equal – group B consumers have higher search 
costs than group A consumers – this increases the likelihood of condition (7) holding.  
That is, the search costs of group B consumers need only be shifted higher than those 
of group A by a small margin to make the retention assumption hold even when the 
maximum probability of an advertising meeting the need of a consumer is 0.99.   
Finally, by nature of the group descriptions, it is natural to assume that consumer 
group B is more likely to search lower specificity keywords than consumer group A.  
This setup produces the following results, summarized in Lemma 1 and 2 below. 
 
Lemma 1.  Differences between the two groups of consumers result in the following 
CTR conclusions: 
1) The CTR increases with keyword specificity for a given position, i.e., 
0CTR θ∂ ∂ ≥ . 
2) The CTR is falling in position for a given keyword auction, i.e.,  0CTR r∂ ∂ ≤ . 
3) The CTR increases with the average quality for all advertisements on the 




Proof:  See Appendix. ⊗  
 
The three conclusions presented in Lemma 1 provide a theoretical basis for 
understanding the relationship between the click through rate and its arguments.  The 
literature on click through rate has remained agnostic to keyword specificity and thus 
the first relationship is new to the literature.  The second relationship between CTR 
and position has been shown in the empirical literature (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2008).  
Similarly, Kempe and Mahdian (2008) find that high quality advertisements on a 
search results page impose a positive externality on the CTR of other advertisements 
on the page, regardless of their specific location.  Intuitively this is because 
consumers see a high quality advertiser on the page while maintaining the assumption 
that advertisers are sorted in order of decreasing ability to meet their need.  Thus, a 
high quality advertiser in the middle of the list of advertisers suggests to the 
consumers that the top advertisers are even more likely to meet their need. 
 
Conversion Rate ( ( ), iCR r θ ).  The conversion rate is defined as the probability of a 
consumer making a purchase, subscribing to a newsletter, answering a questionnaire 
or completing any type of transaction requested from a given advertiser conditional 
on clicking on that advertiser in the paid search results.  The conversion rate is a 
function of the position and keyword specificity and for purposes of this analysis does 
not have an advertiser-specific argument.  That is, I assume that any two advertisers 
will have the exact same conversion rate for the thm position. Contrary to the CTR, 




imposes a positive externality on the conversation rate and thus average quality is not 
an argument in the conversion rate.  Using the presentation of the two groups of 
consumers presented above, I present the following conclusions in Lemma 2:   
 
Lemma 2.  Differences between the two groups of consumers result in the following 
CR conclusions: 
1) The CR increases with keyword specificity, i.e., 0CR θ∂ ∂ ≥ . 
2) The CR could be weakly increasing in position, i.e.,  0CR r∂ ∂ ≥ . 
Proof: See Appendix. ⊗  
 
The intuition behind the first result in Lemma 2 follows from the assumption 
that consumers in group A are more likely to search higher specificity keywords.  The 
second result is possibly less intuitive.  Figure 5 illustrates an example for a given 
keyword and six associated advertisers.  Each advertiser has an intrinsic ability to 
meet a consumer’s need ( µ ) that falls for advertisers lower in the list.  This ability 
maps to a probability that the advertiser will meet the need of a generic consumer 
( ( )F µ ).  .  The corresponding order statistics for the six advertisers are shown as 
( )( )mF µ .  The expected overall probability of an advertiser in the thm  position to 
meet a consumer’s need ( mη ) is a weighted combination of meeting the need of group 
A’s consumers and meeting the need of group B’s consumers.  For each lower 
position starting from the top, a higher percentage of total clicks are coming from 




fourth position, there are no consumers from group B left clicking on advertisers and 
thus the conversion rate starts to decrease.  This is only to show that it may be 
possible for the conversion rate to increase with position, especially near the top of 
the list of advertisers.  There is some empirical evidence and significant anecdotal 
evidence corroborating this conclusion (Agarwal et al., 2009; Lahaie et al., 2007).   
 
Cost-per-Click ( ( )CPC r ).  The final functional relationship we consider is the cost 
per click ( ( )CPC r ).  Holding keyword specificity and search engine-assigned quality 
constant, it follows from equation (6), that the CPC is weakly increasing with the 
score (see Figure 3).  That is, as the advertisement reaches the top of the list, the CPC 
will be higher than at the bottom of the list of advertisements.  Determination of the 
exact ( )CPC r  depends on the equilibrium bidding strategy employed by the bidders 
and will be discussed in extensive detail below.   
 
Competition Between Advertiser-Types 
With this understanding of the various functional relationships, I return to 
equations (3)-(5) to draw some behavioral conclusions about the best choices for 
three types of advertisers.  Prior to considering best choices in an equilibrium setting, 
I consider just the revenue for each advertiser type by word type and position.  These 
results offer insight into the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium bidding strategy discussed 
below.  I determine each advertiser-type’s best choice of word specificity (and thus 




specificity affects all positions equally.  And second, I can draw conclusions about 
best positional choices using each advertiser’s total revenue by position.  
 
Proposition 1 (Best Choice Behavior by Advertiser-Type):  Using the above model 
of the functional relationships and the profit functions for each advertiser, the 
following represent the respective bidder-type’s best choice for keyword specificity 
and ordinal ranking over position:  
• T-type advertisers (Traffic): The marginal revenue ( TMR τ= ) is independent 
of keyword specificity and thus they are indifferent to keyword specificity.  
However, given that their portfolio of words is capped at a finite N, they may 
select keywords with more impressions despite the lower CTR and lower 
assigned quality-weights for these words, ceteris paribus.  Their ordinal 
ranking over positions starts with the top position as their best choice and 
continues in order with lower positions (e.g., position 2 = 2nd choice).  
• B-type advertisers (Branding): The marginal revenue 
( ( ), ,B iMR CTR r qβ θ= ) is decreasing in keyword specificity and thus they 
choose low specificity keywords which earns them lower quality-weights.  
Given that all positions generate the same revenue benefits, B-type advertisers 
are indifferent to position. 
• K-type advertisers (Conversion): The marginal revenue ( ( ),K iMR CV rκ θ= ⋅ ) 
is increasing in keyword specificity and thus they choose high specificity 
keywords which earns them higher quality-weights.  Their best choice of 




function which could result in a best choice of position in the middle of the list 
of advertisers. 
Proof:  Follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. ⊗  
 
The implications of Proposition 1 are that the various advertiser types are 
more likely to bid on different word specificities and exhibit different best positional 
choices.  B-type advertisers migrate toward low specificity words and are indifferent 
to position, since all positions generate the same benefit.  However, in an equilibrium 
setting where costs for any particular advertisers are monotonically increasing for 
higher positions, B-type advertisers will always prefer the bottom position.  These 
low specificity words will result in B-type advertisers earning low quality-weights for 
the keywords in their portfolio.  T-type advertisers are indifferent to word specificity 
but always select the top position as their best choice ranking lower positions in order 
by position.  They will bid on low and high quality keywords, but by Assumption 1, 
will migrate toward low specificity, high volume keywords.  Thus, T-type advertisers 
are also likely to earn lower quality-weights for their portfolio of words.  K-type 
advertisers like high specificity words.  Their ordinal ranking of position depends on 
the specific functional relationships for each word.  As a result of their choice for 
high specificity keywords, they will earn higher quality-weights for their portfolio of 
words.   
Despite the differences in advertiser keyword best choices, it is possible and 
perhaps likely that they could all appear in the same keyword auction.  For example, 




Prius dealership wanting to generate sales leads (K-type), the Toyota corporate 
website wanting to brand Toyota (B-type), and cars.com wanting traffic so that 
people will search for Toyota Prius cars on their site (T-type).  Similarly, the terms 
“doctor”, “breast cancer” and “medical tests” could attract all three advertiser types.  
Each advertiser type brings a different bid and quality-weight.  The next question 
from an auction design perspective relates to how the various advertiser types arrange 
themselves optimally on the search results page.  This represents the first equilibrium 
behavioral result analyzed. 
 The optimal arrangement of various advertiser types by position has obvious 
parallels to the matching literature (see e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).  Without 
quality-weights the optimal ordering can be solved using the canonical one-sided 
preference school-choice matching environment (Edelman et al., 2007; Varian et al., 
2007).  That is, advertisers can ordinally rank positions but the search engine 
(representing the positions) does not have ordinal preferences over advertisers.  Once 
quality weights are added, the problem becomes a two-sided matching problem more 
similar to the college admissions environment.  Now the search engine can ordinally 
rank advertisers reflected in the quality-weight assignments.  These rankings are 
translated to the positions such that all positions have identical rankings over 
advertisers and advertisers maintain their rankings over positions, as determined in 
Proposition 1.  Using a simple Gale-Shapley algorithm where the advertisers choose 





Definition 1. Bidder Optimal Ordering (BOO) is determined using a two-sided 
matching algorithm (e.g., Gale-Shapley, 1962) where the search engine assigns 
rankings over advertisers to positions equal to the quality-weights and advertisers 
express rankings over positions equal to the cardinal values of total revenue per 
position.  The product of the quality weights and the cardinal values determines 
which advertiser wins each position.  The BOO is the equilibrium outcome when 
advertisers choose first. 
 
The BOO describes an equilibrium ranking of advertisers that should be 
supported by any equilibrium bidding strategy.  Initially, the BOO will be determined 
by each advertiser’s cardinal values for total revenue per positions based on 
Proposition 1.  Due to the structure of the auction where each advertiser must submit 
only one bid value per click, however, the ultimate arrangement may not be BOO.  
That is, there may be cases where advertisers submit identical scores and the search 
engine must arrange advertisers in some alternative way e.g. randomly.  Imagine for 
example two B-type advertisers vying for the bottom position in a two position 
auction.  They will both submit bids such that their score is slightly greater than that 
of the first rejected advertiser who is bidding her full value per click.  The search 
engine will be forced to choose one advertiser, which may not be the advertiser with 
the highest value for the bottom position.  Despite these tie-breaking scenarios, 





Using the results from Proposition 1, one can quickly see that any equilibrium 
auction outcome will result involve several distinct advertiser blocks, each of which 
may contain one or more advertisers.  Figure 6 illustrates how Proposition 1 maps 
into various advertiser block arrangements.  The exact arrangement of blocks depends 
on the product of the conversion rate and click through rate for the K-type advertisers.  
That is, if this relationship is strictly decreasing from the top such that their ordinal 
rankings are identical to T-type advertisers, then the top frame represents the block 
structure of the auction result.  Alternatively, if this relationship is strictly increasing 
from the top such that K-type advertisers rank the bottom position as their top choice, 
then the middle frame of Figure 6 represents the block structure of the auction.  The 
third frame of Figure 6 occurs when K-type advertisers rank a middle position as their 
best choice.   
 Defining the various blocks shown in Figure 6 is important for being able to 
succinctly describe the equilibrium bidding strategies of the three advertiser types.  I 
will do that now.  At the very top will be a block of T-type advertisers ( 1M ) who rank 
the top position as their best choice, followed by positions further down the list of 
advertisers.  The advertiser in the top position will be satiated, in that she occupies 
her best choice position.  Below 1M  may be a block of K-type advertisers who rank 
their best position in the middle ( 2M ) where at least one advertiser will occupy their 
best choice and thus be satiated.  As described above, if K-types have a total revenue 
per position as describe in the top or bottom frame of Figure 6, this 2M  block will not 
exist.  Next is another group of K-type or T-type advertisers who are strictly below 




{ }1 2M M= = ∅  in which case the top advertiser is satiated).  And finally the group of 
B-type advertisers who rank the bottom position as a best choice are denoted as 4M  
with the lowest advertiser satiated.   In a given auction, each block may or may not be 
present.   
 When K-type advertisers rank their best choice of position in the middle, their 
second choice of position is not necessarily above or below their first choice (see 
third pane of Figure 6).  That is, the ordinal rankings could be bi-nodal such that their 
best choice is position 2, followed by position 5 as their second choice.  To address 
this possibility and simplify the exposition of bidding strategies, I impose the 
following Assumption that removes the possibility of a bi-nodal optimal position.   
 
Assumption 3.  Bi-Nodal.  Given the complete information auction environment, any 
search engine that determines K-type advertisers have a bi-nodal positional ranking 
structure will set reserve prices for those K-type advertisers to ensure that they are 
competing only for the highest optimal position node. 
 
This assumption imposes a restriction on all K-type advertisers that they have 
a single best choice with ordinal rankings strictly decreasing above and below this 
best choice of position.  Inherent in Assumption 3, as well as determination of the 
BOO and throughout the remaining discussion is an assumption about the information 
setting of the auction.  The keyword auction is set-up such that advertisers can make 
continuous modifications to their bid and receive feedback on the effect of this 




infinite opportunities to learn how competitors are behaving, the keyword auction can 
be modeled as a simultaneous-move, one-shot game of complete information 
(Edelman et al, 2007; Varian, 2007).   
 Given this complete information setting, Assumption 3 and an advertiser 
arrangement according to the BOO, Lemma 3 describes the equilibrium nature of 
2M : 
 
Lemma 3.  If { }2M ≠ ∅ , it must contain only K-type advertisers who rank a position 
other than the top position as their best choice and all K-type advertisers above their 
best positional choice. 
Proof:  2M  is defined from below (i.e., further down positions) to include only K-type 
advertisers (i.e., the lower boundary of 2M  is defined by a T-type or B-type 
advertiser) thus the only way to violate Lemma 3 is the existence of an unsatiated K-
type advertiser above her best choice position and above a T-type advertiser.  By 
nature of the model described above, K-type advertisers experience identical CTR  
and CR  functional relationships and thus only the $ per conversion valuations (κ ) 
are unique to each K-type advertiser.  Thus, all K-type advertisers have the same 
ordinal ranking over positions.  Assume that Lemma 3 is not true and it is necessary 
to include one T-type advertiser in 2M  to contain all K-type advertisers above their 
best choice position.  But given that T-type’s rank lower positions lower and K-type’s 




T-type will switch positions to the benefit of both advertisers.  Thus, 2M  must include 
all K-type advertisers above their best choice position. ⊗  
 
The above advertiser setup now lays the foundation for describing the 
advertiser optimal bidding strategy.  First I consider a scenario where only one 
advertiser is satiated (the top most advertiser) and all other advertisers rank the 
position above their BOO assignment above their assigned position.  This does not 
require that all advertisers rank the top position as their best choice, only that no 
advertiser, except the top advertiser is satiated.  With the exception of the top 
advertiser, this is the definition of group 3M .  This could include K-type advertisers 
competing alongside T-type advertisers for the top position or T-types competing for 
the top position and K-types competing for (and not achieving) some lower position.  
It cannot include, however, B-type advertisers who always rank the bottom position 
as their best choice or satiated K-type advertisers.   
In a related setting, Edelman et al., (2007) prove that a Vickery-Clark-Groves 
(VCG) strategy is an Bayesian Nash equilibrium that is optimal for bidders and 
achieves the BOO.  The VCG strategy can be characterized as truth-dominant which 
means that advertisers reveal their true per click valuations ( ( ), iCR rκ θ⋅ , τ , or 
( ), ,iCTR r qβ θ ) for use in: 1) determining the BOO and 2) calculating each 
advertiser’s equilibrium bid.  In other words, advertisers cannot do better by 
misrepresenting their true value from a click in each position. The VCG strategy 
presented by Edelman et al. must be modified, however, to account for the two new 




product of the quality-weights and bid) and 2) K-type advertiser’s per click valuations 
change as a function of position.  A modified-VCG strategy that incorporates these 
two features is presented in Proposition 2.  Valuation 1v  is the top advertiser’s per 
click valuation.   
 
Proposition 2 (Limited-Advertiser Bidding Strategy).  When all advertisers fall 
into group 3M  with the top advertiser being the only satiated advertiser, the 
following is a truth-dominant strategy that produces a locally envy-free equilibrium 























 = ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
=
 (8) 
Where *jb  is the equilibrium bid for the 
thj  advertiser, mjv  is the per click valuation of 
the thj  advertiser for the thm  position, there are M  positions (the 1M +  position is 
the first rejected advertiser), and the advertiser in the top position bids their marginal 
value per click (or anything greater than the advertiser below her).   
Proof:  See Appendix.  ⊗  
 
Equation (8) is a recursive formula for stating that each advertiser bids the 
quality- and click through rate corrected negative externality imposed by the next 











1 M k k
m k k k k k
k mm m
b v
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 (9) 
In other words, the thm  advertiser determines the maximum amount she would pay to 
move into the 1stm −  position and knows that the 1stm − advertiser must pay that plus 
the third advertiser’s payment to remain in that position.  The thm  advertiser then 
converts this into a per click bid by dividing the amount by the click through rate for 
the 1stm −  spot and by her own quality. 
Fundamentally, this strategy requires advertisers to pay the negative 
externality they exert on advertisers below them or equivalently, the lowest amount 
necessary to make the next lower advertiser indifferent between their current position 
and the position above them.  The implementation, however, is different from that 
proposed in Edelman et al. (2007) when quality-weights were not included.  That is, 
the negative externality is not defined based on the benefit to the advertiser from a 
higher position, but by the benefit to the consumers from having that advertiser in a 
higher position.  In other words, the negative externality is measured in terms of the 
score (value times quality-weight) and not just the advertiser’s value.  In equation (8), 
the first term for the thm  advertiser is: ( )1 1m mm m m kS CTR S CTR− −⋅ − ⋅  where m mj j jS q v= ⋅ , 
i.e., the score of the thj  advertiser for the thm  position.  The strategy requires that 
each advertiser bid such that they are indifferent to their position and the position 
above them.  Operationally this means that they bid the full negative externality 
imposed on them by the advertiser above them (i.e., the full incremental amount they 




negative externality on advertisers below them).  Once the full externality is 
determined, an advertiser has two currencies with which to pay it: 1) dollars or 2) 
quality-weight.  That is, an advertiser with a high quality-weight need pay less for the 
same position than an advertiser with a low quality-weight.  This multiple currency 
auction has the obvious consequence that advertisers may not be listed in order of 
decreasing financial expenditure or decreasing bid.   
 The *B  equilibrium strategy is locally envy free, defined to mean that 
advertisers are indifferent to exchanging scores with the advertiser above her.  This 
differs from the Edelman et al. (2007) definition where locally envy free occurs when 
advertisers are indifferent to exchanging bids.  This indifference only applies to 
exchanging scores with the next higher advertiser; moving to a lower position 
generates strictly less revenue to the advertiser, as demonstrated in the proof to 
Proposition 2. 
Similar to the strategy proposed by Edelman et al. (2007), the above strategy 
is the advertiser-optimal strategy such that any other equilibrium bidding strategy that 
is locally envy-free will produce more revenue for the search engine and lower profits 
for the advertisers.  Intuitively this is because the strategy shown in Proposition 2 
requires that advertisers bid the lowest amount necessary to maintain their current 
position.  If they bid any less, they would move to a lower position.  Bidding more, 
but less than the advertiser above them would not change their surplus for the 
keyword, but would generate more revenue for the search engine.  Thus, the bidding 




search engine of any equilibrium bidding strategy.  This is shown formally in the 
Corollary to Proposition 2. 
 
Corollary to Proposition 2 (Search Engine Revenue).  The strategy *B  described 
in Proposition 2 represents the lowest possible revenue to the search engine and the 
highest possible profit to the advertisers in the class of equilibrium strategies that are 
locally envy free. 
Proof:  See Appendix.  ⊗  
 
Regardless of whether all advertisers in the Proposition 2 auction rank the top 
position as their best choice, Proposition 2 requires that advertisers are currently 
forced to a position below their best choice (except for the top advertiser who is 
assumed to be satiated).  By definition, this requires that only T-type and K-type 
advertisers are present, since B-type advertisers rank the lowest position as their best 
choice and thus do not receive a negative externality from those advertisers above 
them.   
When satiated K-type advertisers (group 2M ) or B-type advertisers (group 
4M ) exist in the auction, the bidding strategy must be revised.  To gain some 


















Top: 1 6 60 30 0 0 
2 3 30 15 90 81 
3 1 10 5 45 41 
4 0 0 0 0 0 
 
With the following BOO arrangement and Proposition 2 bidding outcome as follows: 







Top: 1 6 T1 30 10 5+2ε  
2 3 K1 45 5 5+ε  
3 1 K2 5 15 5+ε  
4 0 T2 0 5 5 
*Note that the negative externality and bid are measured in units of score or 
assumes that all bidders have equal quality-weights.  
If the bids shown in the “Prop 2 Bid” column above are submitted, it will 
clearly change the ordering of advertisers to an order that is not consistent with BOO.  
The resulting order will be K2, T1, K1, and T2 which is suboptimal for the bidders.  
Consequently, K1 and K2 will both move their bids to 10-ε  to return to the BOO.  
However, this causes T1 to pay almost her full value for the top spot.  In response, 
T1, will lower her bid knowing that K1 and K2 will never choose the top position 
over position 2.  T1 will lower her bid to just enough to prevent T2 from gaining the 
top position (i.e., 5+ 2ε ).  K2 and K1 will follow and bid slightly less than T1 (i.e., 




the ordering (assumed here to be K1, K2).  Thus, all advertisers will bid 
approximately 5 with payments = (30, 15, 5, 0) for (T1, K1, K2, and T2), 
respectively.   
Next consider a slightly revised valuation scenario such that K-Type 
advertisers rank the top position strictly above the first rejected advertiser: 










Top: 1 6 60 30 50 46 
2 3 30 15 90 81 
3 1 10 5 1 6 
4 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Again, the advertisers cannot bid a Proposition 2 strategy or they will be 
placed in an order inconsistent with the BOO.  In this example, it is still optimal for 
T1 to retain the top position; however, the next highest value for that position is K2 
and thus T1 will bid to prevent this advertiser (i.e., the advertiser experiencing the 
largest negative externality from the presence of T1) from taking the top position.  If 
K2 had a value for the first position of 46 in Advertiser Scenario1, K2 would only be 
willing to pay 5 extra units to achieve the top spot (46-41=5) resulting in a total 
negative externality of 10 (5 from K2 plus 5 from T2).  Thus, the largest negative 
externality would still be 30 from T2 moving to the top position.  In Advertiser 
Scenario 2, however, the largest negative externality from the presence of T1 is 
experienced by K2.  As a result, T1 must bid an amount such that K2 is indifferent 











Top: 1 6 T1 45 10 7.5+ε  
2 3 K1 80 7.5 7.5 
3 1 K2 5 26.7 7.5 
4 0 T2 0 5 5 
 
As in the previous example, the bid intended to drive the payment of the 
satiated advertiser (K1) is replaced with a bid that ensures BOO or at least the 
possibility of the BOO (the exact ordering of the two tying bids will be determined 
through a randomization by the search engine).  As in the previous example, the top 
advertiser bids such that she provides a ceiling on the two K-type advertisers who will 
bid up to a level just below the bid of T1.  These examples provide insight into the 
behavior of advertisers when there exists satiated or near satiated K-type advertisers 
who do not rank the top position as their best choice.  Proposition 3 develops an 
equilibrium strategy when all three advertiser types are present in the same auction.   
 
Proposition 3 (Tri-Advertiser Equilibrium Bidding Strategy):  Order M  
advertisers according to the BOO and designate as belonging to one of the following 
groups (starting from the top of the advertiser list ( 1M ) to the bottom ( 6R ):   
{ }1 2 3 4 5 6, , , , ,M M M M M R R=  where { }1 11,...M K∈ , { }2 1 21,...,M K K∈ + , 
{ }3 2 31,...,M K K∈ + , { }4 3 1,...,M K M∈ + , 5R  is the first rejected advertiser who 




move into 3M  and is assumed to be T-type. The following bidding strategy represents 
the advertiser-optimal strategy when all three advertising types are present in the 
same auction.   The optimal score ( *S )  and bids ( *B ) are as follows (Note: the 
notation below always shows the thk  advertiser in the thk  position):  
• 4M : { }( )* 5 6max ,m R RS S S ε= + { }3 1,...,m K M∀ ∈ +  
• 3M : ( )* 1 *1 1
1
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Proof:  See Appendix.  ⊗  
 
The intuition underlying Proposition 3 is fairly straightforward.  The BOO 
places advertisers in an order such that any advertiser’s quality-weighted value for 
their assigned position is higher than any other advertiser’s quality-weighted value for 
that same position.  Thus, any advertiser should be able to bid an amount sufficient to 
maintain their optimal position, as defined by the BOO.  The one situation where this 
does not occur is when an advertiser’s best ranked position is not the top position.  In 
these cases, the advertiser in her best ranked position is prevented from bidding her 
full value or a value large enough to guarantee placement in that position because of 
the auction rule that ranks advertisers by score.  As a result, those advertisers who 
rank a position other than the top position as their best choice position will bid an 
amount equal to other neighboring advertisers. 
This is what happens to the branding advertisers in the lowest group ( 4M ).  
Given that they rank the lowest position as their best choice, this group of advertisers 
will all compete for the lowest position.  The advertiser who values the lowest 
position the most is prevented from bidding a lot for that position, as that will move 
her up to a higher position and she will be undercut by other advertisers in the group.   
Thus, all the advertisers in this group bid slightly more than is necessary to keep the 
first rejected advertiser out of the auction.   
 The second group of advertisers from the bottom ( 3M ) all want to move up a 
position and could be either T-type or K-type advertisers.  Thus, they bid very similar 




their assigned position and the next position above them.  The lowest advertiser in 
this group bids with respect to the negative externality she imposes on 6R , ignoring 
group 4M .  The top advertiser in this group bids the largest amount she would pay to 
achieve the lowest position in 1M .   
The group of advertisers in 2M , like the 4M  group,  is near their best choice 
position and one of these K-type advertisers is satiated at her best choice position.  
Also similar to the setting in 4M , the one satiated advertisers in 2M  cannot bid 
enough to guarantee her best choice position due to the auction rules.  As a result, she 
and the other advertisers in 2M  all bid such that they are either ε  above the highest 
score in 3M  or ε  below the highest score in 1M .  The selection of one option will be 
based on which of the two positions has the highest rank for the group of K-type 
advertisers in 2M . 
Finally, the 1M  group all bid according to the Proposition 2 strategy with the 
exception of the lowest advertiser in this group.  This advertiser must bid sufficiently 
high to make the advertiser with the highest value from the 2M  or 3M  group 
indifferent to their current position or the lowest advertiser in 1M ’s position.  Thus, 
the lowest advertiser bids the most she would pay to move up one position plus the 
largest negative externality imposed by her on those advertisers below her.   
As described in Proposition 3, the presence of multiple advertiser types causes 
satiated, near-satiated, and bottom-desiring advertisers to misrepresent their scores.  






Corollary to Proposition 3 (Search Engine Revenue):  When T-type advertisers or 
unsatiated K-type advertisers (i.e., advertisers in 1M  and 3M ) are replaced with 
satiated and bottom-desiring advertisers, respectively, and all advertisers have the 
same quality-weights, search engine revenue declines. 
Proof:  See Appendix.  ⊗  
 
This concludes the analysis of the equilibrium bidding strategy.  I now turn to 
a theoretical exploration of bidder subsidization. 
 
IV.  Subsidization of Bidders 
With the above background, all of the tools are in place to evaluate bidder 
subsidization schemes.  This represents the second contribution of this paper to the 
literature.  This analysis is framed by the market design elements of Google’s 
innovative program to subsidize charities.  There are several important market design 
elements encapsulated in a search engine subsidization program of charitable 
organizations: 
• Participant Identification.  The program is limited to charitable 
organizations recognized under section 501c3 of the US tax code.  Given the 
separate government entities tasked with ensuring that organization which 
receive this 501c3 classification are legitimate charitable organizations, search 





• Historical Participation.  While same charities may participate to a limited 
extent without the program, the vast majority of charities will never expend 
the time and financial resources to understand optimal bidding behavior and 
benefits from participating in adword auctions. 
• Participant Valuations.    While charities occasionally do some B-type 
advertising, their primary objective is best characterized as generating 
donations of time or money (i.e., volunteering).  To verify this, one is 
encouraged to visit the website of nearly any charitable organization.  It is a 
rare charity that uses up a large percentage of the homepage to build a brand; 
instead the charity is asking for money donations, requesting time donations, 
or seeking some other transaction (e.g., newsletter signups).  Thus, charities 
are readily classifiable as K-type advertisers. 
• Program Rules.  The Google program initially involved an application by 
organizations to prove they were indeed eligible and then the charity was 
provided with a $10,000/month credit by Google in their adword auction.  
This credit lasted indefinitely and did not require any financial contribution by 
the nonprofit.  The credit had to be evenly spaced over the month at 
approximately $300-$350/day.  Recently the Google program has been 
expanded to offer $40,000/month grants which require a $1500/month 
contribution by the charity to participate.  Both grant programs renew 
indefinitely for eligible charities.   
• Deviation from Normal Rules.  Charities in the program are limited to a 




Considered simply, the charity subsidization program described above brings 
an otherwise non-existent market participant to the adword auction.  This participant 
can be classified as having a homogenous bidding strategy (K-type) and is easily 
identifiable.  Requiring that the subsidy be equally extended throughout the month 
removes any incentive for participants to become T-type or B-type bidders.  That is, if 
the subsidy could be spent in a single day, it may be in the charity’s best interest to 
avoid spending energy to learn optimal K-type behavior and instead bid on expensive, 
high volume keywords that will bring small short term gains to the charity.  This is 
not possible given the program rules.  Participants must understand the rules and their 
own per click valuations enough to evenly spend their subsidy throughout the month.   
In addition, by selectively targeting K-type bidders, the search engine is likely 
to see the subsidized advertiser bid on high specificity words with higher quality-
weights.  This lowers the total cost of the subsidy for the search engine and increases 
the likelihood that charities will have high enough scores with the bid cap to appear in 
the paid search results.  Had the subsidization program been open to any advertisers, 
two challenges may have arisen:  1) the program may have attracted aggregator T-
type advertisers which, as described earlier, are substitutes to any search engine and 
thus not preferred recipients for a subsidy; 2) the program may have attracted B-type 
advertisers who will aggregate toward the bottom of the search listings and not 
increase the quality of the advertiser offering to the consumers.  Conversely, the 
objectives of K-type advertisers are consistent with those of the search engine in that 
both want to satisfy a consumer’s need.  Thus, subsidizing K-type advertisers is a best 




The question raised initially, however, is whether this best choice extends not 
only to long term revenue benefit but may also increase the short term revenue of the 
search engine platforms.  As an example, consider the following five advertisers 
competing for the same four positions.  The base case does not include the subsidized 
charity (S1).   
Advertiser Scenario 3 
Position  Clicks  














Top: 1 6 60 30 18 12 36 
2 3 30 15 9 6 18 
3 1 10 5 3 2 6 
Reject: 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Clearly the other four advertisers (T1, T2, T3, and T4) will be ranked 
according to their τ  valuations and will bid and pay according to Proposition 2.  This 
is noted as the Original Payment in the table below.  Then when the new subsidized 
charity (S1) enters the bidding, she is placed according to the BOO.  The New 
Payment column describes the payments to the search engine with the additional 
bidder.  In this example, it is the case that the addition of a new bidder in position 2 
results in more profit (34 vs. 33) for the search engine, even when the entire payment 






Position  Clicks  Advertiser  
Original 
Payment  
New Payment  
Top: 1  6  T1  5*3 + 8 = 23  6*3 + 13 = 31  
2  3  S1  --  5*2 + 3 = 13  
3  1  T2  3*2 + 2 = 8  3  
Reject: 4  0  T3  2  0  
5  0  T4  0  0  
Revenue  33  47 – 13 = 34  
 
While the payments from the T2 advertiser and the T3 advertiser are reduced, 
the payment from the T1 advertiser is raised enough to offset the subsidy.  One can 
observe from this example the benefits of a subsidization location right below a large 
drop in the click through rate.  This causes the subsidized advertiser to bid a lot to 
make her indifferent between her current position and the position above her.  And 
this higher bid causes the advertiser above the subsidized advertiser to pay 
significantly more.  For simplicity, this example assumes that all advertisers have the 
same quality-weight.  If this were not the case and the subsidized charity had a higher 
quality weight, the revenue difference would not change, but the amount paid to the 
charity would fall.  Thus the subsidy from the search engine to the subsidized bidder 
falls as the quality-weight increases. 
With this intuition, I present a more formal analysis of the search engine 
revenue effects of advertiser subsidization.  Consider an auction that does not contain 
any satiated advertisers.  That is, the auction is either only T-type in group 1M  or T-




the charity enters a given keyword auction at position K , moving the original 
advertiser ( K ) down one position and the thM  advertiser to the 1stM +  position to 
become the first rejected advertiser.  The score of the new subsidized advertiser is 
then denoted as KS ′ .  I assume there are M  positions and that all scores maintain 
their pre-subsidization positional label.  That is, before the subsidization, the last 
advertiser has score MS  and click through rate MCTR ; after subsidization this 
advertiser maintains score MS  but moves to click through rate 1 0MCTR + = .  With this 
notation, the change in revenue to the search engine following subsidization of an 
advertiser is defined as: 
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∑  (10) 
 
Where Rev∆ =(RevSubsidy – RevNoSubsidy – Subsidy), K K KS q v= .  For notational ease, 
equation (10) also assumes that scores are not position-dependent.  This is not 
expected to be the case for K-type advertisers and thus the analog to (10) with 
position-dependent scores would be required.  Derivation is trivial; multiple out the 
above score and CTR differences such that each term includes the product of a click 
through rate and score, where the value of the score is always taken at the position of 
the multiplied click through rate (e.g., * *
K




An advertiser subsidization program involves three revenue adjustments 
which can be mapped to the three terms presented in equation (10).  First, assuming 
the subsidized advertiser is not the top advertiser the first term represents the 
additional revenue earned by the search engine from the advertiser above the 
subsidized advertiser.  The magnitude of this term increases with the size of the 
difference in scores between the new advertiser ( K ′ ) and the displaced advertiser 
( K ) and the size of the CTR between the new advertiser ( KCTR ) and the position 
above her ( 1KCTR − ).  This confirms the intuition generated by Advertiser Scenario 3.  
Thus, a subsidization scheme that brings in subsidized advertisers at the position 
below the largest drop-off in CTR will lead to the largest possible first term.  As long 
as the subsidized advertiser does not win the top position, the first term will always be 
positive; otherwise, this first term is zero.   
Second, search engine revenue will likely be decreased from each of the 
bidders below the subsidized advertiser who is pushed down a position.  This effect is 
represented by the second term.   These terms are not necessarily negative as a very 
large drop off in advertiser scores can cause these terms to be positive, i.e., for equal 
quality, the second term reduces to (for the thm  position): 1( 1) 0m mm S m S +⋅ − + ⋅ > .  
Under competitive conditions (i.e., 1m mS S ε+= + ), however, these terms will most 
likely be negative.   
Third, the search engine will receive no revenue from the last bidder who was 
knocked out of the bidding by the subsidized advertiser, as represented by the last 
term in equation (10).  As in the discussion of the second term, this term may be 




the original last bidder.  Consider for example a situation where all advertisers have 
quality-weights equal to one and the pre-subsidization values for the 1stM −  and thM  
advertiser are $3/click and $2.5/click, respectively. Assuming 10 advertisers and 
insertion of the subsidized bidder in the 4th position (i.e., K ′=4), the third term above 
is ( )( )3 2.5 9 2.5 2M MCTR CTR− ⋅ − ⋅ = ⋅ .  If the click through rate is large for the last 
position relative to zero (i.e., the last accepted bidder exerts a large negative 
externality on the first rejected bidder) this term could be significantly larger than any 
of the components of the second term of (10), especially if the click through rate rises 
gradually over position.  Continuing the example, consider an extreme case where the 
CTR is a constant 1% in every position.  Thus, the first and second terms in (10) are 
zero and the third term is positive.  In this case, even if the subsidized bidder earns 
the top position, the revenue to the search engine rises with subsidization. 
In addition to these three mechanisms for changing revenue, a fourth change 
in revenue from subsidization could occur as a result of the third conclusion in 
Lemma 1: there is a CTR benefit on all positions to the search engine from attracting 
an advertiser who brings a higher quality-weight to the auction.  Thus, bringing a new 
K-type advertiser to the auction – particularly one who bids on high quality-weight 
keywords –would be expected to increase the revenue to the search engine through 
this mechanism; whereas, bringing a new B-type advertiser would be likely to 
decrease search engine revenue due to their choice of lower quality keywords.  
Moreover, by capping the bid of the subsidized advertiser, the search engine is 




reinforces this effect.  The magnitude of this average quality effect is not studied here 
but causes any estimates of revenue increase from subsidization to be conservative. 
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= ⋅ ⋅ −∑  (11) 
Proposition 4 summarizes the revenue implications of advertiser subsidization, as 
shown by equations (10) and (11): 
 
Proposition 4 (On Bidder Subsidization).  Search engine subsidization of a new 
advertiser by paying the entire cost to the advertiser such that the advertiser joins a 
particular keyword auction at position K ′  causing the lowest bidder to drop out 
leads to the following conclusions:   
1) The change in search engine revenue as a result of the subsidizing event 
(and incorporating the cost of subsidization) is increasing in the degree of 
click-through-rate curvature in the position directly above K ′  and 
increasing in the level of click-through-rate flatness in the positions below 
K ′ .  
2) Subsidizing a B-type advertiser ( 4M ) if the number of advertisers exceeds 
the number of positions decreases revenue. 
3) Subsidizing a high quality advertiser has the effect of allowing them to 
participate in more auctions relative to subsidizing a low quality 




Proof: 1) Follows from Equation (10). 2) Follows from the fact that B-type 
advertisers bid only ε  higher than the first rejected advertiser.  Thus adding a B-type 
does not increase the value of the first term and only reduces the revenue from the 
rejected bidder.  3) The revenue value any advertiser brings to an auction is equal to 
their score which is the product of their bid and quality-weight.  Advertisers with 
higher quality weights will be required to bring lower bids to achieve the same score.  
Thus for equal total subsidies, an advertiser with a higher quality-weight will be able 
to participate in more auctions. ⊗  
 
Proposition 4 does not make a statement delineating when or if subsidizing a 
bidder is revenue improving.  From inspection of equation (10), one can see that it is 
possible for subsidization to be revenue increasing but it is surely not necessary.   
A final component deserving of analysis in the subsidy program described 
above is the inclusion of bid caps.  The bid cap can serve multiple purposes, one of 
which is to respond to the possibility raised in Proposition 1 that K-type advertisers 
may become positionally satiated near the top, but not at the top of the list of 
advertisers.  As shown in Proposition 3, multiple satiated and near-satiated K-type 
advertisers uniquely determine at most one advertiser’s bid (i.e., the bottom advertiser 
in 1M ).  Thus, if any of the K-type advertisers who are not uniquely determining 
another advertiser’s bid are subsidized, they are less likely to result in an increase in 
search engine revenue.  With respect to equation (10), the first term is zero in this 
case and so the only effect of introducing a subsidized bidder is to move all of the 




described above, revenue may still increase.  However, if this subsidized bidder were 
forced to move to a lower position by a bid cap (i.e., out of 2M  and into 3M ), she 
would now be uniquely determining the bid of the advertiser above her.  Intuition 
suggests that this condition is more likely to result in a revenue increase for the search 
engine; however, the model above does not support a Proposition on when bid caps 
are revenue improving for the search engine.   
A second effect of the bid cap is that it will force advertisers to bid on only the 
highest quality-weight words or auctions with insufficient competition in order to win 
a position in the auction.  Through the mechanisms discussed above – positive 
externality on CTR from higher quality advertisers, lower cost of subsidization – this 
will benefit the search engine.  Finally, a bid cap may serve as an anchor for bids and 
thus, may influence the actual bid value for participating charities.  Remember that 
the strategy described in Proposition 2 and 3 generates the lowest level of revenue for 
the search engine.  If the anchor causes these advertisers to deviate from this strategy 
by bidding more56
This concludes the theoretical analysis of search engine keyword bidding.  In 
the next two sections I bring data, econometrics, and simulations to the problem in an 
effort to better characterize the magnitude of the effects described in the theory and 
better understand the revenue implications of bidder subsidization. 
, this will result in more revenue for the search engine.  This is the 
third mechanism whereby bid caps may increase the revenue to the search engine. 
                                                 
56 In practice, it appears that subsidized charities often bid the cap making this mechanism for 




V.  Functional Relationship Calibration 
As stated in the introduction, a third contribution to the literature is to examine 
the effects described above using a novel dataset of keywords from three different 
firms across four different search engines (i.e., Google, Yahoo, MSN, and Ask).  The 
objectives of the firms in placing advertisements varied as follows: 
• Firm 1 is a for-profit firm wanting consumers to visit their site and sign up for 
their regular newsletter.  This data was not generated under a bidder 
subsidization program. 
• Firm 2 is a charitable organization wanting consumers to make a symbolic 
adoption of a wild animal as part of a charitable fundraising campaign.  This 
data was generated under a bidder subsidization program. 
• Firm 3 is also a charitable organization wanting consumers to donate directly 
to their organization.  This data was also generated under a bidder 
subsidization program. 
Table 1 summarizes the available data.  Data for firms 1 and 2 are available on 
a daily basis; whereas, data for firm 3 is only available on a monthly basis.  Table 1 
reflects the adjustment of this monthly data from firm 3 into approximate daily 
statistics assuming 30 days/month.  As can be seen from Table 1, the three firms vary 
by the quantity of keywords purchased on each search engine, the price they paid and 
the results they observed.  It should not be surprising that Firm 1 has a higher 
conversion rate than the other two firms (3.8% - 11.5% compared to 0.6% - 1.3%) 
given the lower transaction cost of their advertisement’s request to the consumer (free 




My strategy in analyzing the data is as follows.  Firm 2 has the richest 
collection of data on a single search engine and thus I will start by analyzing Firm 2’s 
data to support the functional relationship conclusions drawn in Lemma 1 and Lemma 
2.  In addition and where possible, I will estimate the magnitude of these 
relationships.  Then as a robustness check on this analysis, I will compare the three 
firms across the Google search engine and similarly I will compare Firm 1 across the 
four platforms (Ask, MSN, Yahoo, and Google).   
Firm 2 purchased 2,300 keywords over 108 day period with 2,188 keywords 
purchased on at least two days.  Using this data I will estimate the CTR  and CR  as a 
function of their arguments.  Search engines do not currently provide information on 
the specific quality-weight or word specificity for each keyword (θ ) and thus I 
cannot directly determine any of the relationships with respect to keyword specificity.  
To establish the relationship with specificity, I employ Assumption 1; namely, that 
keyword specificity is defined such that the number of impressions for low specificity 
keywords are greater than the number for high specificity keywords: ( ) 0I θ′ ≤ . 
Using Assumption 1, I can solve for the effect of keyword specificity on the 
click-through-rate and conversion rate using the following equalities: 









If the empirical analysis finds that 0CTR I∂ ∂ ≤  controlling for position, then it must 
be the case that 0CTR θ∂ ∂ ≥  because by Assumption 1 0I θ∂ ∂ ≤ .  This confirms 
the first conclusion of Lemma 1.  Similarly if 0CR I∂ ∂ ≤ , it must be the case that 




Lemma 2.  The use of Assumption 1 precludes finding a magnitude of the effect of 
keyword specificity on CTR  and CR .  Figure 7, however, illustrates the distribution 
of daily impressions across the 1,256 keywords on Google.   
I should also note that the available data does not allow me to evaluate the 
third conclusion of Lemma 1 regarding the increase in the click-through-rate as the 
average advertiser quality ( q ) increases.  This would require a dataset of advertisers 
by keyword so I can observe the affect on CTR of adding an advertiser with a higher 
quality weight or lower quality weight.   
For purposes of the regressions below, I ignore keywords that do not receive 
any clicks over the term of the analysis and I ignore any days where the keyword is in 
a position greater than 2057
 
.  Both of these events describe low probability anomalies 
that fall outside the model described above.   
Click-through-rate (CTR).  I verify the first conclusion of Lemma 1 ( 0CTR θ∂ ∂ ≥ ) 
using the following regression: 
 20 1 2 3i i i i iCTR I r rβ β β β ε= + + + +  (13) 
Given that I am ultimately interested in knowing the effect of keyword specificity on 
CTR, I run this regression across words and not within words.  Specifically, I 
consider the average CTR for each word and regress that on the average impressions 
for each word, controlling for position.  This regression, including various 
                                                 
57 An advertisement in a position greater than 20 does not appear on the search results page but on a 
deeper page of advertisers.  Thus, for a consumer to see this advertiser, the consumer must go to the 
bottom of the list of advertisers and click the link to see more advertisers.  While infrequent, this 
behavior falls outside the activity modeled above and thus any days where the advertisement is in a 




transformations of the dependent and independent variables is shown in Table 2.  
Given that I am only using keywords that receive at least one click over the period of 
analysis, there are no censored data in this analysis.  The row labeled “Word Dummy 
Included” is used to describe the case when a dummy variable for each word is 
included.  When marked “yes”, the regression describes a linear regression with fixed 
effects for each keyword.  In each of the regressions from Table 2, the coefficient on 
impressions is negative and it is significant in regressions 1 and 3 at the 5% and 0.1% 
levels respectively.  The results suggest that lower impression words have a higher 
CTR than higher impression words, controlling for position.  Using the first equality 
in equation (12), one can conclude that the click through rate is rising for higher 
specificity keywords ( 0CTR θ∂ ∂ ≥ ), as predicted in the first conclusion from 
Lemma 1. 
The second conclusion from Lemma 1 regarding the effect of position on click 
through rate ( 0CTR r∂ ∂ ≤ ) requires a more detailed discussion of the data and data 
generating process.  Given that over 80% of the word*day observations have zero 
clicks (96% of the words with positive clicks have zero conversions), prediction of 
the CTR or CR requires either a two-staged hurdle model or alternatively a tobit or 
Heckman model.  Determination of the appropriate model requires an assumption of 
the underlying mechanism for generating the zero click or zero conversion days.  If 
the mechanism that generates zero clicks (conversions) is independent of the 
mechanism that generates positive clicks (conversions), then a two-staged hurdle 
model is appropriate.  Alternatively, if the same mechanism generates zeros and 




appropriate.  An example of this later case could be that in the consumer clicking 
model, consumers do not follow a cascade model as predicted by Athey and Ellison 
(2007) but instead choose never to click on the top two advertisements unless the 
likelihood of those advertisements solving their need exceeds some very high 
threshold.  Instead, consumers jump to the third advertisement and start clicking 
there.  There is no theory in the literature to support such a model, nor are there any 
empirical analyses of search engine data that reinforce this as a possible model.  
However, the possible existence of such a model warrants analysis. 
Including this model in our range of data generating processes, there are three 
mechanisms through which zero clicks could be generated:  1) the associated 
keyword receives very few impressions and thus no advertiser receives any clicks; 2) 
the advertiser is in a very low position on the page and receives no clicks; or 3) there 
is some nonlinear consumer rule about clicking on a particular advertisement (as 
described above).  To disentangle these three causes of zero clicks, one would need to 
know clicks by keyword for many advertisers on the same keyword.  The dataset 
available here does not include this information and thus arriving at a definitive 
conclusion may not be possible.  However, one can gain insight into the determinants 
of receiving zero clicks through the following regression: 
 ( ) 20 1 2 3Pr 0i i i i iCTR I r rβ β β β ε> = + + + +  (14) 
The results are shown in Table 3 and confirm that a low number of impressions is a 
strong determinant of zero clicks, as is a low position.  Reducing the number of 
impressions from 54 per day to 20 per day reduces the probability of a click by 7 




position reduces the probability of a click by 1.5 percentage points.  This provides 
support for the cascade model of consumer clicking described in Section III, but does 
not exclude the possibility of a non-monotonic clicking strategy of consumers. 
As a further test of the model, I run both a random effect panel tobit model 
and the second stage of a two-stage panel hurdle model.  By using only keywords 
with at least one click over the period of analysis, I exclude a large number of the low 
impression words which receive zero clicks; however, over 70,000 keyword*day 
combinations remain with zero clicks.  The random effects tobit model assumption 
would say that every data point with zero clicks provides information on the 
propensity of that position to elicit clicks.  As an example of where this might break 
down, consider two words.  Word 1 receives on average 5 impressions a day and only 
has 2 advertisers competing for advertising slots.  Word 2 receives on average 500 
impressions a day and has 10 advertisers competing for advertising slots.  Firm 2 is 
present in the top position 1 of Word 1 but never receives any clicks.  Due to the 
more competitive nature of Word 2, Firm 2 is present in position 6 and receives many 
clicks in this position.  The assumption underlying the tobit model would use this data 
to support a model of increasing click through rates as an advertiser moves further 
down the page (i.e., zero clicks in the first position and many clicks in the 6th position 
supports an increasing CTR further down the page). 
The alternative assumption necessary for the two-stage hurdle model to be the 
appropriate model is that when you exclude words that receive zero clicks for low 
impression reasons, the zero click events are caused because the advertiser is too far 




other consumer behavioral clicking reason.  If this were the case, then the second 
stage of the two-stage model could be a regression of CTR on position conditional on 
a positive number of clicks.   
Unfortunately, the dataset available here does not provide sufficient data to 
completely disentangle these two effects and as a result the presence of zero click 
days confounds the results.  However, by running both the random effect panel tobit 
and the fixed effect OLS model one can gain yet further insight as to the appropriate 
model.  The results are presented in Table 4 and are consistent in their analysis of the 
CTR – position relationship.  Both show that as the advertiser falls to a lower 
position, the CTR also falls.  This confirms the second conclusion of Lemma 1.   
This is further evidence supporting the hypothesis that there does not exist 
some non monotonic consumer behavior that causes consumers to be more likely to 
click further down the list of advertisers.  Thus, I use the following fixed effect OLS 
regression as my base regression in the robustness analysis:   
 ( ) ( ) 20 1 2 3ln lnit it it it i itCTR I r rβ β β β µ ε= + + + + +  (15) 
This is the second stage of a two-stage hurdle model and tests the assumption that if 
an advertisement is going to get any clicks, it will generate more clicks if higher in 
the list of advertisers.  While this still may not be the case, the data available does not 
support further disentangling the mechanism causing zero click days.   
 
Conversion rate (CR).  Following a methodology similar to the click through rate, I 
verify the first conclusion of Lemma 2 ( 0CR θ∂ ∂ ≥ ) using the following regression: 




As in the CTR regression, I consider the average conversion rate and average daily 
impressions for each keyword.  Like the regressions in Table 2, this regression does 
not have a keyword fixed effect which allows the interpretation of 1β  to include 
between-word differences.  The results for this regression and various log 
transformations of the variables are shown in Table 5.  As predicted in Lemma 2, the 
coefficient on the impressions term is negative in every specification regardless of 
whether the regression is conditioned on a positive conversion rate.  Using the second 
equality in equation (12) and Assumption 1, this demonstrates that the conversion rate 
is rising for higher specificity keywords.   
To illustrate the results from the second conclusion of Lemma 2, I use both a 
random effect panel tobit model and a fixed effect OLS regression to show that 
0CR r∂ ∂ ≥ .  While the results are not always significant, Table 6 does show that as 
the position increases (i.e., advertisers further down the page), the conversion rate 
weakly increases.  Selection of the correct model for the conversion rate follows a 
similar course of reasoning as discussed above with respect to the click through rate.  
Given the difficulty in disentangling the data generating process for the zeros, but the 
consistency of results across several model specifications, I choose to use the 
following fixed effect OLS specification as my base regression in the robustness 
analysis: 






This richness of the dataset allows for a robustness analysis of Lemma 1 and 
Lemma 2 across different advertisers and different search engine platforms.  First I 
consider the effect of different platforms.  Figure 8 illustrates the average daily 
keyword impressions across the four search engine platforms.  They generally reflect 
similar keyword behavior, i.e., most keywords on which Firm 1 bid are low 
impression keywords.  Tables 7 and 8 summarize the results from all three firms on 
the same search engine platform (Google) using regression 2 from Table 4 as the base 
regression for CTR and regression 3 from Table 6 as the base regression for CR.  In 
Table 7, the signs for the three firms are the same with respect to the effect of position 
on CTR; however, the magnitude vary.  The CTR on keywords bid for by Firms 1 and 
3 drops faster for positions further down the page than the CTR on keywords bid for 
by Firm 2.  This is evidenced by the larger regression coefficient on position for Firm 
1 and 3 (-0.420 and -0.307, respectively) compared to the coefficient on position for 
Firm 2 (-0.104).  The implications of this on platform revenue and bidding strategy 
will be explored in the next section during the simulations. 
Turning to Table 8 one can see that the conversion rate relations using 
regression 3 from Table 6 is also similar in sign and magnitude across advertisers.  
Thus, one can conclude that the results from Lemma 1 and 2 are robust to different 
advertisers. 
A second check to robustness is to compare the same advertiser across search 
engines.  As alluded to above, different search engines employ slightly different rules 




examined here employ a generalized second price algorithm for determining the cost 
per click.  Table 9 and 10 demonstrate that with respect to click through rate, MSN, 
Yahoo, and Google are comparable.  Ask is the smallest of the four search engines 
and thus has significantly less traffic than the other three.  The effect of this is that, as 
shown in Table 1, Firm 1 was almost always in the top position on Ask for keywords.  
As a result of this lack of variation in position, one might expect the statistically 
insignificant coefficients observed in Regression 1 of Table 9.  With respect to the 
conversion rate, Table 10 demonstrates that MSN, Yahoo, and Google again are 
similar while Ask appears to be an outlier.    In all three search engines the conversion 
rate is rising for positions further down the list of advertisers, though this effect is 
only statistically significant on Yahoo.  These results demonstrate that the 
conclusions from Lemma 1 and 2 are robust to different search engines. 
With this setup, I now turn to the final section involving simulating the effect 
of bidder subsidization. 
 
VI.  Simulation 
The subsidization of weak bidders is discussed in theory in Section III where I 
conclude that it may be revenue improving to the search engine to entice an additional 
bidder to the keyword auction even if all of the costs to that bidder are covered by the 
search engine.  The model, however, states this only as a possibility and not a 
guarantee.  It is clearly possible that there are cases where subsidization may cost the 
search engine more than it gains.  To evaluate the conditions under which 




environment using actual keyword data and click through rate results from the 
regressions.  I then compare search engine revenue with and without a subsidized 
bidder.  The results are presented in this section. 
The model assumes that under the base case, there are 11 T-type or K-type 
advertisers competing for 10 positions.  All of the advertisers rank the top position as 
their best choice with the second highest position ranked second and so on until the 
10th position.  That is, ordinal rankings are strictly decreasing for position further 
down the page.  To normalize competitive effects between advertisers, I model all 
advertisers as having a marginal value per click independent of position and drawn 
from a fixed uniform distribution.  This is consistent with the model for T-type 
advertisers.  With respect to K-type advertisers, this accounts for the fact that while 
the conversion rate conditional on positive conversions may be increasing in position, 
the vast majority of clicks result in zero conversions.  Thus the unconditional 
conversion rate is much flatter with respect to position and for purposes of these 
simulations, I have assumed the unconditional conversion rate to be constant across 
positions.  The quality-weights for each of these advertisers are also drawn from a 
uniform distribution.  In each base case model the 11 advertisers are bidding on 10 
keywords, each with a distinct click through rate, as determined by the data in Section 
V for keywords with a positive CTR58
Specifically I run regression 2 from Table 4 and extract the keyword fixed 
effect for each word.  Then for 10 randomly chosen keywords, I use the regression 
coefficients, this keyword fixed effect, and the average number of daily impressions 
.   
                                                 
58 I do not attempt to model zero click events.  Instead I only include in the subsidization simulations 




to estimate the click through rate for each position.  As discussed above, for keywords 
with a low probability of receiving any clicks, these predicted CTRs may be slightly 
higher than in actuality.  However, the occasionally elevated CTR should have no 
affect on the simulation results. 
Once each advertiser’s value by position is determined, I run the Gale-Shapley 
algorithm to determine the Bidder Optimal Ordering for the group of advertisers.  
Each advertiser’s bidding strategy is based on Proposition 2 which is optimal in this 
setting because all advertisers rank the top position as their best choice.  That is, 
every advertiser experiences a negative externality imposed by the advertiser above 
them, except for the top advertiser who is satiated.  Equilibrium bids are determined 
and then based on the specifics of the selected keyword, the total cost to each 
advertiser and thus revenue to the search engine is determined.  This process is 
repeated for 10 keywords and the sum of the revenue to the search engine becomes 
the search engine revenue for one simulation.  Each model consists of 1,000 
simulations such that the expected search engine revenue is the average revenue from 
each simulation: 
 11Rev i q qT
sim w i i
b q
q
+ += ∑∑∑  (18) 
Where i  is the index for the 11 advertisers, w  is the index for the 10 keywords and 
sim  is the index for the 1,000 simulations ( 1,000T = ). 
Following each model (of 1,000 simulations with 11 advertisers competing for 
10 positions over 10 keywords), I introduce a 12th advertiser as the subsidized 




starting at [ ]~ 0,1q U .  For each subsequent model, I increase the upper and lower 
bound on the quality-weight distribution for the subsidized bidder by 0.5.  That is, in 
the second model, the quality-weight for the 12th subsidized bidder is drawn from the 
uniform distribution [ ]~ 0.5,1.5q U .  This continues up to the 90th model where the 
quality-weight for the subsidized bidder is drawn from the uniform distribution 
[ ]~ 9,10q U .  I assume that all advertisers have the same quality weight for each of 
the 10 keywords, but that the quality weight differs across days.    
It should be noted that while the selection of the specific quality weights are 
arbitrary, all that matters for determination of the auction outcome is the relative 
quality weights.  Thus, by varying the quality weight of the subsidized advertiser 
from 0-10 relative to a group of base case advertisers with quality weights between 
3.5 and 4.5, I am effectively comparing a situation where the subsidized advertiser 
has a lower quality weight than the base advertisers, same quality weight as the base 
advertisers, and higher quality weight than the base advertisers.  This encapsulates the 
three possibilities for the subsidized advertiser and is independent of the exact quality 
weights assigned by the search engine. 
To summarize, a single session consists of the following: 
1) Model 1:  a=0; b=1 
a. Base Case Simulation (repeated 1000 times) 
i. 11 Advertisers compete over 10 position for each of 10 keywords 
ii. Per click value for these advertisers: [ ]~ 0.5,2.5v U  




b. Subsidized Simulation (repeated 1000 times) 
i. Identical 11 Advertisers plus a 12th Advertiser compete over 10 
positions for each of the same 10 keywords as in base case 
ii. Per click value for base advertisers (not re-sampled); Per click 
value for subsidized advertiser [ ]~ 0,1subv U . 
iii. Quality-weight for base advertisers (not re-sampled); Quality-
weight for subsidized advertiser is drawn [ ]~ ,U a b  
2) Model 2:  a=0.5; b=1.5 
a. Repeat above  
  
90)  Model 90:  a=9; b=10 
 
Simulation results 
Quality-Weight and Bid Caps.  The purpose of the simulations is to determine the 
effect of advertiser subsidization on search engine revenue under several settings.  
First, I will explore the interplay between the quality-weight of the subsidized 
advertiser and bid caps for the subsidized bidder relative to the base case bidders.  
That is, I will run the above session under three bidder valuation scenarios:  1) 
[ ]~ 0,1subv U ; 2) [ ]~ 1,2subv U ; and 3) [ ]~ 3,4subv U .  The first scenario mimics a 
tight bid cap and forces the expected value of the subsidized advertiser to be at the 
lower end of the possible values for the base case advertisers.  The second scenario 




for the subsidized advertiser is equal to that of the base case advertisers, though 
drawn from a tighter interval.  The tighter interval mimics the fact that the bid cap 
may result in anchoring for the subsidized advertiser which will decrease the variance 
of their values.  And finally, I model a loose bid cap which results in the subsidized 
advertiser having a per click valuation that is in expectation greater than the base case 
advertisers. 
The setup is described in Table 11 and the results are presented in Figure 9.  
The top three graphs in Figure 9 illustrate the revenue difference between the base 
case and the subsidized case under the three scenarios.  The thick solid black line is 
the expected revenue difference and the thinner dotted lines are the standard errors on 
the revenue difference.  In each case, there is a portion of the black line that is 
positive which indicates that in expectation, subsidizing a bidder can result in 
incremental revenue under the assumed model specification.  The bottom three graphs 
indicate the position (smooth dark line) and the value of the subsidy (ridged lighter 
line) under each of the three scenarios.   
There are several conclusions one can draw from these graphs.  First, as the 
quality of the subsidized advertiser increases (represented by the X-axis in all 
graphs), their winning position increases up to the point of winning the top position.  
When the subsidized advertiser wins the top position, revenue for the search engine 
appears to decline.   This is particularly evident in the third graph when the subsidized 
advertiser starts winning the top position around a quality weight of 4.  At this point, 





A second observation is that as the bid cap tightens, there is an increased 
likelihood – under the assumptions made in this model – that advertiser subsidization 
is profitable for the search engine.  And the profitability increases with increasing 
quality of the subsidized bidder.  This is evident in the first graph.  As the subsidized 
advertiser starts winning, the profitability of subsidization increases.  The reason for 
this is that the size of the subsidy is very small (<4) but the large quality-weight of the 
advertiser causes them to have a large score capable of winning the 7th or 8th position.  
Thus, the subsidized advertiser increases the payment of the advertisers above her 
without requiring much actual subsidization from the search engine. 
Finally, as the bid cap weakens, the total cost of the subsidy to the search 
engine increases.  With a bid cap of 1, the largest subsidy is 4; at a bid cap of 2, the 
subsidy increases to 11-12; and a bid cap of 3 causes the subsidy to increase in places 
to over 22.  As predicted, the bid cap serves the purpose of requiring the advertiser to 
bring quality to the auction if they want to win because they will not be winning 
based only on the size of their bid.  As discussed above, this implied motivation for 
advertisers is a natural strategy for the K-type advertisers whose best choice words 
are high specificity, earning them a high quality score. 
 
Role of CTR Curvature.  The second point of exploration relates to the curvature of 
the click through rate equation.  As described in Table 7 and 9, there is some 
indication that while the click through rate is declining as the position falls, it may be 
declining at differing rates.  To test the implications of various curvature assumptions 




represents an even more extreme curvature.  The exact coefficient differences are 
described in Table 11 and the results are illustrated in Figure 10.   
The top three graphs again illustrate the difference in revenue to the search 
engine between the subsidized case and the base case.  And the bottom three graphs 
illustrate the average position of the subsidized advertiser and subsidy paid to the 
subsidized advertiser.  The subsidized advertiser in all three cases is assumed to have 
a bid cap of 2 (i.e., the middle case in Figure 9). 
The results are striking.  As the click through rate curvature increases (faster 
drop off for positions further down the list of advertisers), the optimal target position 
for the subsidized advertiser, from the perspective of the search engine, narrows.  In 
the first graph, the search engine earns incremental profits from subsidization as long 
as the subsidized advertiser wins a position lower than the 2nd position from the top.  
By the third case, the search engine experiences lower profits if the subsidized 
advertiser wins anything higher than the 6th position.   
Intuitively this stems from the calculation of the negative externality for each 
advertiser in each position.  If, for example, the click through rate drop off were 
exactly linear in position, each advertiser would pay to move from position 4 to 
position 3 as much as they would from position 3 to position 2.  However, if there is a 
substantial drop in the click through rate in the first few positions, advertisers 
experience an increasing negative externality as they get closer to the top.  That is, 
they would much rather move from position 3 to position 2 relative to moving from 
position 4 to position 3.  In the third graph, the click through rate is much steeper in 




positions exerts a large negative externality on those advertisers who she displaced.  
This results in a large negative magnitude of term 2 in equation (10) and thus a 
negative profit resulting from subsidization. 
This result confirms the conclusions presented in Proposition 4 and illustrates 
that advertiser subsidization with certain bid caps can be profitable for search 
engines. 
 
Potential Benefits of Anchoring.  The final analysis reflects the possibility discussed 
earlier that the bid cap may serve as an anchor for the bids of subsidized advertisers.  
That is, given the potential lack of bidding sophistication of subsidized advertisers, 
particularly when they first start bidding, they may bid the bid cap instead of 
following the optimal strategy described in Proposition 2 or Proposition 3.  As 
discussed in the Corollary to Proposition 2, any deviation from the Proposition 2 
bidding strategy will result in strictly higher revenue for the search engine.  To 
consider this through simulation I consider two sessions: 1) the subsidized bidder is 
known to have a value of one but follows the Proposition 2 bidding strategy; and 2) 
the subsidized bidder is known to have a value of one and deviates from the 
Proposition 2 strategy by bidding their value regardless of their position.  In this 
second session, all other advertisers adjust their bid based on the new advertiser 
ordering with the subsidized advertiser deviating from the Proposition 2 strategy. The 
sessions and resulting figure are described in Table 11. 
Figure 11 describes the results of these simulations.  As is quickly evident 




strategy results in more revenue to the search engine.  The expected incremental 
revenue when the Proposition 2 bidding strategy is followed by the subsidized bidder 
is $3.47 (i.e., revenue with subsidization minus revenue without subsidization is 
$3.47 as shown from the figure on the left).  When the subsidized advertiser deviates 
from Proposition 2 and bids their full value, this incremental revenue to the search 
engine jumps to $7.06.  From the lower two graphs in Figure 11 it is clear that the 
deviation moves the subsidized advertiser to a higher position and costs the search 
engine more money in terms of the actual subsidy.  This additional expense to the 
search engine, however, is more than compensated for by the incremental fees paid 
by the advertisers ranked above the subsidized advertiser.  Note that the subsidized 
advertiser is most often in position 2 or 3 when their expected quality exceeds 6 and 
thus, the advertiser in the first or second position is being charged significantly more 
with the subsidized advertiser present than without her present.  This confirms the 
theoretical result presented in the Corollary to Proposition 2 and provides evidence of 
yet another benefit to the bid cap. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Search engine marketing represents one of the largest and fastest growing 
means for generating revenue on the internet with over $8 billion raised in 2007.  The 
sheer magnitude of this market and the number of transactions estimated at over 
2,000 each second provides economists with a tremendously rich environment for 




In this paper I extend the current literature in several dimensions.  First, I 
incorporate search engine assigned quality-weights which are used by search engines 
to ensure that advertisers are sorted in order of their benefit to the consumer rather 
than just their bid.  This consumer benefit measure is also consistent with the long run 
revenue benefit to the search engine.  In addition, I present a model where keywords 
can be differentiated by their impressions, click through rate and conversion rate.   
With this framework, I present asymmetric advertisers who bring dramatically 
different strategies to the keyword auction.  I first assume only a subgroup of these 
advertisers is present; the same subgroup assumed to be present in the current 
literature.  With this subgroup, I derive an equilibrium bidding function that parallels 
the equilibrium bidding function currently presented in the literature.  The 
introduction of quality-weights, however, causes the equilibrium bidding function to 
consider the overall value the advertiser brings to the auction and not just their bid.  
Then, I present an equilibrium bidding strategy that is robust to different advertiser 
types. 
With this complex set of asymmetric advertisers, I explore the role of 
advertiser subsidization to determine if it can be successfully used to increase search 
engine revenue.  This represents my second contribution to the literature.  I find that 
while not guaranteed, there are conditions under which advertiser subsidization can 
be revenue increasing for search engines. 
Following a theoretical evaluation, I present an extremely rich dataset which I 
use to fully characterize the relevant functional relationships (click through rate and 




checks using this dataset represent the third contribution to the literature.  This 
extension and validation of predictions with respect to the click through rate and 
conversion rate provides a foundation on which to test alternative market design 
initiatives.  This testing of market design initiatives represents the fourth and final 
contribution to the literature.  Using actual search engine data and simulations, I 
demonstrate that under certain conditions, advertiser subsidization can be used to 
increase profitability for search engines.   
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IX.  Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1 Example of Search Engine Search Results page 
The assignment and pricing of advertisers to paid advertising slots are the focus of 
this paper.  The organic results are determined through a proprietary algorithm unique 








Figure 2 Determining the optimal number of words to purchase.  
Here Π  is the fixed surplus per word and ( )x xnα′  is the marginal cost of managing 
xn  words under one management system and ( )ˆx xnα′  is a more efficient system with 
a lower marginal cost per word.  The equilibrium number of words under the two 
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Figure 4 The distribution of search costs and likelihood of a search need being met for 
consumers in group A and B 
Consumer group A are those consumers who know what they want and how to search 
for it, thus they have lower search costs and a higher likelihood of having their need 
met.  Consumer group B either do not know what they want or do not know how to 
search for it giving them higher search costs and a lower likelihood of having their 
need met. 
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Figure 5 Example of increasing conversion rates 
The overall conversion rate of an advertiser is a weighted average of the likelihood of 
that advertisers meeting the need of consumer group A (those who know what they 
want) and consumer group B (those who do not know what they want).  ( )( )1F µ  is 
the first order statistic of the generic probability of an advertiser to meet a consumer’s 
need.  This is transformed into the probability of meeting the need of a consumer in 
group A and B through the functions ( )( )A Fφ µ  and ( )( )B Fφ µ , respectively. 
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Figure 6 Possible Bidder Arrangement Blocks 
T-type (traffic advertisers), B-type (branding advertisers), and K-type (conversion 
advertisers) in equilibrium will arrange themselves into one of four specific blocks 
depending on the revenue per position for the K-type advertisers.  The revenue per 
position for B-type and T-type advertisers is fixed for any particular keyword but the 
revenue per position for the K-type will be proportional to the product of the 
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Figure 9 Simulation results for varying Subsidized Bidder Values 
In the upper three figures, the middle dark line represents the mean additional search 
engine revenue under the subsidization program and the outer two lines are one 
standard deviation from the mean.  The vertical line through four represents the 
expected quality of the eleven base advertisers.  In the bottom three graphs, the 
smooth line with a maximum value of eleven is the position of the subsidized 
advertiser.  The jagged line is the value of the subsidy.  The underlying value of the 
subsidized advertiser (or the bid cap for the subsidized advertiser) differs across the 
three scenarios getting progressively higher in each case moving right. 
































Difference (Subsidy - No Subsidy)
Subsidized Value ~U[0, 1]
Base Case Value ~U[0.5 2.5]
































Difference (Subsidy - No Subsidy)
Subsidized Value ~U[1, 2]
Base Case Value ~U[0.5 2.5]
































Difference (Subsidy - No Subsidy)
Subsidized Value ~U[2, 3]
Base Case Value ~U[0.5 2.5]
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Figure 10 Simulation results for varying CTR curvatures 
In the upper three figures, the middle dark line represents the mean additional search 
engine revenue under the subsidization program and the outer two lines are one 
standard deviation from the mean.  The vertical line through four represents the 
expected quality of the eleven base advertisers.  In the bottom three graphs, the 
smooth line with a maximum value of eleven is the position of the subsidized 
advertiser.  The jagged line is the value of the subsidy.  The slope of the CTR changes 
over the eleven positions becoming progressively steeper for the three scenarios 
below. 
































Difference (Subsidy - No Subsidy)
Subsidized Value ~U[1, 2]
Base Case Value ~U[0.5 2.5]
B1 = -0.118; B2 = 0.00445
































Difference (Subsidy - No Subsidy)
Subsidized Value ~U[1, 2]
Base Case Value ~U[0.5 2.5]
B1 = -0.301; B2 = 0.011
































Difference (Subsidy - No Subsidy)
Subsidized Value ~U[1, 2]
Base Case Value ~U[0.5 2.5]
B1 = -0.774; B2 = 0.029
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Figure 11 Simulation results comparing Proposition 2 to Value Bidding for Subsidized 
Advertiser 
In the upper three figures, the middle dark line represents the mean additional search 
engine revenue under the subsidization program and the outer two lines are one 
standard deviation from the mean.  The vertical line through four represents the 
expected quality of the eleven base advertisers.  In the bottom three graphs, the 
smooth line with a maximum value of eleven is the position of the subsidized 
advertiser.  The jagged line is the value of the subsidy.  The two cases compare a case 
where the subsidized advertiser follows a Proposition 2 bidding strategy (left 
scenario) against a case where the subsidized advertisers bids their value (right 
scenario) 










































Difference (Subsidy - No Subsidy)
Subsidized Value = 1
Base Case Value ~U[0.5 2.5]










































Difference (Subsidy - No Subsidy)
Subsidized Value = 1
Base Case Value ~U[0.5 2.5]























































Table 1 Summary Statistics for 3 Firms across Four Platforms 
 
Firm 2 Firm 3
Ask MSN Yahoo Google Google Google
346 388 708 710 244 450
Range 1 - 22 5 - 38 21 - 272 33 - 147 818 - 1,256 102 - 809
Mean 13 28 130 81 1,052 406
SD (4) (5) (98) (20) (85) (275)
Range 92 - 28,434 25 - 29,418 145 - 57,605 1,579 - 189,206 37,790 - 117,025 6,180 - 133,906
Mean 6,043 1,472 9,060 19,943 77,611 60,166
SD (5,457) (2,197) (11,333) (25,578) (15,837) (28,740)
Range 2 - 6,736 1 - 722 1 - 11,959 1 - 64,774 1 - 10,323 0 - 37,880
Mean 437 51 58 224 74 256
SD (1,237) (149) (385) (1,990) (476) (2,390)
Range 1 - 3 1 - 24 1 - 67 1 - 170 1 - 88 1 - 82
Mean 1.0 1.5 3.0 2.5 3.1 4.0
SD (0.1) 0.8 (0.1) (4.4) (3.1) (3.7)
Range 1 - 480 1 - 78 3 - 654 53 - 2,483 306 - 1,294 46 - 1,708
Mean 98 32 120 466 931 1,171
SD (106) (18) (148) (358) (223) (540)
Mean 6.1% 8.7% 2.1% 6.2% 1.7% 1.7%
SD  (17.8%)  (19.8%)  (7.4%)  (10.7%)  (8.5%)  (4.6%)
Range 0 - 108 0 - 134 0 - 237 0 - 951 0 - 19 0 - 4
Mean 5 4 28 99 6 1
SD (12) (10) (44) (90) (5) (1)
Mean 5.2% 3.8% 7.6% 11.5% 1.3% 0.6%
SD  (19.3%)  (16.8%)  (21.7%)  (24.6%)  (9.3%)  (5.7%)
Range $0.03 - $0.50 $0.05 - $0.65 $0.05 - $0.50 $0.01 - $10.00 $0.02 - $1.00 $0.02 - $1.00
Mean $0.17 $0.24 $0.22 $0.33 $0.81 $0.80

























Table 2 Analysis of CTR across keywords testing the role of keyword specificity on CTR 
(standard errors are in parentheses) 
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS





position -3.634e-03*** -9.191e-02*** -9.083e-02***
[1.017e-03] [2.192e-02] [2.088e-02]
position^2 5.218e-05** 7.551e-04* 6.924e-04
[1.838e-05] [3.840e-04] [3.691e-04]
Const 4.306e-02*** -4.312e+00*** -3.957e+00***
[3.858e-03] [8.209e-02] [9.357e-02]
Word Dummy Included no no no
n 1,117 1,117 1,117
F 11.10 33.34 51.35
Adj. R-squared 0.0713 0.0230 0.0778
Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered on word); * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%  
 
 
Table 3 Analysis of the determinants of zero click events 
(1)
Probit, mfx









Likelihood Ratio Chi2 36636
Pseudo R2 0.353
Marginal effects for Probit; * significant at 






Table 4 Analysis of CTR within keywords testing the role of position on CTR (standard errors 
are in parentheses) 
(1) (2) (3)
Random Effect Tobit Fixed Effect, OLS Fixed Effect, OLS
Independent Variable ln (CTR) ln (CTR) CTR
Impressions -9.794e-07*
[4.719e-07]
ln (Impressions) 1.238*** -0.705***
[0.0162] [0.0210]
position -0.504*** -0.104*** -9.268e-03***
[0.0473] [0.0175] [1.197e-03]
position^2 0.0145** 0.00295 5.996e-04***
[0.00517] [0.00235] [8.993e-05]
Const -11.84*** -0.0630 4.349e-02***
[0.101] [0.0747] [2.524e-03]
sigma_u 3.197*** -- --
[0.0741]
sigma_e 4.603*** -- --
[0.0271]
Word Dummy Included -- yes yes
No. Groups 1,117 1,083 1,083
n 90,719 17,799 90,719
F (OLS) / Wald Chi2 (Tobit) 6127 845.8 21.53
Adj. R-squared -- 0.9168 0.1938
Standard errors in brackets for Tobit, Robust standard errors in brackets for OLS (clustered on 






Table 5 Analysis of CR across keywords testing the role of keyword specificity on CR (standard 
errors are in parentheses) 
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS





position 6.703e-04 9.354e-02 -9.521e-02
[1.547e-03] [2.133e-01] [2.656e-01]
position^2 -1.723e-05 -7.198e-03 1.409e-02
[2.746e-05] [2.790e-02] [3.532e-02]
Const 1.191e-02** -2.415e+00*** -3.380e+00***
[4.596e-03] [3.504e-01] [4.290e-01]
Word Dummy Included no no no
n 1,117 181 181
F 3.282 58.08 7.811
Adj. R-squared 5.692e-04 0.4942 0.1873
Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered on word); * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%  
 
Table 6 Analysis of CTR within keywords testing the role of position on CTR (t statistics are in 
parentheses) 
(1) (2) (3)
Random Effect Tobit Random Effect Tobit Fixed Effect, OLS
Independent Variable ln (CR) ln (CR) ln (CR)
ln (Impressions) 0.372*** -0.447***
[0.0726] [0.0565]
position 0.978* 1.589*** 0.156
[0.454] [0.440] [0.103]
position^2 -0.208** -0.274*** -0.00144
[0.0641] [0.0633] [0.0154]
Const -23.16*** -22.58*** -0.0502
[0.946] [0.922] [0.255]
sigma_u 0.265*** 0.261*** --
[0.0253] [0.0249]
sigma_e 8.644*** 8.617*** --
[0.309] [0.307]
Word Dummy Included -- -- yes
No. Groups 1,117 1,117 181
n 17,917 17,917 681
F (OLS) / Wald Chi2 (Tobit) 48.26 23.41 24.31
Adj. R-squared -- -- 0.9162
Standard errors in brackets for Tobit, Robust standard errors in brackets for OLS (clustered on 






Table 7 Robustness Check on CTR Across Advertisers on Platform 4 (t statistics are in 
parentheses) 
(1) (2) (3)
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3
Independent Variable ln (CTR) ln (CTR) ln (CTR)
ln (Impressions) -0.350*** -0.705*** -0.157***
(0.032) [0.0210] (0.027)
position -0.420*** -0.104*** -0.307***
(0.061) [0.0175] (0.034)
position^2 0.031*** 0.00295 0.010***
(0.006) [0.00235] (0.001)
Const -0.687*** -0.0630 -1.896***
(0.126) [0.0747] (0.191)
Word Dummy Included yes yes yes
No. Clusters 584 1,083 566
n 29,337 17,799 2,979
F 83.967 845.8 61.87
Adj. R-squared 0.736 0.9168 0.829
Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered on word); * significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%  
Table 8 Robustness Check on CR Across Advertisers on Platform 4 (t statistics are in 
parentheses) 
(1) (2) (3)
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3
Independent Variable ln (CR) ln (CR) ln (CR)
ln (Impressions) -0.525*** -0.447*** -0.755***
(0.033) [0.0565] (0.077)
position 0.105 0.156 0.027
(0.122) [0.103] (0.227)
position^2 0.005 -0.00144 0.001
(0.015) [0.0154] (0.014)
Const 1.542*** -0.0502 1.943*
(0.234) [0.255] (0.794)
Word Dummy Included yes yes yes
No. Clusters 284 181 95
n 9,429 681 235
F 85.698 24.31 36.731
Adj. R-squared 0.487 0.9162 0.935
Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered on word); * significant at 5%; 





Table 9 Robustness Check on CTR Across Platforms (t statistics are in parentheses) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Search Engine Ask MSN Yahoo Google
Independent Variable ln (CTR) ln (CTR) ln (CTR) ln (CTR)
ln (Impressions) -0.695*** -0.625*** -0.587*** -0.350***
(0.049) (0.071) (0.043) (0.032)
position 0.635 -0.191* -0.226*** -0.420***
(1.227) (0.075) (0.063) (0.061)
position^2 -0.236 0.009 0.015** 0.031***
(0.350) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006)
Const -0.520 -0.152 -0.328** -0.687***
(0.791) (0.226) (0.117) (0.126)
Word Dummy Included yes yes yes yes
No. Clusters 48.00 41.00 249.00 584.00
n 1,951 3,713 10,280 29,337
F 91.373 47.682 236.316 83.967
Adj. R-squared 0.789 0.873 0.796 0.736
Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered on word); * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%  
Table 10 Robustness Check on CR Across Platforms (t statistics are in parentheses) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Search Engine Ask MSN Yahoo Google
Independent Variable ln (CR) ln (CR) ln (CR) ln (CR)
ln (Impressions) -0.374** -0.315*** -0.475*** -0.525***
(0.113) (0.084) (0.052) (0.033)
position -18.774 0.335 0.250* 0.105
(10.251) (0.454) (0.098) (0.122)
position^2 6.858 -0.037 -0.015 0.005
(3.403) (0.091) (0.009) (0.015)
Const 12.819 0.228 1.220*** 1.542***
(6.721) (0.413) (0.185) (0.234)
Word Dummy Included yes yes yes yes
No. Clusters 23 28 96 284
n 341 359 2,281 9,429
F 192.076 5.668 32.439 85.698
Adj. R-squared 0.576 0.579 0.424 0.487
Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered on word); * significant at 5%; ** significant 












1 ~U[3.5 , 4.5] ~U[0.5, 2.5] ~U[0 , 1]
2 ~U[3.5 , 4.5] ~U[0.5, 2.5] ~U[1, 2]
3 ~U[3.5 , 4.5] ~U[0.5, 2.5] ~U[2 , 3]
Subsidized 
Bidder
Eq. (13) B1 Eq. (13) B2 Value [$/click]
2 -0.118 0.00445 ~U[1 , 2]
4 -0.301 0.011 ~U[1 , 2]








6 ~U[3.5 , 4.5] ~U[0.5, 2.5] v=1; b=Prop 2
7 ~U[3.5 , 4.5] ~U[0.5, 2.5] v=1; b=1
10





















X.  Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1.  1) The probability of consumer k  in group { },z A B∈  clicking 
on the thm  advertisement ( ,z mCTR ) , conditional on seeing the advertisement is: 
( ), , ,Prz m z m z kCTR sη= >  where ( )( )( )( )1 1, | ... 0m mz m zE Fη φ µ ω ω −= = = =  is the 
expectation of the thm order statistic for the probability that the advertiser will meet 
the need of the consumer in group z given that the consumer’s need has not yet been 
met (following Athey and Ellison (2008), 1,..., mω ω  are Bernoulli random variables 
equal to one with the probability that the consumers need was satisfied by the thm  
advertiser), and , ~z k zs G  is the search cost for the 
thk consumer in group z .  Using 
the fact that BG  first order stochastic dominates AG  and that 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )A BF F Fφ µ φ µ µ≥ ∀ , we have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , , ,Pr PrA k A m A A m B A m B B m B k B ms G G G sη η η η η< = > > = <  
Thus, , ,A m B mCTR CTR> .  AC  consumers from group A ( BC  consumers from group B) 
search high specificity words with probability Hα  ( Hβ ) and low specificity words 
with probability Lα ( Lβ ) where 1L Hα α+ =  ( 1L Hβ β+ = ).  Using the retention 
assumption we have that if 1 1H Hα β>  for position 1, it must be the case for all 
positions (note: ( ) ( )2 1 ,1 ,21H H A A AGα α η η= − ⋅ ). Given that 1 1H Hα β>  and defining 
, ,
m m
H A A m H B B mH
m m m
A H B H
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m m
L A A m L B B mL
m m m
A L B L








 it is 




position (i.e., H Lm mCTR CTR≥ ) and thus the average click through rate for M  positions 
is higher for high specificity words.   
2) The probability of clicking on position T  for group z  is 




1z z m z z T
m
CTR T Gη η
Τ−
=









−∏  represents the probability that 
the consumer has not been satisfied by any of the above advertisers and ( ),z z TG η  is 
the probability that the expected utility for the thT  position is less than the known 
search costs.  Given that , , 11   z m z m mη η +> ≥ ∀  and that ( ),z z mG η  is falling for lower 
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= − ⋅ − ⋅ .  The last two terms are 
less than one and by extension, ( )zCTR T  and the weighted average of the CTR for 
group A and B is decreasing in T .  






= ∑ .  Since 
( )( ),z m z mFη φ µ= , increasing µ  results in increasing probability that consumers will 
have their need met in any position.  The retention assumption states that more 
consumers are dropping out of the search process from negative expected search costs 
than having their need met.  Thus, ceteris paribus, higher quality-weights for the 
advertisers will result in higher average µ ,  and larger ,z mη  which will increase the 
CTR due to fewer consumers experiencing negative expected search costs in each 





Proof of Lemma 2.  Using the results from Lemma 1:  1) The conversion rate is 
defined as the probability of the advertiser meeting the consumers need conditional 
on clicking.  For consumer group z  and the thm  position, this is defined as: 
( )( ), ,z m z m z mCR Fη φ µ= = .  Since ( )( )A mFφ µ ( )( )B mFφ µ≥ , it follows that 
, ,A m B mCR CR≥ .  Following the methodology in Lemma 1, one can see that if 
1 1
H Hα β>  
and there are AC  consumers from group A and BC  consumers from group B, the 
position specific conversion rate high specificity words is greater than that for low 
specificity words ( H Lm mCR CR≥ ) and thus the average conversion rate for high 
specificity words is greater than that for low specificity words: H LCR CR≥ .   
2) Define the overall CR for position 1 as the weighted average of conversion rates 
from group A and group B (for notational simplicity the H or L subscript has been 
suppressed, though this is clearly for only one word specificity): 
( ) ( )1 1 ,1 1 ,1 1 1A A B B A BCR C C C Cα η β η α β= + + .  The proportion of group A (group B) 
consumers clicking on the second advertiser is ( ) ( )2 1 ,1 ,21A A A AC Gα α η η= −  
( ( ) ( )2 1 ,1 ,21B B B BC Gβ β η η= − ) where ,z mη  is defined in Lemma 1.  Thus, 2 1CR CR>  
when: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 ,1 ,2 ,2 ,1 ,1 ,2 ,1 ,2
2 2 2 2
1 ,1 ,2 ,1 ,2 1 ,1 ,2 ,1 ,2
1 1
                1 1 0
A B A A A A B B B B A B
A A A A A A B B B B B B
C C G G
C G C G
α β η η η η η η η η
α η η η η β η η η η
   − − − − −   
   − − − − − − >   
 
The second and third terms are both negative and reflect the fact that the ,z mCR  falls 




lower variance, such that ( )( ) ( )( )1 0z m z mF Fφ µ φ µ + − →  , the magnitude of these 
terms fall.  The magnitude of the first term determines the sign.  While 
,2 ,1 ,1 ,2A B A Bη η η η   − < −    , the Retention Assumption allows for the possibility that 
the first term is positive and could potentially balance out the next two terms.  Thus, 
under the conditions discussed here, it is possible that the conversion rate could 
increase between the first and second positions and by extension, positions further 
down the list of advertisers. ⊗  
 
Proof of Proposition 2.  Proof of this strategy as a truth-dominant equilibrium 
strategy requires proof of three items: 1) The strategy always maintains the correct 
ordering of bidder score (i.e., * *1 1j j j jq b q b− −< ); 2) There is no profitable deviation to a 
lower a position; and 3) there is no profitable deviation to a higher position.  I prove 
each of these below: 
1) The strategy always maintains the correct ordering of bidder score.  Given that: 
( ) ( )* 1 1 1j jj j j j j j j j jb v CTR v CTR q P q CTR− − − = ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅   and 
( )* 1 1j j j jb P q CTR+ += ⋅ where jP  is the effective payment in dollars and quality points 
that must be paid by the thj  advertiser. It follows: 
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Given the assumption that every advertiser experiences a negative externality by the 
advertiser above her, we know that 1j jj jv v δ
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⋅ ⋅ + > ⋅ ⋅ >
−
 
The second inequality ( jj j j jv q CTR P⋅ ⋅ > ) must always be true for the VCG auction.  
That is, no advertiser will pay in dollars or quality-weights more than their value and 
assigned quality weight (or else they could bid zero and pay zero).  Similarly, no 
advertiser will pay exactly as much as they value the slot (a slightly lower value that 
does not change the advertiser ordering induces the same payment).   
2) There is no profitable deviation to a lower position.  Assuming the converse, we 
compare the profit from truth-telling with the profit from deviating lower j j′ > : 
 




j j j j j j j j
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v CTR P q v CTR P q





⋅ − < ⋅ −
⋅ − ⋅ − − >
 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 0
j j
i i
j i j i i j i j
i j i j





⋅ − ⋅ − − >∑ ∑  
Noting that ( )11 1 1 1 1i ii i i i i i iP v CTR v CTR q P++ + + + += ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ +  yields: 
 ( ) ( )1 11 1 1 1 11 0
j j
i i i i
j i i i i i j i j i
i j i j
q v CTR v CTR q v CTR v CTR
′ ′
+ +
+ + + + +
= =
⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ >∑ ∑  
There are two types of advertisers who could experience a negative externality from 
the advertiser above them: T-type and K-type.  T-type advertiser’s per click values 
are independent of position which reduces the above inequality to: 
( )( )1 1 1 0
j
i i j j i i
i j








K-type advertiser’s per click values depend on position, but in the same way, and thus 
can be represented as: 1 1 1
m
j j m mv CV CTRκ
+
+ += ⋅ ⋅  for the 
thj  advertiser and thm  
position.  Again this allows the above inequality to be simplified to: 
( )( )1 1 1 1 0
j
i i j j i i i i
i j
q q CV CTR CV CTRκ κ
′
+ + + +
=
⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ >∑ .  If the K-type advertisers want 
to move up, it must be the case that: 1 1i i i iCV CTR CV CTR+ +⋅ > ⋅ .  And based on the 
actual ordering, 1 1i i j jq qκ κ+ +⋅ < ⋅  which also invalidates the above inequality.  Thus, 
there is no profitable deviation below the truthful position. 1stj +  
3) There is no profitable deviation to a higher position.  Assuming the converse, we 
compare the profit from truth-telling with the profit from deviating higher j j′ < .  
Taking some liberties with the above notation, we have:  
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⋅ − ⋅ − − <∑ ∑  
 ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0
j j
i i i i
j j i j i i i i i i
i j i j
q v CTR v CTR v CTR v CTR q
− −
+ +
+ + + + +
′ ′= =
⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ <∑ ∑  
Using an identical methodology to the proof that it is not optimal to deviate to a lower 
position for T-type or K-type advertisers, one can see that the above inequality must 
be weakly positive and thus it is not optimal to deviate to a higher position.  The only 
case where the above inequality equals zero is when 1j j′ = − .  To see this: 
( ) ( )1 11 1 0j j j jj j j j j j j j j jq v CTR v CTR v CTR v CTR q− −− −⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ = .  This proves that any 
advertiser is exactly indifferent to swapping scores with the advertiser above her (i.e., 





Proof to Corollary to Proposition 2.  Following the proof laid out by Edelman et al. 
(2007), the matching literature makes clear that an advertiser optimal equilibrium 
must exist in the set of stable matching assignments (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).  
Here advertiser optimal is described as profit maximization.  Let 
( )1 2 3, , ,..., MP p p p p=  be the set of payments in the bidder optimal stable 
assignment.  Similarly, let ( )1 2 3, , ,...,V V V V VMP p p p p=  be the set of payments described 
under Proposition 2.  For the bidder optimal assignment, it must be the case that in the 
lowest position, 1 1M M M Mp CTR q v+ +≥ ⋅ ⋅  or the first rejected bidder (i.e., the one in the 
1stM +  position would bid for the thM  position).  In the Proposition 2 strategy, it is 
the case that 1 1
V
M M M Mp CTR q v+ += ⋅ ⋅  and thus, 
V
M Mp p= .  In the bidder optimal stable 
assignment, it must be the case that ( )11 1M MM M M M M M Mp p q v CTR v CTR−− −− ≥ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅  or 
the bidder in the thM  position would choose to be in the 1stM − .  From this it follows 
that:  
 




M Mp p− −=  and following the same methodology we have that 
VP P= .  Thus, 






=∑  is the lowest from the class of stable assignments.  ⊗  
 
Proof to Proposition 3.  The B-type advertisers in 4M  report scores only slightly 




advertisers from moving into 3M  but allows them to avoid rejection.  If any 
advertiser deviates and bids less, they will drop out of the auction and make zero 
profit.  If any advertiser deviates and bids more, they will win a higher position which 
is strictly lower ranked due to the fact that values are rising for positions lower in the 
list. The search engine will randomly assign an ordering to the advertisers in this 
group. 
The 3M  advertisers follow a strategy similar to the Proposition 2 except for 
the first and last advertisers.  As proven in Proposition 2, there are no profitable 
deviations for these advertisers in the middle of 3M .  The lowest advertiser ( 3K ) bids 
with respect to the first rejected advertiser who would like to move into 3M .  That is, 
this advertiser bids as if the 4M  group did not exist.  Deviating and bidding less 
would cause 6R  to capture the 3K  position.  Then all the advertisers in 4M   will bid 
more than this bid to force the deviating advertiser out of the auction earning that 
advertiser zero profit.  Deviating and bidding more such that this lowest advertiser 
wins the next higher position would earn the advertiser zero incremental profit (i.e., 
as in Proposition 2, the lowest advertiser in this group is indifferent to her position or 
the position above her at the equilibrium price).  The highest advertiser in this group 
( 2 1K + ) must bid the amount that makes her indifferent from advancing to the next 
higher position.  Given that the group of advertisers in 2M  are optimally located in 
2M , they will always bid higher than this advertiser’s bid.  Thus, this highest 
advertiser bids an amount that makes her indifferent to moving into the lowest 




The advertisers in 1M  follow a strategy similar to Proposition 2 except for the 
lowest advertiser.  This advertiser bids an amount that would make her indifferent to 
the position above her except that she bids with respect to the largest negative 
externality she imposes on those advertisers below her.  This may not be the negative 
externality imposed on advertiser 2 1K + .  Deviating and bidding less than this would 
cause an advertiser from 2M  to move into her position reducing the profit of the 1K  
advertiser.  Deviating and bidding more would be non-optimal, as shown in the proof 
to Proposition 2.   
The advertisers in 2M  all bid the same amount such that the search engine 
randomly assigns them to position.  If they deviate, they either move down a position 
guaranteeing lower profit or up a position guaranteeing lower profit. 
A few special cases.  1) If there is only 1 advertiser in 1M , this advertiser bids 
according to the 1K  advertiser.  As described in Advertiser Scenario 1, this prevents 
the 2M  advertisers from bidding away all the profit of the sole 1M  advertiser.  2) If 
there are no 2M  advertisers, then all advertisers follow the 3M  strategy with the top 
advertiser bidding value. 3) if there is only 1 advertiser in 2M  (or the max value is 
equally close to both 1M  and 3M ), this advertiser will bid the lower amount 
{ }* 3maxm SS M ε= + .  This advertiser is indifferent to any bid between { }1minS M ε−  
and { }3maxS M ε+ , but will always break ties by bidding the lower value.  This is 




are indifferent to bidding above the next higher bidder, but remain at the lower bid 
level. ⊗  
 
Proof to Corollary to Proposition 3.  Consider two groups of identically sized T-
type advertisers with identical quality-weights where the sequence of scores for the 
advertisers in groups 1 ( 1T ) and group 2 ( 2T ) are such that 1 2T T≥  in piecewise 
fashion.  Search engine revenue is defined as: 
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Comparing search engine revenue under the two advertiser scenarios yields:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
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Thus, search engine revenue is strictly larger when all scores are larger and all 
advertisers have the same quality-weights.  Similarly, consider any group of T-type 
advertisers where one or more T-type is replaced with an advertiser from 4M  (i.e., B-
type advertisers) or a single satiated advertiser that does not alter the BOO for T-type 
advertisers.  The scores of these new advertisers will be less than the T-type they 
replaced by nature of the bidding strategy in Proposition 3 (for single satiated bidder 
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